Protecting the Sea Base with Unmanned Vehicles Chris Mailey SSCSD

1. Protecting the Sea Base with Unmanned Vehicles Chris Mailey SSCSD

2. 2 NSWC Innovation Cell Overview UV Sentry Team Joint NSWC / SPAWAR Systems Center effort NSWC - Carderock (W. Bethesda, Norfolk, Philadelphia) SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego NSWC-Dahlgren, NSWC-Panama City, and NUWC also participated Limited Study Period (4-6 Months) Diverse Project Team Membership Not necessarily subject matter experts Diversity of team -- 2 major commands represented, and team members from non-centralized locations.Diversity of team -- 2 major commands represented, and team members from non-centralized locations.

3. 3 UV Sentry Team Diversity of team -- 2 major commands represented, and team members from non-centralized locations.Diversity of team -- 2 major commands represented, and team members from non-centralized locations.

4. 4 UV Sentry Project Overview Define the Problem The Project Charter Background & Assumptions Concept of Operations (CONOPs) UV Sentry System Design C4 Architecture – Platform Requirements Suite of Vehicles – Support Strategy Enabling Technologies High Payoff-Potential Tech Innovations Define the Problem Need to protect assets with minimal ability to protect themselves Examples: Sea Base, Offshore Platform, Harbor or Port, Choke Point Innovative Concept UV systems in a Network-centric environment to sense and id potential threats Look not just at platforms, but at system of systems level Ability to neutralize threats with command approval This project is more about integration than designDefine the Problem Need to protect assets with minimal ability to protect themselves Examples: Sea Base, Offshore Platform, Harbor or Port, Choke Point Innovative Concept UV systems in a Network-centric environment to sense and id potential threats Look not just at platforms, but at system of systems level Ability to neutralize threats with command approval This project is more about integration than design

5. 5 The Problem & Concept Littoral Sea Bases are Vulnerable to Asymmetric Threats How do we protect minimally manned assets with limited self-defense capabilities? An Innovative Concept for a Possible Solution Unmanned Vehicles

6. 6 Project Charter To maximize system capability through the exploitation of characteristics unique to each type of unmanned platform To operate semi-autonomously as a fully distributed network of systems (Not "remote controlled", yet human influence remains for command/control) To efficiently maximize the availability of battlespace awareness information to the Joint Forces To maximize reconfigurability through modular and open architecture design To maximize system capability through the exploitation of characteristics unique to each type of unmanned platform To operate semi-autonomously as a fully distributed network of systems (Not "remote controlled", yet human influence remains for command/control) To efficiently maximize the availability of battlespace awareness information to the Joint Forces To maximize reconfigurability through modular and open architecture design

7. 7 Assumptions Sea Base Operations (“10-30-30”) Ready for operations in 10 days Support operation of Expeditionary Forces for 30 days 30 days to reconstitute forces DMER5 Operational Model Deployment, Management, Exploitation, Refueling, Repositioning, Recovering, Replacement, Redeployment CSG & ESG Act as Components of Sea Shield UV Sentry works with these assets to neutralize threats Air Threats Detected by Other Assets (e.g. AEGIS) Initial Operational Capability: 2015 UV Sentry designed to sustain operations for 50 days. Littoral Warfare area is focus -- Blue Water not current scenario set Deployment: the actual launch or dispatching of an array element or unmanned vehicle. Management: the algorithm for processing which sensors or systems need attention of any sort at any time, and the determination of how to best accomplish this from a range of distances, considering operational and tactical circumstances. Exploitation: the ability of the host ship to operate as a node to take advantage of the data obtained from on board and off board systems in a network of deployed and reach back assets. Refueling: fuel cell / battery replacement, liquid refueling, alternative energy methods of gaining more time and/or range from an off board vehicle. Would include a broader definition of rearming in the case of armed unmanned vehicles. Repositioning: moving existing systems to better tactical advantage, in support of Commander's Intent, or to meet mission needs. Recovering: bringing an unmanned vehicle or system back on board the host ship for repair or maintenance or to retire the vehicle for a time. Precedes redeployment and may precede refueling and replacement depending on the tactical and logistics scenario. Replacement: a substitution of an (or of many) off board system elements. The replaced component is not necessarily brought back aboard the host ship. Replacement may be necessary because of loss, enemy retrieval, expiration, disadvantageous location, etc. Redeployment: the act of retrieving from stowage a previously deployed sensor or vehicle and deploying it on, under or over the sea. UV Sentry designed to sustain operations for 50 days. Littoral Warfare area is focus -- Blue Water not current scenario set Deployment: the actual launch or dispatching of an array element or unmanned vehicle. Management: the algorithm for processing which sensors or systems need attention of any sort at any time, and the determination of how to best accomplish this from a range of distances, considering operational and tactical circumstances. Exploitation: the ability of the host ship to operate as a node to take advantage of the data obtained from on board and off board systems in a network of deployed and reach back assets. Refueling: fuel cell / battery replacement, liquid refueling, alternative energy methods of gaining more time and/or range from an off board vehicle. Would include a broader definition of rearming in the case of armed unmanned vehicles. Repositioning: moving existing systems to better tactical advantage, in support of Commander's Intent, or to meet mission needs. Recovering: bringing an unmanned vehicle or system back on board the host ship for repair or maintenance or to retire the vehicle for a time. Precedes redeployment and may precede refueling and replacement depending on the tactical and logistics scenario. Replacement: a substitution of an (or of many) off board system elements. The replaced component is not necessarily brought back aboard the host ship. Replacement may be necessary because of loss, enemy retrieval, expiration, disadvantageous location, etc. Redeployment: the act of retrieving from stowage a previously deployed sensor or vehicle and deploying it on, under or over the sea.

8. 8 What is our Sea Base?

9. 9 Protecting The Sea Base Generic Threats under consideration -- Mines Submarines 'Small' surface craft and boats CBR Not concerned with AIR ThreatsGeneric Threats under consideration -- Mines Submarines 'Small' surface craft and boats CBR Not concerned with AIR Threats

10. 10 Notional Threat Considerations MIW – ½ nmi stand off ASW / SUW – 15 nmi ID perimeter SUW Monitoring Zone - 50 nmi standoff Keep in mind it was never our intention to operate in an area without assured US air superiority. However, with hindsight being what it is, we now realize we could be vulnerable to surface or subsurface launched supersonic missiles. As we rely solely on catching the launch platform prior to missile launch. If the system does not ID the launch platform prior to launch it would be left up to a close-in weapon ‘type’ system to defend against such an attach.MIW – ½ nmi stand off ASW / SUW – 15 nmi ID perimeter SUW Monitoring Zone - 50 nmi standoff Keep in mind it was never our intention to operate in an area without assured US air superiority. However, with hindsight being what it is, we now realize we could be vulnerable to surface or subsurface launched supersonic missiles. As we rely solely on catching the launch platform prior to missile launch. If the system does not ID the launch platform prior to launch it would be left up to a close-in weapon ‘type’ system to defend against such an attach.

11. 11 UV Sentry Missions Surface Threat Identification and Tracking (SUW) Mine Detection, Classification, Identification (MIW) Submarine Detection and Tracking (ASW) Chem/Bio/Radiological Threat Detection (CBR) Signal Intelligence / Electronic Warfare (SIGINT) UV Replenishment Classification levels does not allow us to look in to Identifying Subs. We can only assume that this can be done by unmanned sensors to a level that would allow prosecution of hostile contacts w/o putting other sensors on target. First 3 are primary missions. 2nd 2 are secondary. Last is support.Classification levels does not allow us to look in to Identifying Subs. We can only assume that this can be done by unmanned sensors to a level that would allow prosecution of hostile contacts w/o putting other sensors on target. First 3 are primary missions. 2nd 2 are secondary. Last is support.

12. 12 Capabilities Overall Capabilities C4 Multiple vehicle control Rugged dependability Logistics Launch & Recovery LCS, HSV, or other Transport Military or Commercial Sealift Maintenance Drives host ship manning req’ts Min. Manning Option: Advanced Base Sensors to provide fire control quality data as required Mission Specific Sensors/Payloads MIW Surface mines: LIDAR Deep Mines: HF or Parametric Sonar RAMICS, Mine disposal UUV ASW Multi-Static Active and Passive Sonar Network Lightweight Torpedoes (Mk 54) SUW Radar, Electro-Optical, Infra-red or Thermal imaging Netfires CBR Point Detection: Electro-chemical, Mass-spectrometry or Fiber-optic Standoff : LIDAR What capabilities must the platform(s) have to complete the mission? What sensors must they carry, how do these sensors operate, what are their support requirements? So the main capability each platform must have is sensor/payload compatibility. Through consultation with experts we determined which sensor(s) were the best for which missions. Each sensor/payload has its own operational requirements. These requirements were used to evaluate perspective platforms and find which platforms would be best suited to which missions.What capabilities must the platform(s) have to complete the mission? What sensors must they carry, how do these sensors operate, what are their support requirements? So the main capability each platform must have is sensor/payload compatibility. Through consultation with experts we determined which sensor(s) were the best for which missions. Each sensor/payload has its own operational requirements. These requirements were used to evaluate perspective platforms and find which platforms would be best suited to which missions.

13. 13 Conceptual Operational View -- Composeable FORCEnet (CFn)

14. 14 C4ISR Area of Focus

15. 15 UV System Command & Control Architecture

16. 16 UV System C2 Information Flow Tracking UAV sees contact moving at high rate of speed toward restricted area, Alerts controller (and other UV in area). Controller tasks USV w/ VTUAV to investigate. VTUAV identifies contact as threat, alerts controller for weapons release. Controller approves, VTUAV provides guidance data to NetFires Missile launched from another USV. Netfires Missile hits target, VTUAV confirms kill. Tracking UAV sees contact moving at high rate of speed toward restricted area, Alerts controller (and other UV in area). Controller tasks USV w/ VTUAV to investigate. VTUAV identifies contact as threat, alerts controller for weapons release. Controller approves, VTUAV provides guidance data to NetFires Missile launched from another USV. Netfires Missile hits target, VTUAV confirms kill.

17. 17 Platform Requirements UAV- Two tiered approach-- MRE UAV could be Seaplane or VTOL USV- Could be required to tow side scan sonar or be capable of high speeds for sprint and drift missions. A monohull design could limit mission effectiveness in higher sea states, other hullforms need to be explored. UUV-UAV- Two tiered approach-- MRE UAV could be Seaplane or VTOL USV- Could be required to tow side scan sonar or be capable of high speeds for sprint and drift missions. A monohull design could limit mission effectiveness in higher sea states, other hullforms need to be explored. UUV-

18. 18 Platform Requirements (cont'd) MRE UAV could be Seaplane or VTOLMRE UAV could be Seaplane or VTOL

19. 19 Notional UV Suite CR VTUAV 15 MRE UAV 6 USV 27 UUV 13 Active Buoys 400 Passive Buoys 795

20. 20 Transport Vessel Requirements Requires unique storage & handling USVs MRE UAVs Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC) Fits into 20ft ISO containers (TEUs) Connectable Transportable to Seabase by: JHSV MPF(F) Commercial/cargo ship, etc Several hundred fit on each vessel USVs & MRE UAVs too large for standard transport containers Require specialized L&R systems MPF(F) does contain multiple vehicle holds which provide over 150,000 square feet of stowage area in addition to the 3 cargo holds with the 500+ TEUs JHSV caries 200+ TEUs Transport to USV & UAVs (largest UVs in our suite) limited to LCS type asset with equipment handling and storage. We’ve been told MPF(F) & JHSV would not be capable of storage, or L&R of these vessels although they have adaquate room. Developing and interface to allow transport on these would reduce the needed number of LCSs. For control we only need 5 LCSs (one for each mission) USV and UAV could be handled as rolling stock. UAV w/ folding wings and USV with wheeled cradles. Analysis assumes that the fleet will have many (50+) LCS type ships (relatively small, multi-mission reconfigurable, relatively high speed ships) Transport of UV Sentry platforms by more ‘cargo type’ ships is possible when control of those ships is handled by central command ship(s).Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC) Fits into 20ft ISO containers (TEUs) Connectable Transportable to Seabase by: JHSV MPF(F) Commercial/cargo ship, etc Several hundred fit on each vessel USVs & MRE UAVs too large for standard transport containers Require specialized L&R systems MPF(F) does contain multiple vehicle holds which provide over 150,000 square feet of stowage area in addition to the 3 cargo holds with the 500+ TEUs JHSV caries 200+ TEUs Transport to USV & UAVs (largest UVs in our suite) limited to LCS type asset with equipment handling and storage. We’ve been told MPF(F) & JHSV would not be capable of storage, or L&R of these vessels although they have adaquate room. Developing and interface to allow transport on these would reduce the needed number of LCSs. For control we only need 5 LCSs (one for each mission) USV and UAV could be handled as rolling stock. UAV w/ folding wings and USV with wheeled cradles. Analysis assumes that the fleet will have many (50+) LCS type ships (relatively small, multi-mission reconfigurable, relatively high speed ships) Transport of UV Sentry platforms by more ‘cargo type’ ships is possible when control of those ships is handled by central command ship(s).

21. 21 Enabling Technologies Cascading Vehicles USVs hosting UUVs or UAVs Autonomous Launch & Recovery Underway refueling Unmanned recovery On Board Data Processing Autonomously transforming ‘data’ into ‘knowledge’ CAD/CAC/CAI Advanced Data Management Underwater Communications Alternative Energy Sources Modularity Sensor Development LIDAR Parametric sonar Electro-optical wake recognition Autonomous & collaborative UV systems Self diagnostics Swarming Secure Wireless Networks Net-centric Architecture Open, re-usable & scaleabl GIG= Global Information Grid. Joint global communications architecture. Level above FORCEnet UV will have modular payload capabilities GIG= Global Information Grid. Joint global communications architecture. Level above FORCEnet UV will have modular payload capabilities

22. 22 High Payoff-PotentialTechnology Innovations USV Fully Operational in SS 4 Seaplanes Underwater communications Optics Energy harvesting Solar Wave motion Small footprint, lightweight, low power consumption, encryption radios Anti-jamming systems

23. Protecting the Sea Base with Unmanned Vehicles