'Memory safety' presentation slideshows

Software Verification With Liquid Types

Software Verification With Liquid Types. Ranjit Jhala , UC San Diego (with Pat Rondon , Ming Kawaguchi). Software Verification. i nt min_index ( int [] a){ r = 0; n = a.length ; for (i = 0; i < n; i++){ if (a[i] < a[r]) r = i; } return r; }.

2.17k views • 206 slides

Software Security Memory corruption public enemy number 1

Erik Poll Digital Security Radboud University Nijmegen. Software Security Memory corruption public enemy number 1. Overview (next 2 weeks). How do memory corruption flaws work ? What can be the impact? How can we spot such problems in C(++) code? Next weeks: tool-support for this

797 views • 77 slides

Efficient, Context-Sensitive Detection of Real-World Semantic Attacks

Michael Bond Varun Srivastava Kathryn McKinley Vitaly Shmatikov University of Texas at Austin. Efficient, Context-Sensitive Detection of Real-World Semantic Attacks. Real Semantic Exploits & Efficient, Context-Sensitive Detection. How an applet loads a class.

897 views • 76 slides

Exploits Against Software and Defences

Exploits Against Software and Defences. Nicolas T. Courtois - U niversity C ollege L ondon. How to Break Into Computers?. Stack attacks: Chapter 10.4. SQL injection: not at the exam: see our lab. Defences: Chapter 10.7. Is that All?. There is MUCH more (not covered here):

776 views • 65 slides

Complete Memory-Safety with SoftBoundCETS

Complete Memory-Safety with SoftBoundCETS. Slides courtesy of Prof. Santosh Nagarakatte. Project goal: Make C/C++ safe and secure. Why? Lack of memory safety is the root cause of serious bugs and security vulnerabilities. Security Vulnerabilities due to Lack of Memory Safety.

570 views • 50 slides

Beyond Reachability: Shape Abstraction in the presence of Pointer Arithmetic

536 views • 37 slides

The Fail-Safe C to Java translator

The Fail-Safe C to Java translator. Yuhki Kamijima (Tohoku Univ.). Background. The programming language C does not guarantee memory safety This is the cause of memory attacks ex. buffer overflow attacks Attackers can obtain root privilege and operate freely

440 views • 32 slides

A Language for Programmable Hardware Security

A Language for Programmable Hardware Security. Chris Casinghino HILT 2018. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.

288 views • 28 slides

Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage Collection

Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage Collection. By Dinakar Dhurjati Joint work with Sumant Kowshik, Vikram Adve and Chris Lattner University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Motivation. Secure Online Upgrades in Embedded Systems.

371 views • 27 slides

863 views • 27 slides

Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage Collection

Memory Safety Without Runtime Checks or Garbage Collection. By Dinakar Dhurjati Joint work with Sumant Kowshik, Vikram Adve and Chris Lattner University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Motivation. Secure Online Upgrades in Embedded Systems.

281 views • 27 slides

Ensuring Code Safety Without Run-time Checks for Real-time Control Systems

Ensuring Code Safety Without Run-time Checks for Real-time Control Systems. -Presented by Sumant Kowshik Joint Work With Dinakar Dhurjati and Vikram Adve. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Supported by NSF U. Illinois. Motivation.

392 views • 22 slides

Differential Assertion Checking

Differential Assertion Checking. Shuvendu Lahiri Kenneth McMillan Rahul Sharma Chris Hawblitzel. Assertion Checking. void strcopy (char* dst , char* src , int size) { int i =0; for(; i <size-1 && * src ; i ++) * dst ++ = * src ++; * dst = 0; }. Given a program

240 views • 17 slides

Checking Memory Safety and Test Generation Using B last

Checking Memory Safety and Test Generation Using B last. By: Pashootan Vaezipoor. Computing Science Dept of Simon Fraser University. Memory Safety. A program is memory safe if: Only accesses objects it has allocated Or the ones that it has been granted access

273 views • 15 slides

Writing Systems Software in a Functional Language An Experience Report

124 views • 12 slides

The Software Model Checker B LAST

By D. Beyer et. al. The Software Model Checker B LAST. Presentation By: Pashootan Vaezipoor. Simon Fraser University (Spring 09). Introduction. Model Checking is a technique to verify a system desc against a spec Input: Program source (system desc) Temporal safty property (spec)

209 views • 9 slides