'Impossibility results' presentation slideshows

15-446 Distributed Systems Spring 2009

15-446 Distributed Systems Spring 2009. Final Review. 15-446 Distributed Systems Spring 2009. L-14 Security. Important Lessons - Security. Internet design and growth ? security challenges Symmetric (pre-shared key, fast) and asymmetric (key pairs, slow) primitives provide:

2.23k views • 196 slides

Byzantine Generals Problem

Byzantine Generals Problem. Anthony Soo Kaim Ryan Chu Stephen Wu. Overview. The Problem Two Solutions Oral Messages Signed Messages Missing Communication Paths Reliable Systems Conclusion. The Problem. Background. Important to have reliable computer systems

949 views • 58 slides

In Byzantium

In Byzantium. Advanced Topics in Distributed Systems Spring 2011 Imranul Hoque. Problem. Computer systems provide crucial services Computer systems fail Crash-stop failure Crash-recovery failure Byzantine failure

636 views • 50 slides

Computationally-Efficient Approximation Mechanisms (cont.)

526 views • 40 slides

Iftach Haitner , Jonathan Hoch, Omer Reingold and Gil Segev

Finding Collisions in Interactive Protocols A Tight Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Statistically-Hiding Commitments. Iftach Haitner , Jonathan Hoch, Omer Reingold and Gil Segev. Talk Outline. Statistically-hiding commitments Black-box lower bounds

393 views • 30 slides

Games and the Impossibility of Realizable Ideal Functionality

Games and the Impossibility of Realizable Ideal Functionality. Anupam Datta Ante Derek John C. MitchelL Ajith Ramanathan Andre Scedrov. Background. Games [GM84]: Defines specific moves for each player and properties that need to hold Not composable Examples: IND-CPA, IND-CCA for encryption

366 views • 30 slides

Class 37: Uncomputability

Class 37: Uncomputability. David Evans University of Virginia cs1120. Halting Problems Hockey Team. Project Updates. We will provide a server to host your web project externally <your site>. cs.virginia.edu e.g., overheardit.cs.virginia.edu.

316 views • 21 slides

Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions

Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions. Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Self-interested designers. There are three types of self-interested designers:

293 views • 18 slides