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Ethics and Critical Thinking: Terminology

Ethics and Critical Thinking: Terminology. Descriptions and Definitions. Expectations of Ethical Theories. Questions we want an ethical theory to answer for us: Which acts are right and which are wrong? How do we know which acts we ought to perform?

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Ethics and Critical Thinking: Terminology

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  1. Ethics and Critical Thinking: Terminology Descriptions and Definitions

  2. Expectations of Ethical Theories • Questions we want an ethical theory to answer for us: • Which acts are right and which are wrong? How do we know which acts we ought to perform? • What makes a particular act right or wrong? What is it about an action that determines its moral status? • How do we know what is right and wrong? • Moral reasoning is concerned with decisions to act and their justification. Since moral reasoning is practical, what underlies its conclusions are desires, intentions, and actions or feelings and convictions that can motivate desires, intentions, and actions. • Relativism's answer: Lying is wrong for an agent of society S if and only if (iff) the moral code accepted in society S says that lying is wrong. • Morality is dependent on the moral code of one's culture. • This is a view we founding inadequate.

  3. Normative Ethics • However, we have already seen that there is no Archimedean standpoint in or consensus for ethics. There is no theory that everyone agrees with. • Rich heritage but perhaps we are in the infancy of ethical theory—some believe we have been forced to redouble our efforts since the “death of God.” • Justification of moral principles proceeds independently of religion. Neither fideism (with its abandonment of rationality) nor an ill-formed conscience (let your conscience be your guide) can assure that a moral agent's actions are right. • Two basic approaches—consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories

  4. Consequentialism • The view that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by the value of its consequences rather than by the intentions of the agent or the principle that motivated the action. • If in a sum of the consequences of an action, the good consequences outweigh the bad, the action is good. • Consequences are held to determine rightness. • Consequentialist ethical theories are distinguished by the answers to questions such as: Consequences for whom? What consequences?

  5. Ethical Egoism vs. Utilitarianism • Ethical egoism holds that actions are moral if the consequences of those actions bring about more good than harm to the individual performing that action. • Utilitarianism holds that actions are moral if the consequences of those actions bring about greatest happiness for the greatest number of people (considering everyone affected). • In either view, the rightness or wrongness is solely a function of an action’s results or consequences. (teleological—an action is right or wrong according to its purpose or goal)

  6. Ethical Egoism defined-1 • Ethical egoism holds that actions are moral if and only if (iff) the consequences of those actions bring about more good than harm to the *agent performing that action. The ethical egoist holds that everyone should act and judge by the standard of his or her own long-term advantage.(Further references are to EE). • *Agent = individual or corporation

  7. Ethical Egoism defined-2 • Ethical egoism: an agent ought to do (and only ought to do) what is in his/her/its best interest over the long run. Our only duty is to do what is best for ourselves . • Ethical egoism is sometimes confused with another view that Rachels discusses: psychological egoism. It's very important to keep these views distinguished.

  8. Psychological Egoism Defined 1 • Psychological egoism—every human action is motivated by self-interest alone (64). Moreover, all human actions are motivated by selfish desires; the only thing ultimately driving human action is self-interest. People always try to promote their own self-interest, which ultimately is the sole motivation for human action. PE is a theory of human psychology.

  9. Psychological Egoism Defined 1 • Is altruism possible? See examples in text. • Wallenberg, Buffet, Gates, etc. Nobility and self-sacrifice is an illusion. • Arguments for PE: the person is merely doing what he or she most wants to do (65). • PE asserts: Any action I perform is prompted by my motives, my desires; and if my action is successful as intended, I will gain satisfaction. So, all action is motivated by self-interest.

  10. Psychological Egoism-Rachels' Objections—1 • Reinterpreting motives doesn't prove PE correct—it only shows that it is possible to interpret motives egoistically. • #1—People never voluntarily do things that they don't want to?—Not true, we often do things out of obligation rather than our strongest desire. Even if we always act on our desires, we may have unselfish desires. • #2—We do unselfish actions to "produce a sense of self-satisfaction." It's foolish to say that because someone derives satisfaction from helping others that they are selfish. The good feelings or sense of satisfaction are a by-product of helping others. • Subway example as unselfish desire (68).

  11. Psychological Egoism-Confusions—2 • PE attempts to find a single formula that explains all behavior—the urge for simplicity is misguided in this case. • Selfishness  Self-interest. Brushing one's teeth, going to a doctor are self-interested but not selfish. Selfishness ignores the interests of others—ex. hoarding food when others are starving. • Self-interested behavior  pursuit of pleasure. Ex. smoking is pleasurable for some but not self-interested. Thus, not all actions are done from self-interest. • Concern with one's own welfare is compatible with a concern for the welfare of others. Much, but not all, of human behavior can be interpreted as motivated by self-interest. However, PE seems irrefutable, once adopted. • Once PE is accepted as a controlling hypothesis, nothing is allowed to count against it—PE thus becomes un-testable and un-falsifiable. • Motivations besides self-interest: greed, anger, lust, revenge, love, hate, jealousy, curiosity, worry, inspiration, etc. PE cannot account for Othello's jealousy and Rigoletto's revenge, where self-interest is ignored.

  12. Psychological Egoism-Objections • From the fact that I am always motivated by my desires and my motives, it doesn't follow that I am always motivated by selfish or self-interested desires. • What makes a desire/motive mine? The origin or source of the desire is in me. • What makes a desire/motive selfish? the object of the desire is my good. • Although I may always be motivated by my desires, it's questionable that my motivating desires are always self-interested. The object of my desire could be the good of someone else.

  13. Psychological Egoism-Objections • Even if we always get satisfaction from an action, it doesn't follow that our satisfaction was the object or goal (an airplane burns fuel in crossing the ocean, but burning fuel is not the goal or objective or purpose of the flight). Some things are simply side-effects of what we do, not their object. • We can have the object of saving someone from drowning and experience satisfaction that our attempt was successful as a side effect. • Not all successful actions bring us satisfaction: remember the saying "Be careful what you wish for, you may get it!" Dissatisfaction is common even when you get what you want.

  14. Psychological Egoism—Objections • When we say that self-interest is a fact of human nature, that everyone looks out for number 1, and that concern with comfort, excitement, self-esteem, power or other advantage of the agent is inevitable, we are forced to conclude that even altruism is disguised self-seeking. But in that case, anything that provides me with a motive must be a desire of mine. • PE becomes true by definition and hence not an explanatory theory. It’s trivially true, empty, not falsifiable. • Self-interest is not, in fact, a motive. • We can have as our object an act to give pleasure to others or help others. Would we want to say that an act to give pleasure to or to help the other person is wrong?

  15. PE vs. EE—Big Differences • EE is a reflective ethical position that asserts that we ought to maximize our self-interest. • PE is not a reflective ethical position. It asserts that the only motive for all voluntary behavior is self-interest or self-love, and we cannot knowingly act otherwise—we must behave selfishly. • PE cannot be a theory for guiding human conduct if we cannot do otherwise. If it is not falsifiable, i.e., it can’t be proven wrong; hence, it’s not an effective, meaningful theory.

  16. Moreover, PE Doesn’t Support EE • Psychological egoism would not support EE even if it were true. • Since according to PE we can only act in our own interest, it makes no sense to say that we ought to. PE renders EE useless since we could not do otherwise than seek our own good. • PE deprives morality of any significance. PE says we cannot help but be preoccupied with our own happiness and interests and any moral view can only tell us to do what we must do.

  17. Ethical Egoism refined-1 • Ethical egoism: an agent ought to do (and only ought to do) what is in his/her/its best interest over the long run. • EE takes a reflective position—what ought to happen is that people pursue their self-interest. There is no duty to help starving people or balance our interests against the interests of others. • EE says that our only duty is to do what is best for ourselves (69) and ONLY what is best for ourselves. • Although self-interest is our guiding principle, I may have to promote giving a helping hand to others to create a benefit for myself. The benefit to others is not what makes the act right: the fact that the action is to one's advantage is what makes it right.

  18. Arguments for EE-#1 • Altruism is self-defeating—it is best that we each look after our own interests because it will work out best for everyone if everyone pursues his or her own interest. Charity is degrading and intrusive. Ayn Rand’s view. • This is not an argument for EE at all. It suggests that we ought to behave the way an egoist would recommend, but the ultimate source of justification is the betterment of everyone's condition—BUT the principle of beneficence is not compatible with EE. • Ethical egoism: an agent ought to do (and only ought to do) what is in his/her/its best interest over the long run; AND whether or not something is in one's best interests over the long run is what makes it the morally right or wrong thing for one to do.

  19. Arguments for EE-#2 • Ayn Rand thought altruism a destructive idea. (71) Moral views other than EE do not respect the value of the individual. The Individualistic argument asserts: One's own life is of supreme importance. A morality of altruism requires one to sacrifice one's life/values to help others. Therefore a morality of altruism does not appropriately value the individual. • This argument depends for its plausibility on extreme cases: either one gives one's own interests no weight or absolute weight.(See 73). • It may be wrong to entirely sacrifice oneself for others, but this doesn't support the idea that one should give his or her interests absolute weight. Our interests and the interests of others both have weight.

  20. Arguments for EE-#3 • Explanatory argument: EE explains our actual moral practices and ordinary judgments about what is right and wrong. On this approach EE is not a challenge to commonsense morality, but an attempted explanation and systematization of it. The commonsense duties not to harm others, not to lie, and to keep are promises are all based on self-interest. EE leads to the Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have them do unto you (Hobbes). • However, EE does not show it is always to one's advantage to refrain from harming others—if you can gain from harming others, you should, according to EE. But EE doesn't square with our ordinary practices: normally, lying/ cheating/ torture is considered wrong even if it has good consequences for ourselves.

  21. Ethical Egoism Restated • One ought always to maximize one’s own personal good as an end. EE is morally binding on everyone. • Egoists need not be selfish—look upon the well-being or happiness of others or causes such as helping the starving or saving the environment as a way to maximize their own good. Can’t judge by behavior, only by the motivations for action. We should care about others because it's in our own self-interest. The reason we should obey the rule against harming others is that the rule protects us too. But this doesn't explain why we should happily break the rules as in the Gyges case. Do we help the starving because it's to our advantage or just to help the starving people? Care about others independently of our self-interest.

  22. Egoism—Misconceptions • Egoists only do what they like—sacrifice for your own good. • Not all egoists believe in hedonism—the doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the sole or chief good in life. The end may be knowledge, power, self-actualization. • Egoists cannot act for the good of others—if it advances self-interest they can. We do not have a duty to help others unless it benefits us (the agent). • No obligation to bring about the greater good of others—that’s utilitarianism.

  23. Ethical Egoism—Objections 1 • Not a sound theory—all motivations are really self-interested—to act altruistically is wrong? • Not an effective theory to guide human conduct—break the rules if it’s in your interest —allows blatant misdeeds. How successful is it?—leads to greediness & selfishness when it is misinterpreted. • Consequentialist position—maximize value in the consequences of our actions—do you know the consequences of all the choices open to you?—how are we to judge correctly the consequences of even a single act? EE is concerned with long-term good. Difficult to apply even in principle—impractical.

  24. Ethical Egoism—Objections 2 • Not a sound theory because it leads to contradictions. • Baier’s argument is not convincing (See page 76). • Illicit assumption. The charge of self-contradiction fails. • If EE were in fact applied, how could we trust anyone or resolve competing goods (ends)? • Could or should we assume a harmony among competing goods (ends) to be maximized? • What’s to be done when what is good for one genuinely conflicts with what is good for the other? • Abortion Divorce

  25. Ethical Egoism—Objections 3 • Egoism’s incompleteness as a moral stance. • EE takes no stand against seemingly outrageous acts like stealing, murder, racial or sexual discrimination, deliberately false advertising, and wanton pollution. All such actions are morally neutral until the test of self-interest is applied. • Accept EE if and only if doing so would maximize your own good. However, when the good of others conflicts with your good, one party must prevail, so by everyone’s accepting and trying to follow EE, some will end up not maximizing their good.

  26. Ethical Egoism—Objections 4 • EE is self-defeating as a guide to conduct when all other agents are maximizing their own interests. When interests conflict there’s no egoistic rule to resolve conflicts. • Just as in the case of the “paradox of hedonism,” [that happiness cannot be found by pursuing it for its own sake, but can only result from something else which we are pursing is the "paradox of hedonism"] egoists do worse at promoting their interests than people who adopt a moral stance where conditional cooperation takes the place of maximizing self-interest.

  27. Rachels' Non-Arbitrariness Principle • I am justified in treating people differently only if I can point to some factual difference between them that (morally) legitimates the differential treatment. • This is what's at issue in arguments against nepotism, racism, virulent nationalism or sexism. Can someone who engages in nepotism point to something special about his relatives beyond that they're his relatives? • Can the racist point to relevant differences that would make differential treatment appropriate?

  28. Rachels' Non-Arbitrariness Principle • Rachels' objection is that ethical egoism is an arbitrary moral doctrine: EE would have each person assign greater weight to his or her interests. However, there is no general difference between oneself and others to justify this differential treatment. So EE is unacceptably arbitrary. Draft Lottery—people received an equal chance to go to Vietnam. Principle of Equal Treatment. EE divides the world into ourselves vs. the rest just as the racist does. • “This realization—that we are on a par with one another— is the deepest reason why our morality must recognize the needs of others. And that is why ultimately, Ethical Egoism fails as a moral theory (79).

  29. Rachels' Non-Arbitrariness Principle • Why can't the difference between oneself and others count as morally relevant? Am I justified in responding differently to threats against myself than to threats against others? [diffusion of responsibility and bystander effect.] • Does every difference in treatment of others have to be grounded in a moral difference? Is the fact than someone is a relative or a neighbor a basis for special treatment? If so, why? • What counts as a "morally relevant difference" between people? What makes us value one person more than another?

  30. Ethical Egoism—Further Objections • In economic affairs, The Wealth of Nations (1776) popularized the “invisible hand,” the idea that the individual who “intends only his gain” is, as it were, “led by an invisible hand to promote...the public interest.” • Many instances of concerted self-interested action, however, do not promote the public interest despite Adam Smith’s contention. • See “Tragedy of the Commons” below.

  31. “Tragedy of the Commons” • The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

  32. EE—Tragedy of the Commons” 2 • As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component. • 1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. • 2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision­making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1.

  33. EE—Tragedy of the Commons” 3 • Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

  34. EE—Tragedy of the Commons” • Thus EE, when practiced assiduously by individuals, is not only self-defeating, but also results in situations such as those described in the Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons.” • One writer, Russell Hardin in Collective Action, [no relation] perceptively calls it the back of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” • Problems involving tragedy of the commons include: over-fishing, pollution, population growth, etc. • People (maximizers or otherwise) must be coerced to cooperate in using finite resources.

  35. EE—Concluding Thoughts • People act out of their own self-interest? No. People often neglect or sacrifice their own interests to other passions and concerns. • Even if people interpret EE correctly, limitations in our knowledge of consequences may make EE impossible to apply practically. • You should accept EE iff doing so would maximize your good. This puts you on a collision course with other ethical egoists who are equally committed to maximizing their own good. Perhaps a better alternative is to maximize the good of all those affected by your actions. (Utilitarianism)

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