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The 2012 Presidential Election in Context

The 2012 Presidential Election in Context. POLI 423. The “Fundamentals”. The outcomes of [Presidential] elections depend almost entirely on “fundamentals,” not campaign resources and tactics, gaffes, etc. What are these fundamentals?

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The 2012 Presidential Election in Context

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  1. The 2012 Presidential Electionin Context POLI 423

  2. The “Fundamentals” • The outcomes of [Presidential] elections depend almost entirely on “fundamentals,” • not campaign resources and tactics, gaffes, etc. • What are these fundamentals? • First, most voters have made a “standing decision” to support one or other party and rarely vote otherwise. • Second, certain given facts (especially the state of the economy) largely determine how the remaining voters will vote (or how many other voters may change their “standing decision”). • But if the fundamentals point to a very close election, the other factors may determine the winner.

  3. Fundamental 1: Party Identification • First academic voting study, The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in Presidential Campaign, 1940 • Columbia University sociologists • emphasizing groups affiliations • local survey (Sandusky and Eire County, OH) • face-to-face personal interviews • panel survey (repeatedly interviewing same respondents) • control group • voting intentions fixed early and rarely changed • Index of Political Predisposition (IPP)

  4. Party Identification (cont.) • The American Voter, 1952 and 1956 • University of Michigan social psychologists political scientists • emphasizing opinions, attitudes, and orientation over group affiliations • national survey • face-to-face personal interviews • limited panel survey (pre- and post-election interviews) • “Michigan Studies” evolved into the NSF-funded (American) National Election Studies

  5. Party Identification (cont.) • Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what? • [If Dem/Rep] Would you call yourself a strong Dem/Rep or a not very strong Dem/Rep? • [If Ind] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party? • Party ID – Seven-Point Scale Strong Democrat Weak Democrat Democratic Leaner Pure Independent Republican Leaner Weak Republican Strong Republican Other, DK

  6. Long-term vs. Short-term Forces • Long-term forces determine the “normal vote.” • Long-term forces pertain to the distribution of Party ID. • A substantial imbalance in Party ID creates a “majority party” and “minority party” (as in the 1950s). • The normal vote is not simply the ratio of majority to minority party identifiers (about 3 to 2 in favor of Dems vs. Reps in the 1950s). • There is a “normal” rate of defection from party ID, which depends on the average strength of party ID • Any (equal) rate of defection relatively helps the minority party • “Normally” Independents split their votes equally between the parties • This also helps the minority party • Turnout increases with strength of party ID • For sociological reasons, Democratic identifiers tend to have lower turnout than Republican identifiers of the same strength and to defect at somewhat higher rates. • In 1950s, the normal vote was estimated to be ~53% Dem in high-turnout (Presidential) elections and ~54% in low-turnout (off-year Congressional) elections.

  7. Long-term vs. Short-term Forces (cont.) • Short-term forces pertain to a particular election and may cause the actual vote to deviate from the normal vote. • Short-term forces include: • Personal characteristics of the candidates (Ike in 1952 and 1956) • US Presidential vs. Congressional elections • US Presidential elections vs. UK general elections • State of the economy • The electorate tends to see the government as responsible for good/bad times, and the “the government” as basically the President, not Congress. • “political control of the economy” • timing of elections (UK vs. US) • Other circumstances or aspects of incumbent performance • e.g., war and peace, scandals • Short-term forces may be reinforcing or counter-balancing • Net short-term forces may be strong or weak • The normal vote may be more or less responsive to a given level of net short-term forces, • depending on the average strength of party ID.

  8. A Typology of Elections • Maintaining elections: • Short-term forces are relatively weak or counter-balancing, so • the actual vote is close to the normal vote, and • the normal majority party is “maintained” in power. • Deviating elections: • Short-term forces are strong and reinforcing, so • the actual vote deviates considerably from the normal vote, and either • the normal minority party wins the election, or • the normal majority party wins an unusual “landslide.” • 1948 as a maintaining election • 1952 and 1956 as deviating elections • 1960 as a “reinstating” election, i.e., a maintaining election following a deviating elections • Most (especially off-year) Congressional elections are maintaining.

  9. A Typology of Elections (cont.) • Realigning elections (or periods): • The long-term forces (the distribution of party ID) that are typically fixed themselves change. • Voters (groups) chose up sides in a different way. • Parties may switch majority vs. minority status. • 1932 (1928-1936) demarcating shift from “Fourth Party System” to “Fifth [New Deal] Party System” • 1952 was not realigning. • Has there been a realignment producing a “Sixth [or even Seventh] Party System” • Clearly yes, but the realignment has been “secular” (long and slow), rather than (relatively) abrupt. • Most obviously, the (white) South has “switched sides.” • Some other changes have modestly helped the Democrats. • Party ID is now very closely balanced (normal vote ~50% for each party) with high average strength. • Short-term forces have less impact. • No landslide election since 1984.

  10. Incumbent vs. Challenger • For purposes of this discussion (and course), there is always an incumbent party, i.e., the party that controls the White House (as opposed to Congress). • So in 2008, John McCain was the candidate of the incumbent party (though not the incumbent President). • On the other hand, in some elections there is an incumbent President running for re-election and in others there is not. • 2012 is such an election, 2008 was not.

  11. Incumbency Advantage in Presidential Elections? • A common observation pertaining to contemporary American politics is that Congressional (especially House) incumbents who seek re-election almost always win (~95% of the time). • Is there a similar incumbency advantage in Presidential elections? • PS #1, Problem 1.

  12. PS #1, Problem 1. As you may know, incumbency advantage appears to play a decisive role in Congressional (especially House) elections (when typically the over-whelming majority of incumbents who seek re-election are successful). Does the record indicate that there is a similar incumbency advantage in Presidential elections? Finding the data wherever you can (and citing the source, whatever it is), first classify all Presidential election into two types: (1) an election with an incumbent candidate seeking re-election (e.g., 2012) and (2) a “open seat” election (e.g., 2008). Then, within each type, classify each election into a “hold” for the incumbent party or “turnover” to the challenging (non-incumbent) party. (To illustrate example, these four elections illustrate all four possible types: 1988: open-hold, 1992: incumbent-turnover, 1996: incumbent-hold, and 2000: open-turnover.) Does the resulting cross-classification support the incumbency advantage thesis?

  13. “Referendum” vs. “Choice” Elections • This is a journalistic, more than political science, distinction. • Referendum election: an election that may be viewed as referendum (“thumbs up” or “thumbs down”) on the incumbent’s performance. • Depending on circumstances, incumbent or challenger may try to define an election as a referendum election. • “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” • PM Macmillan in 1959: “You’ve never had it so good.” • Characteristics, platform, etc., of challenger candidate and his party are more or less irrelevant, provided they meet some “acceptable” standard. • Carter vs. Reagan in 1980 • Such an election entails retrospective voting (by independents and weak party identifiers).

  14. “Referendum” vs. “Choice” Elections (cont.) • Choice election: an election that may be viewed as a choice between two rival plans, platforms, candidacies, futures. • Such an election entails prospective voting (by independents and weak party identifiers). • Defining an election as one or other is an element of campaign strategy, depending on direction of short-term forces. • Republican theme: this is a referendum election. • Clinton speech: this is a choice election. • Ryan selection may have supported Clinton’s argument.

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