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Robert Neruda Vice Chairman Office for the Protection of Competition, the Czech Republic

Second Annual Conference on Competition Enforcement in the Recently Acceded Member States Brno 23 April 2010 Development of Competition Enforcement in the Czech Republic Important Decisions. Robert Neruda Vice Chairman Office for the Protection of Competition, the Czech Republic. Overview.

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Robert Neruda Vice Chairman Office for the Protection of Competition, the Czech Republic

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  1. Second Annual Conference on Competition Enforcement in the Recently Acceded Member StatesBrno 23 April 2010Development of Competition Enforcement in the Czech RepublicImportant Decisions Robert Neruda Vice Chairman Office for the Protection of Competition, the Czech Republic

  2. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  3. Background Organisational changes structure of the Competition Section Chief economist department Cartel department Devil's advocates' panel Policy changes willingness to enforce signaled more economic approach Prioritisation

  4. First instance decisions

  5. Cases Opened

  6. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  7. CartelsCases RPM campaign provisionally finished Export bans Sokolovská uhelná (lignite) KMV (soft drinks, settled) Pending bid rigging (evidence submitted by the police)

  8. CartelsOther important developments Leniency program rules on access to leniency file seeking a balance between LP and settlements joint application Self incrimination rules

  9. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  10. Abuse of dominanceDevelopment Focus on exclusionary conduct Pricing (margin squeeze, predatory pricing) But still some room for investigation of exploitation! RWE Transgas excessive advances for gas supply compensation of damages in settlement procedure

  11. Abuse of dominanceCases MUS (lignite) complaint on refusal to supply and discriminatory (excessive) pricing mutual business dependence between MUS and heating plant no dominance found despite very high market share (> 60 %) countervailing buyer power (dominance on purchase market) vertical integration of competitors case closed … … with controversy

  12. Abuse of dominanceCommitments RWE Transgas access to gas storage facilities parallel investigations by the Office and the regulator (ERU) commitments outside formal proceeding making 20 % of storage capacity available to competitors shortening of capacity reservation by 12 years lessons learned

  13. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  14. Mergers Crisis? What? Scarce interventions but structural commitments only (Agrofert/Agropol) painful revision of commitments Concept of undertaking definition of economic activity health insurance is not economic activity (HZP/ZP Agel) Are some mergers abandoned because of the threat of MEA?

  15. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  16. Courts Supreme Administrative Court Petrol stations cartel succession of liability - a Pyrrhic victory? automatic legal or economic continuity not available in the Czech law except for cases where transformation of company was motivated (at least partially) by the intention to evade consequences of violation of competition law fully applicable for 2001, but situation might have changed after 1 May 2004 (1 September 2009)

  17. Overview Background Cartels Abuse of dominance Mergers Courts Conclusions

  18. Conclusions Significant change of competition policy from formal to effect based approach Due process in cartel investigation Balance between leniency program and settlements Mergers as usually

  19. Thank you for your attention. For further information: Robert Neruda robert.neruda@compet.cz www.compet.cz

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