Intuitings, Intuiteds, and I-languages: Data and Explananda

1. Intuitings, Intuiteds, and I-languages: Data and Explananda Paul M. Pietroski Dept. of Linguistics, Dept. of Philosophy University of Maryland

2. Intuitions: Why Care? Perhaps many reasons, but for me… • intuitions as reliable data points that can be used to assess theories of human language (see Aspects, ch. 1, Rules and Representations) • the natural phenomenon, calling for explanation, that humans “have reliable linguistic intuitions” • the potential conclusion that episodes of intuiting are notepisodes of judging (cp. Williamson) • the potential relevance of these points for externalist/internalist conceptions of linguistic meaning

3. Some Working Terminology from Lycan and Chomsky • Intuitings: psychological episodes of a certain sort • Intuiteds: propositional contents of intuitings • I-Languages: procedures (of a certain sort)that generate endlessly many expressions, which pair signals of some kind with interpretations of some kind • Human I-Languages: I-Languages, including ASL and creoles, that human children can naturally acquire (and hence implement) given a “minimally decent” course of human experience

4. Infant Child Modules: Vision Audition … Modules: Vision Audition … Human Language Faculty in a Mature State (an I-Language): COMBINATORICS LEXICON Human Language Faculty in its Initial State Experience + and Growth mature range of concepts initial range of concepts + Lexicalization

5. Some Working Terminology from Bogen-and-Woodward • Data provide evidence of stable phenomena • Phenomena are candidates for (theoretical) explanation • Explanations target phenomena, not mere causal chains that run through experimental apparatus • In controlled contexts, thermometer “readings” can confirm the abstract (not directly observable) claim that lead melts at 327.5°C. A theory of chemical composition can explain why lead melts at this temperature without explaining any particular thermometer reading. Even if one can formulate the relevant ancillary assumptions, so that each thermometer reading is predictable (within a certain range of variation, ceteris paribus), this isn’t always possible in science. Moreover, adding a hodgepodge of assumptions to a theory doesn’t yield a more detailed theory: it yields a theory-plus-a-hodgepodge.

6. Overview of Talk • The “intuitions” that matter for (careful) linguists are intuitions of contrast—often concerning the interpretive possibilities for “minimal pairs” of word-strings • Distinguish: acceptability/grammaticality/well-formedness data/phenomena intuitings/intuiteds/judgments • “Intuitions” suggest at least two kinds of phenonema (i) constraints on grammaticality (ii) semantic intuitings • Intuitings do not reflect well-formedness or truth-conditions; they reflect instructions to build concepts, which are neither syntactic nor classically semantic

7. Two Possible (Kinds of) Languages (E) a set of expressions, characterized by rules of well-formedness includes endlessly many sentences that have compositionally determined truth conditions (I) a procedure that generates expressions, which pair “signaling” instructions (PFs, PHONS) with “interpreting” instructions (LFs, SEMs) semantic instructions are compositional, but “sentential” SEMs don’t have truth conditions

8. Human Language Faculty in a Mature State (an I-Language): COMBINATORICS LEXICON  PHONs   SEMs  mature range of “sounds” mature range of concepts “articulatory/perceptual” systems “conceptual/intentional” systems can think of SEMs as instructions to build complex concepts from lexicalizable constituents

9. Minimalist Sidebar LEX concepts DS DS LEX | | | SS SS /\ | | / \ PF / \ PF LF PF LF (PHON) (SEM) concepts LEX concepts can think of SEMs as instructions to build complex concepts from lexicalizable constituents LEX PHON concepts a “sound system” may come later) SEM

10. ‘I’ is for Intensional/Implemented (Church/Marr) (E) a set of expressions (I) a procedure that generates expressions |x – 1| +√(x2 – 2x + 1) {…, (-2, 3), (-1, 2), (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 2), … } λx . AbsoluteValue[Subtract(x, 1)] λx . Pos□Root[Add{Subtract[□(x), Multiply(x, 2)]}, 1] λx . |x – 1| ≠λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1) λx . |x – 1| = λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1) Extension[λx . |x – 1|] = Extension[λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1)] Underdiscussed issue: --what are the plausible candidates for natural composition ops (supervenience realizers; cp. Szaboe) --are they sufficiently permissive for truth? we usually worry about whether TCs can be comp at all, but we should also worry about whether “easy” TCs are naturally compositional

11. A Further Chomskyan Thought (needing arguments) (E) a set of expressions (I) a procedure that generates expressions The natural phenomena of understanding and intuiting concern I-languages, which are (along with I-linguistic meanings) individuated internalistically. One can introduce notions of outerstanding and extuition, such that individuals (in different environments) can share an I-Language yet have different extuitions and outerstand words/phrases differently. Such notions may have a place. But they do no explanatory work. And at this point, they are more distracting than helpful.

12. Complication: Possible Ψ-Languages (E) a set of expressions, characterized by rules of well-formedness includes endlessly many sentences that have compositionally determined truth conditions (Ψ) an externalistically individuated procedure, which generates SEMs that do have truth conditions (I) a procedure that generates expressions, which pair “signaling” instructions (PFs, PHONS) with “interpreting” instructions (LFs, SEMs) semantic instructions are compositional, but “sentential” SEMs don’t have truth conditions

13. Two Conceptions of Linguistic Data “acceptability” intuitions provide evidence for rules of well-formedness (grammaticality) “applicability” intuitions provide evidence for axioms of a truth theory (satisfaction conditions) intuitions of contrasts, concerning the acceptabilty of interpreting a sound/sign in a certain way, provide evidence for hypotheses about the procedures that pair PHONs with SEMs we can also make judgments about whether our concepts apply to (actual/hypothetical) cases

14. (1) no cat likes every mat (2) *every likes mat no cat (3) no big cat has been on every red mat (4) *big has on red every been mat cat no S  NP VP Q  every, no NP  Q N N  cat, mat N  A N A  big, red VP  V NP V  likes VP  has been PP P  on PP  P NP

15. Tempting Analogy: Resist! S  F var var x S  R varvar for all α: ifvar α, then var α’ so: S  Fx, Fx’, Fx’’, Fx’’’, …, Rxx, Rxx’, Rx’x, Rx’x’, … S  ~S S  (S & S ) Q  ∀ var Q  ∃ var S  Q(S) so: S  ∀x(∃x’(∀x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’))) ∀x ∃x’(∀x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’)) ∃x’ ∀x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’)) ∀x’’ (Fx & ~Rx’x’’) Fx & ~Rx’x’’

16. (3) no big cat has been on every red mat (3a) *no big cat been has on every red mat S  NP aux VP … aux  has been (*been has) (5) Was the cat that saw a vet found on a mat? (5a) *Was the cat that found on a mat saw a vet? (6) The cat that saw a vet was found on a mat. (6a) The cat that was found on a mat saw a vet.

17. Absent Meanings (notAbsent WFFs) (7) Was the cook who fed waffles fed the thief? (7a) Yes or No: the cook who fed waffles was fed the thief (7b) #Yes or No: the cook who was fed waffles fed the thief (8) The cook saw the thief with binoculars (8a) The cook saw the thief who had binoculars (8b) The cook saw the thiefby using binoculars (8c) #The cook saw the thiefand had binoculars

18. General Moral • if speakers report that a string of words cannot support an interpretation supported by a similar string (of the same open class lexical items), this can confirm a claim that the string has n but not n+1 readings, for a certain n • in special cases, n = 0 (4) *big has on red every been mat cat no or more interestingly… (3a) *no big cat been has on every red mat • such examples, when “robust,” can confirm hypothesized constraints on the procedures (I-Languages) that connect the relevant “sounds” with “interpretations” • mere “well-formedness” constraints do not explain the phenomena

19. (8) The cook saw the thief with binoculars (8a) The cook saw the thief who had binoculars (8b) The cook saw the thiefby using binoculars (8c) #The cook saw the thiefand had binoculars Why (8b) and not (8c)? the cook has two features (8b) meaning: the seeing (of the thief) was done with binoculars & The cook saw the thief with binoculars The cook saw the thief and (the cook) has binoculars But why does this structure have this meaning? Why doesn’t it (also) have another meaning:

20. General Moral via Chomsky and Austen • intuitions that a string cannot support an interpretation can confirm that the string has n but not n+1 readings • Elizabeth, on her side, had much to do. She wanted to ascertain the feelings of each of her visitors, she wanted to compose her own, and to make herself agreeable to all; and in the latter object, where she feared most to fail, she was most sure of success, for those to whom she endeavoured to give pleasure were prepossessed in her favour. Bingley was ready, Georgiana was eager, and Darcy determined to be pleased. (9) __ was eager to please (10) __ was easy to please (11) __ was ready to please eager for __ to please E #eager for E to please __ # easy for __ to please E easy for E to please __ ready for __ to please E ready for E to please __

21. More Constraints on Interpretations (12) The cook, the thief, his wife, and her lover [count the possible readings] (13) The cook thinks he saw the thief (14) The cook thinks the thief saw him/himself (15) The cook wants the thief to see him/himself (16) The cook wants him/himself to see the thief [count the possible readings] (17) *The child seems sleeping (17a) The child seems to be sleeping (17b) #The child seems sleepy

22. Implemented Procedures do what they do Higgy = SEM(‘The child seems sleeping’) Halle = PHON(‘The child seems sleeping’) Ludlow = SEM(‘The child seems to be sleeping’) Smith = SEM(‘The child seems sleepy’) At least to a first approximation… <Halle, Higgy> is not an expression of my I-Language, yet Halle has one reading (Higgy = Ludlow) and not two. Smith is not a possible reading of Halle. I-Languages need not determine sets of WFFs. This is certainly not all they determine. And intuitings are not intuitings of well-formedness.

23. Repair by Ellipsis (Ross/Merchant/Lasnik…) (18) Howard asked if someone was going to fail, but I can’t remember whoihe asked if _i was going to fail pairing the “short” PHON with the SEM is OK, but pairing the full PHON with the same SEM is not Maybe what we can intuit is (just) the “pairability” of a given phonological instruction with a semantic instruction. And maybe we can intuit this kind of pairability, even when any pairing is doomed to imperfection, as with ‘The child seems sleeping’.

24. SEMs as Instructions to Build Concepts (18) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (19) France is hexagonal, and France is a republic • An instruction may not be easily executable • An instruction may be executable in more than one way • Go into the next room: find a box, find a toy, and put the toy in the box I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS Instruction Executer one or more  complex concepts PHON   SEM  (polysemy)

25. Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS Instruction Executer one or more  complex concepts PHON   SEM  one of the constructed concepts (perhaps “refined”) First Stage Representation of Scene (including any representations of speakers intentions) Judger Second Stage Representation of Scene Relevant Perceptual and Inferential Systems JUDGMENT: Yes or No ( the concept applies/doesn’t) ENVIRONMENT

26. Ambiguous (homophonous) PHON I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS  SEM 1  Instruction Executer PHON   SEM 2  one or more concepts constructed by executing SEM 1 one or more concepts constructed by executing SEM 2 Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS Instruction Executer one or more  complex concepts PHON   SEM 

27. Up and To the right Familiar Analogy for ambiguity/homophony Down and To the left

28. Intuiting Instructions • maybe we can intuit the “pairability” of a given phonological instruction with a semantic instruction • intuiting a reading may just be recognizing that one’s I-Language can pair a given PHON with a certain SEM • intuiting the absence of a reading may be recognizing that one’s I-Language cannot pair a certain PHON with the SEM of a superficially similar PHON • no need to appeal to infallibility • one can miss readings (‘I almost had my wallet stolen’), have limited memory (‘The rat the cat the dog chased chased ate the cheese’), be subject to illusions, etc.

29. Linguists and Eye Doctors (7) Was the cook who fed waffles fed the thief? Which re-presentation is better? (a) The cook who fed waffles was fed the thief? or (b) The cook who was fed waffles fed the thief? (18) John is eager to please Which re-presentation is better? (a) John is eager that he please relevant parties or (b) John is eager that relevant parties please him many cases are, of course, less clear cut; and recent developments in testing for “gradable” intuitions are germane

30. Intuitings vs. Judgments • Intuitings are not judgings, but there may be judgings with the same (or closely related) intuited contents • One can judge (via testimony, or a theory) that one’s own I-Language can/cannot pair a certain PHON with a certain SEM without undergoing a relevant intuiting (triggered by the PHON in question) • One can have such an intuiting without judging that one’s own I-Language can/cannot pair the PHON with the SEM in question

31. Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS Instruction Executer one or more  complex concepts PHON   SEM  an intuiting may reflect this and nothing more: the PHON is paired with a certain SEM, which the mind can go to work on constructed concept First Stage Representation of Scene (including any representations of speakers intentions) Judger Second Stage Representation of Scene Relevant Perceptual and Inferential Systems JUDGMENT: Yes or No ( the concept applies/doesn’t) ENVIRONMENT

32. Ambiguous (homophonous) PHON I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS  SEM 1  Instruction Executer PHON   SEM 2  intuitings may reflect this and nothing more: the PHON is paired with two particular SEMs, which the mind can go to work on QUESTION: if SEMs themselves have truth conditions, how do we intuit (or extuit) the availability/absence of readings? Wouldn’t this require that intuitings reflect a “larger portion” of the more complicated picture?

33. I-Language: LEXICON COMBINATORICS Instruction Executer one or more  complex concepts PHON   SEM  one of the constructed concepts (perhaps “refined”) First Stage Representation of Scene (including any representations of speakers intentions) Judger Second Stage Representation of Scene JUDGMENT: Yes or No ( the concept applies/doesn’t) Relevant Perceptual and Inferential Systems ENVIRONMENT Judgments may have truth conditions; but they are not intuitings. Intuitings are good data for theories of the system that generates SEMs. But it is hard to see how SEMs could play this role for linguists, and still play the required role in our psychology, if SEMs themselves had truth conditions—as opposed to being instructions to build concepts.

34. Overview of Talk • The “intuitions” that matter for (careful) linguists are intuitions of contrast—often concerning the interpretive possibilities for “minimal pairs” of word-strings • Distinguish: acceptability/grammaticality/well-formedness data/phenomena intuitings/intuiteds/judgments • “Intuitions” suggest at least two kinds of phenonema (i) constraints on grammaticality (ii) semantic intuitings • Intuitings do not reflect well-formedness or truth-conditions; they reflect instructions to build concepts, which are neither syntactic nor classically semantic

35. THANKS

36. Slides that follow are not part of the talk • These are here in case there are questions about how a single instruction might be executed in more than one way (yielding polysemy but not ambiguity/homophony), yet the result be a single concept “judged” to apply (because one way of executing the instruction “drops out” when other expressions are considered

37. SEM(‘hexagonal’) = fetch@‘hexagonal’ SEM(‘republic’) =fetch@‘republic’ SEM(‘hexagonal republic’) = CONJOIN[fetch@‘hexagonal’, fetch@‘republic’] HEXAGONAL(_)REPUBLIC(_) Her country is hexagonal/mountainous/nearby Her country is a republic/politically stable/wealthy two or more fetchable concepts may reside at ‘country’ 

38. two or more fetchable concepts may reside at ‘country’ fetch@‘country’  TERRA-COUNTRY(_) POLIS-COUNTRY(_) CONJOIN[fetch@‘country’, fetch@‘hexagonal’]  TERRA-COUNTRY(_)HEXAGONAL(_) POLIS-COUNTRY(_)HEXAGONAL(_) CONJOIN[fetch@‘country’, fetch@‘hexagonal’]  TERRA-COUNTRY(_)REPUBLIC(_) POLIS-COUNTRY(_)REPUBLIC(_)