Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Implications for Seabasing

1. United States Marine Corps Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Implications for Seabasing 22 October 2003 UNCLASSIFIED

2. Outline of Brief • Characteristics of OIF • Enemy Lessons Learned • Seabasing as a lens for viewing OIF Success

3. Overview of Seabasing Implications from OIF • Characteristic US strengths demonstrated in OIF • Rapid force closure • Rapid maneuver • Precision fires • Bypass enemy strengths, focus on objective • Sustainment over extended ranges • Joint synergy • Enemy Lessons Learned • Deny ports and airfields • Attack vulnerable extended supply lines • Disrupt information networks through deception and active measures • Seabasing preserves US strengths in face of enemy countermeasures

4. Future Impact of Enhanced Networked Seabasing • Freedom of action – Broadens strategic options and reduces vulnerability during buildup and combat operations • Rapid force closure - Assures access and improves ability to exploit access when provided • Reduces vulnerability of deployed forces, and frees shore-based infrastructure for other forces • Integrates Joint C4ISR to provide responsive, integrated and decisive application of naval strike capability and assault forces • Provides persistence and sustainment while reducing footprint of maneuver forces and support functions ashore

6. Questions?

7. BACKUP SLIDES

8. What Went Well: Rapid Force Closure • 8 weeks from DEPORD to combat ready 60K+MEF • Largest USMC MPF operation in history • Amphibious Deployments: • 2 seven-ship ATFs from East and West coasts loaded within 12 days of DEPORD • 3 PHIBRONs with embarked 2200-man MEU(SOC)s • Strategic Lift: • 1,035 AMC missions / 21 MSC/TAVB “black bottom” ships But…OIF required a permissive environment for arrival and assembly of forces: Sea basing assures access.

9. What Went Well Operational Reach • Operations over 500NM inland/>100,000 KM2 Seabased Naval Air, including Hornets and the “Harrier Carriers” provided operational reach from the sea and freed up shore infrastructure for other capabilities.

10. What Needs Improvement • Selective unit deployment versus execution of pre-planned deployment packages • SecDef wanted to regulate forces into theater, but selective deployment resulted in gaps in needed capabilities and complicated lift to deploy • Need more flexible, responsive, and tailorable force deployment packages • Sustainment challenges • Initial self-sustainment - Naval logistics • High Speed Vessels The movement of seabasing assets to a potential area of employment could in itself serve as a deterrent or stabilizing influence.

11. Background • Advantages of Enhanced Networked Seabasing • Assured access • Rapid force projection • Reduced vulnerability to attack • Agility and Speed • Capabilities • Strike (SEA STRIKE) • Defensive roles (SEA SHIELD) • Logistical sustainment through the (SEABASE) • C2 Capabilities through (FORCE NET)

12. What Needs ImprovementJoint Processes • Joint processes outpaced by catastrophic success of campaign • Joint planning & approval; JOPES; IO; ATO; TST; BDA; CasReps; etc. • Synched to sequential, procedural planning mindset, not rhythm of a dynamic battlefield (e.g., ATO) • Some delays linked to standards, organizations, and procedures (e.g., BDA) To an extent, these shortcomings can be addressed via integrated Naval C2 systems within FORCEnet.

13. National Assets FSSG MEG DIV WING Maneuver Elements Battalions Companies Platoons 100s – 1,000s Squads Companies Platoons Squads Companies Platoons Squads 10,000s – 100,000s Intelligence Dissemination CENTCOM CFMCC CFLCC CFACC CFSOC THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 14

14. Bandwidth THE DIGITAL DIVIDE THE DIGITAL DIVIDE DIGITAL DESERT Requirements Intel Requirements & CapabilitiesVaries with level of organization Type/number/control of Collection Assets Equipment size Space-time horizon Types of Products Type/number of Analysts Bandwidth Availability 15

15. Questions?

16. What Went WellTactical Flexibility and Training • USMC units operationally agile - responsive to short-fuse taskers • Demonstrated criticality of Marine Corps planning process • Importance of tactically integrated training/exercises • USMC tactical flexibility directly linked to organic capabilities • Fires, aviation, logistics, etc. • Unit flexibility directly linked to Expeditionary mindset • Validated core competency of combined arms proficiency and individual skill training • “Every Marine a Rifleman” • Warrior Spirit – “No better friend. No worse enemy.”

17. What Did Not Go Well • Need to “operationalize” all functions as well as measures of effectiveness and measures of merit • Many measures tailored for HQ not tactical forces (e.g., supply volume flow; equipment readiness vs. training) • Garrison efficiencies  combat effectiveness • Stress operational reach in exercises and training • Logistics • Communications

18. Operational Reach • Support and sustainment enabled rapid advance • Hose reel • Use of contract vehicles and organic assets • Forward Arming and Refueling Points/Forward Operating Bases (FARPs/FOBs) • Sustainment challenges • Class IX (repair parts) near-complete failure • Theater distribution, In-Transit Visibility for all classes of supply Network-enabled C4ISR, selective offload, and seabased sustainment are conceptual capabilities with which these challenges can be addressed.

19. Summary • OIF reflected several elements of the envisioned sea basing capability set • Rapid force closure can be improved • At sea arrival and assembly can provide assured access • Selective off-load would lighten load of maneuver elements and permit assembly and delivery of tailored sustainment packages • Retention of many functional services at sea reduces vulnerability to attack • Organic capabilities and expeditionary mindset remain key components of our success.