Hardware Support for Trustworthy Systems

1. Hardware Support for Trustworthy Systems Ted Huffmire ACACES 2012 Fiuggi, Italy

2. Disclaimer • The views presented in this course are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Defense.

3. About Me • Assistant Professor of CS at NPS • Research • Computer Architecture, Computer Security • Fast and Secure • Hardware-Oriented Security

4. Course Overview • Lecture 1: Overview: Hardware-Oriented Security and Security Engineering • Lecture 2: Reconfigurable Security Primitives • Lecture 3: Apply Primitives to Memory Protection, Design Example • Lecture 4: Forward-Looking Problems

5. Lecture 1 Overview • Hardware-Oriented Security • Security Engineering

6. Hardware-Oriented Security • Hardware-Oriented Security • Security Engineering

7. What is Hardware Security? • Many of the issues of hardware security are similar to traditional computer security • Anything can be hacked, but the attacker has finite resources. • Each security technique has tradeoffs.

8. What is Hardware Security? • Foundry Trust • Intellectual Property • Operational Attacks • Developmental Attacks • System Assurance

9. What is Hardware Security? • Interfaces • Composition • Metrics • Education

10. Problems • Global Supply Chain of Integrated Circuits • System Assurance

11. Confronting Security at the Hardware Level • Opportunities of the hardware level • Challenges of the hardware level

12. A Brief Word About ‘Cyber’ • Beware of propaganda • Think critically

13. Security Engineering • Hardware-Oriented Security • Security Engineering

14. Security Engineering • Defending against skilled attackers is hard • Holistic view of entire system • Use the scientific method • Every security technique has tradeoffs

15. Security Engineering • Assume the enemy will be in your networks • Increase the risk and cost for the adversary

16. Security Engineering • Do not rely on security through obscurity • Principle of least privilege • Minimize system complexity

17. Security Engineering • Reference monitor concept • Separation (of duties and system components)

18. Security Engineering • Penetrate & patch vs. inherently trustworthy • Platform diversity • Checklists and hardening guides

19. Security Engineering • Study past success • Secure defaults • Backups, recovery, and rollback

20. Security Engineering • Important Considerations • Approaches to Security Engineering

21. Rigorous Design Practices • Configuration management of tools/IP • Eliminate support for insecure legacy technology • Default configuration disables unnecessary services

22. Rigorous Design Practices • Only develop the features needed • Debugging messages not in production code • Error messages that don’t reveal information

23. Rigorous Design Practices • Secure coding practices • Use of formal security analysis and evaluation • Covert channel analysis • Side channel analysis

24. Rigorous Design Practices • Protocol analysis • Robust protocols and authentication schemes • Is the implementation faithful to the spec? • Manage complexity. Reference monitor concept.

25. Self-protection • Do not expose critical security functions to attack from other circuitry. • Examples

26. Layered Dependencies • Security-critical circuitry must not depend on circuitry of lesser trustworthiness • In trusted software stack, applications depend on OS libraries, which depend on secure kernel

27. Lecture 1 Reading • Secure Design • Reflections on Trusting Trust • http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=358210 • The Protection of Information in Computer Systems • http://www.acsac.org/secshelf/papers/protection_information.pdf • Design Principles for Security (NPS Technical Report) • http://www.cisr.us/downloads/techpubs/nps_cs_05_010.pdf

28. Lecture 1 Reading • Secure Design • Design and verification of secure systems • http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=806586 • Shared Resource Matrix Methodology: An Approach to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels • http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=357374 • On the Buzzword ‘Security Policy’ • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=130789

29. Lecture 1 Reading • Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust • Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying and Classifying Hardware Trojans • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=5604161 • Security Engineering • http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html • Micro-Architectural Cryptanalysis • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4288047 • Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation • http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1278484

30. Lecture 1 Reading • Physical Attacks • Temperature Attacks • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4812164 • Information Leakage from Optical Emanations • http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=545189 • Differential Power Analysis • http://www.springerlink.com/content/kx35ub53vtrkh2nx/ • Keyboard Acoustic Emanations • http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1301311

31. Lecture 1 Reading • trust-HUB.org • http://trust-hub.org/ • Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust • http://springer.com/978-1-4419-8079-3 • Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security • http://springer.com/978-3-642-14451-6