Observation of e-enabled elections

1. Observation of e-enabled elections Jonathan Stonestreet Council of Europe WorkshopOslo, 18-19 March 2010

2. Purpose of election observation? • Different actors: • international organizations • political party/candidate representatives • non-partisan civil society groups • Different objectives: • Determine facts; assess process against international standards; make recommendations • Ensure election is in accordance with law; complaints • Political participation; citizen control over elections • Common denominator Transparency 3

3. Definition of observation • Election observation is the ability to verify independently that electoral and other authorities respect the law and/or international standards and that claims made by the authorities are true • Election observation is a practical exercise of the principle of transparency implicit in the conduct of democratic elections • Observation ≠ certification or auditing

4. OSCE Copenhagen Document 1990 • (7.4) “ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;” • (8) “…the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process …. [The OSCE participating States] therefore invite observers from any other participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings…” • Transparency is implicit in these commitments 3

5. Venice Commission Code of Good Practice • Principle of Free Suffrage: - 3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes and action to combat electoral fraud • “iv. electronic voting should be used only if it is safe and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage; the system must be transparent;” • “xiii. counting must be transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and the media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the records;”

6. Council of Europe e-voting recommendation, 2004 • “…only those e-voting systems which are secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters will build the public confidence which is a pre-requisite for holding e-voting…” • “i. e-voting shall respect all the principles of democratic elections and referendums. E-voting shall be as reliable and secure as democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means…” 3

7. 2004 Rec: Standards • 23: “Any observers, to the extent permitted by law, shall be able to be present to observe and comment on the e-elections, including the establishing of the results.” • 108: “The audit system shall provide the ability to verify that an e-election or e-referendum has complied with the applicable legal provisions, the aim being to verify that the results are an accurate representation of the authentic votes.”

8. E-voting – what can be observed? • Context of electronic voting • Background for introduction • Previous legal challenges • Access of observers • Confidence of political parties and voters

9. E-voting – what can be observed? • Cycle of events and activities • legal framework • setting of standards/requirements • certification and testing • system management • physical security • accessibility, usability, ballot design • education of voters and officials • adherence to election day procedures • complaints and appeals • post-election audits 2

10. Challenges to observation • There are crucial aspects of the e-voting process cannot be directly observed • electronic security of the system • secrecy of the electronic ballot • casting, storing, and counting the electronic ballot 4

11. How to ensure transparency? • For transparency, evidence is needed • Access to system documentation and certification and audit reports However….. • For casting, storing and counting ballots, the system must provide proof that voter choices are respected • At present, no purely electronic solution that can “verify that the results are an accurate representation of the authentic votes” (also respecting secrecy of vote)

12. Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) / Scanned Ballots • Paper record of each vote, checked by voter, which can be audited or recounted • Raises questions: • when does an audit or recount take place? • what happens if there is a discrepancy between the electronic and paper records? • what is the legal ballot? • VVPAT not a solution to the observability problem if • rarely or never audited • leads to an unclear result 3

13. Other Issues • Open source code • Role of and accountability of vendors and election officials • Remote e-voting

14. How to facilitate observation of electronic voting? • Legal framework • Access to documentation and reports • Testing • Observer training • VVPAT and audits • Open source codes? • Transparency should be a defining principle of any electronic voting system, just as it should be in paper ballot systems

15. Questions?