Norms in criminal organizations: Inside the evolution of social order

1. Norms in criminal organizations:Inside the evolution of social order Martin Neumann Ulf Lotzmann University of Koblenz

2. The problem • State monopoly of violence securing social order in modern societies • Enforcement of legal norms by the state: no vigilant justice • Criminal organizations • Absence of state monopoly of violence • Norm enforcement cannot be delegated to third party (i.e. state) • Lab for studying the evolution of social order

3. The problem • Two aspects: • Necessity of subjective interpretation of perception of social environment • Cognitive aspect • Authority (e.g. of state monopoly of violence) • Social differentiation • Social aspect • Necessity of socio-cognitivemodeling

4. The problem • Enforcement of commitment to criminal (covert) organisation • Sanctioning deviant behaviour: • Absence of state monopoly of violence • No recourse to court • Tension between self-interest and norm enforcement • What is legitimate aggression?

5. Normative Theory: modelling • Traditional modelling approach: • Game theory (e.g. Axelrod, 1986): • Three possible actions: cooperate, defect, sanction • Norm = cooperate • Aggression = sanction • Cognitive approaches (e.g. Emil, Savarimuthu) • More possible action • Norm recognition possible (Savarimuthu) • Norm innovation possible (Emil) • Aggression = sanction • Sanction recognition not discussed

6. Normative Theory: Sociology • Rational choice • Norms: behaviour regularity enforced by sanctions • Normative Theories • Problem: norm obedience in large anonymous societies (absence of sanctions) • internalisation, socialisation (Parsons) • small groups as role model for learning (Bicchieri) • Sanctions central element of norm enforcement

7. Normative Theory • Not considered: what is sanction at all? • In behavioural terms: • Sanction = aggression • loss of utility (e.g. fee for wrong parking) • feeling of shame (e.g. yelling) • physical restraint (e.g. prison) • death penalty • How and when interpret aggression as sanction?

8. Two cases • Question: impact of social structure (i.e. differentiation) on cognition • Two cases: Gradual scale of degree of organisational structure • Sicilian Cosa Nostra • High degree or organisation • Quasi political authority: social embedding • unstructured criminal networks • Self-interested association of peers • Rules more or less explicit • More or less open to self-interested manipulation • More or less (accepted) Authority • More or less stratification

9. CosaNostra Beginnings ca. in mid 19th century Protection of properties of landowners (living in cities abroad) Becoming a Mafiosi by being recognised as such Described as cultural phenomenon

10. CosaNostra Expansion of Business: Drug trafficking (Export of Heroin to USA) real estate (Sack of Palermo) Organisational growth Series of organizational innovations in the 20th century: Establishment of Cupola in 1950s Grand Hotel meeting 1957 Establishment of inter-provincial commission in 1970s Establishment of formal “bureaucratic” organizational structures

11. CosaNostra Covert organisation: Authority of hierarchy precarious Constant tension between organisational structure and personal interest Arlacchi: “Hobbesian society” Breakdown of Organisational hierarchy in Mafia wars 1st Mafia war 1961-63 2nd Mafia war 1981-83

12. CosaNostra 1st Mafia war (1961-1963: already tension between 2 Mafia families Trigger: alleged stealing of drugs Disobedience to acquittal of Cuploa decision Start of series of murders presumably initiated by 3rd party M. Cavataio who allegedly provoked the 1st Mafia war murdered in 1969

13. CosaNostra Mafia wars: Early 1980s: Power struggle At least 400 murders between 1981 and 1983 Victim of Corleoneser family (all rivals killed) S. Inzerillo murdered in the 2nd Mafia war 1981

14. Contrasting case • Gang of drug dealers, • established ca. 1990 • Network of peers • Trust between actors required • Self-interested association: making money Need for money laundering • three type of actors: • Black collar criminals • White collar criminals • Straw men

15. Contrasting case • Collapse ca. 2002 – 2005 • Series of murders: most of them killed • extortion among criminals: ‘Run on the bank’ • Cascading effect of spread of mistrust • Collapse described as ‘rule of terror’ • Governed not by ruler (e.g. Nero), but by an invisible hand • ‚corrupt chaos‘ • ‚Old friends killing each other‘

16. Brief comparison • Network: No organizational structure • Lack of authority for norm enforcement and conflict resolution • Consequence: group terminated during crisis • Contrast to Cosa Nostra • Formal organizational structures: 2nd level of sociality • Organizations: (dis)trust in persons ≠ (dis)trust in organization • While Mafiosi frequently distrust and kill each other, distrust in Mafiosi does not lead to distrust in Mafia • Network: (dis)trust in persons = (dis)trust in network • No organizational memory or learning (e.g. of modes of conflict resolution)

17. Modelling the cases • Two models: • Model of Mafia war • Organizational failure • Breakdown of social order • Model of collapse of criminal network • Breakdown of trust • Escalation of violence • Objective • aggression: punishmentor revenge (cognition)? • Impact of formal structure on system’s behaviour (society)?

18. Modelling • Mafia: obedience to authority • Loss of trust: Recoverable • Contrasting case: self-commitment • Loss of trust: (once a point of no return has been passed) not recoverable

19. Mafia war: Model structure

20. Mafia war: Model structure Ordinary business • Soldiers walk randomly through the world • If they arrive at patch with shop they extort • Hand over the money to their Capo • Capo distributes money among its soldiers • If shop outside territory: Capo sanctions soldiers • Learning of territorial borders • In absence of sanctions gradually forget • If Capo unsatisfied with income: stop sanctioning soldiers

21. Mafia war: Model structure Ordinary conflict resolution • exploited Capo complaints at Cupola • Cupola sanctions deviant Capo • Adjustment of probability that Capo will sanction his soldiers • Organisational hierarchy • Efficient only under certain conditions • Dependent on Capo: Comparison between income (individual interest) and norm obedience (commitment to organization) • Dependent on reliability of Cupola

22. Mafia war: Model structure Conflict escalation: preconditions • Agents have: • aggression level • friendship network • FamilyAttitude • - 1 <= FamilyAttitude <= + 1 • Hostility • Loyalty

23. Mafia war: Model structure If Cupola sanction inefficient or constant deviation of one capo: • Plan murder • Send to Friendship network: • May be accepted or denounced: • Dependent on family attitude • Denouncement triggers revenge • Who to murder? • Typically first ‘giving a sign’ • murder of top level strategically planned: • Dependent on family attitude in other family • Hostile take over

24. Mafia war: simulation results Blue family reveals peaks of deviant behaviour Sanctions by Cupola Unsanctioned foreign Extortion

25. Mafia war: simulation results Pink family early looses power Blue family gradually looses power during deviant behaviour peaks of low sanction probability which recover due to sanctions Strength of family Capo sanction probability

26. Mafia war: simulation results • Hostile take-over of families • Entails peace agreement • Increases reliability and authority of Cupola • Enables recovering of social order (2nd Mafia war)

27. Mafia war: simulation results • Summary: • Episodes of peace and war: long periods of peace interrupted by short outbreaks of war (Some parameter constellations) • Semi-stability of social order • System of self-organized criticality • Cognitive aspect: • Switch from peace to war = switch from punishment to revenge • Once one party reacts with revenge others retaliate: • undermining of authority • After war = switch back to punishment • Impact of social structure: • Interpretation as punishment = obedience to authority • Stability of social order dependent on reliability of authority • Hostile take-over: mechanism to re-establish peace and authority

28. Contrasting case: Model structure Conceptual model: A model of conflict escalation

29. Contrasting case: Model structure • Crystallising kernel of mistrust • Becoming disreputable • External event such as someone becoming too greedy • Aggression: • An attack to the life of M. (survived) • Interpreting aggression: • M. told the newspapers ‘about my [V01] role in the network’ because he thought that I wanted to kill him to get the money.

30. Contrasting case: Model structure shown as flow chart for conceptual model action „perform aggressive actions against member X“

31. Contrasting case: Model structure shown as Data Dependency Graph of the DRAMS model „perform aggressive actions against member X“

32. Contrasting case: Model structure shown as flow chart for conceptual model action „member X interprets aggressive action“

33. Contrasting case: model structure shown as Data Dependency Graph of the DRAMS model „member X interprets aggressive action“

34. Contrasting case: Model output *** 1.0 *** 1.0:0 [global.external event: make random criminal disreputable] "Criminal ReputableCriminal-1 has become disreputable due to an unknown (external) event." 1.0:1 [global.decline reputation of member X] "Reputation of criminal ReputableCriminal-1 drops from high to low ." Time to run: 0.133 seconds *** 2.0 *** 2.0:1 [ReputableCriminal-5.plan aggressive actions against members X - rational] "ReputableCriminal-5 has rationally decided to threat ReputableCriminal-1 due to the latter's low reputation." 2.0:2 [ReputableCriminal-5.plan threatening action - rational] "ReputableCriminal-5 decides to threat ReputableCriminal-1 by putting a gun into the stomach ." 2.0:3 [ReputableCriminal-5.perform aggressive actions against members X] "ReputableCriminal-5 is attacking ReputableCriminal-1 by putting a gun into the stomach." 2.0:4 [global.evaluate consequences of aggression for member] "ReputableCriminal-1 has suffered an attack ( putting a gun into the stomach ) and is alive" Time to run: 0.233 seconds

35. Conclusion • Comparison • Both cases: vigilant justice possible • Not justice but revenge • Breakdown of social order • Justice recoverable in case of organization • Acceptance of authority: precarious social order • Replacement of revenge by punishment • Not recoverable in case of network • Retaliation and revenge

36. Conclusion • Impact of social structure on cognition • Evolution of social order • validity of norms is guaranteed by certain form of hierarchy • Authority precondition for sanctioning • Social differentiation • difference punishment and revenge: • punishment might stop once the punishment has been applied while revenge might lead to endless circle (Compare blood revenge). • Social differentiation mode of conflict resolution • Social differentiation secures stability of social order

37. Thank you