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Lecture 9

Lecture 9. The Demise of Sino-Soviet Alliance. Accumulated Tension. Feb. 1956, CPSU 20 th Congress Criticizing Stalin and his personality cult without consult Beijing in advance. Mao ’ s Reaction. Mid-March to early April 1956, a series of meetings

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Lecture 9

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  1. Lecture 9 The Demise of Sino-Soviet Alliance

  2. Accumulated Tension • Feb. 1956, CPSU 20th Congress Criticizing Stalin and his personality cult without consult Beijing in advance

  3. Mao’s Reaction • Mid-March to early April 1956, a series of meetings • Mao: “exposed the problems”, “made a mess” • Stalin’s mistakes during the Chinese Communist revolution: Wang Ming’s policy; Chinese Civil War; Sino-Soviet Treaty; Korean War.

  4. Mao’s Evaluation on Stalin • A “great Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leader”; • “70-30 ratio” methodology – achievements should account for 70% of Stalin’s career & mistakes for only 30%

  5. Why did Mao defend Stalin? • Defending CCP’s own experience of building socialism in China; • Learning to establish a highly centralized economic planning system; • Accelerating China’s economic development; • Consolidating his leadership.

  6. Mao’s Meeting with Soviet Ambassador (March 31, 1956) • Proper tone for criticizing Stalin; • Warning Khrushchev not to repeat the same mistake, hoping a new pattern of Sino-Soviet relations; • Greater voice on questions concerning not only bilateral relations, but international Communist movement.

  7. Beijing’s management of thePolish & Hungarian crisis (Late 1956) • Both crises resulting from Soviet “big-power chauvinism”; • Polish Crisis ---- anti-Soviet; • Hungarian Crisis ---- anti-Communist.

  8. Chinese Leaders’ Reflection on Soviet’s Behavior • Summer of 1957, anti-rightist movement ; • Criticizing Zhou Enlai’s viewpoint of balanced economic development; • Zhou’s comments on Soviet according to his Soviet, Poland & Hungary visit from Jan. 7 to 18, 1957.

  9. Divergence between Mao & Khrushchev • Mao: Should not be frightened by nuclear war started by imperialists; • Khrushchev: necessity & possibility of “peaceful coexistence” with Western imperialist countries.

  10. From Tension to Crisis • China’s domestic situation: Great Leap Forward; Zhou Enlai’s self-criticism;

  11. Soviet’s Comments on the Great Leap Forward • Khrushchev and his colleague were confused; • Thousands of Soviet advisers issued warnings;

  12. 2 Important Events: • Long-wave radio transmission center & a receiving station: Mao: China would pay all the expenses & would retain exclusive ownership of the station. • A joint submarine flotilla: Mao: not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative”.

  13. Khrushchev’s China Trip(July 31 – Aug. 3, 1958) • Khrushchev’s explanation; • Mao’s reaction: “big-power chauvinism” did exist in the Soviet’s attitude toward China; • Results: Agreement-signing, but Sino-Soviet psychological rift persisted & intensified.

  14. 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis:Shelling Jinmen (Quemoy) • At the end of July 1958, Beijing decided to begin large-scale shelling of Jinmen without informing Khrushchev; • Aug. 23, began shelling; • Early Sept., Gromyko visited Beijing, Mao: attracting world’s attention to the Taiwan question & to divert US strength from other part of the world (Esp. the Middle East). • Sept. 8, Soviet issued a statement to show its solidarity with the Chinese.

  15. China’s Situation in 1959: • Negative effects of The Great Leap Forward; • March, anti-Chinese & anti-communist rebellion in Tibet; • June, Soviet cannot provide Beijing with atomic prototype & technical data for producing the bomb according to US-Soviet Geneva negotiation; • July, Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai’s “anti-party plot”; • Aug. Sino-India border conflict.

  16. Khrushchev’s Speech at China’s National Day Banquet (1959) • 40-minute speech; Emphasizing the “Camp David” spirit; Hoping to contribute to the relaxation of tensions between East & West; Unwise to use military means to test the stability of the capitalist system. • Mao’s reflection: Khrushchev’s speech meant to insult him & revolutionary China.

  17. Sino-Soviet Vitriolic Debate(Sept. 30 – Oct. 4, 1959) • K. delivered Eisenhower’s request on releasing 5 American POWs; • Taiwan Issue; • Sino-India border conflict; • Tibet Rebellion; • About Peng Dehuai’s criticism.

  18. K.’s Speech at Vladivostokon Oct. 6, 1959 • “brotherly solidarity” between Moscow & Beijing as a cornerstone for world peace. • “it was unwise to behave like a bellicose cock & to long for war.”

  19. Breakdown • July 1960, K. recalled all Soviet experts from China and drastically reduced material & military aid to Beijing; • Disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap Forward;

  20. Events: • 1962, Mao initiated Sino-Soviet polemic debate; • Wang Jiaxiang & “3 reconciliation & 1 reduction”; • Nov. 1964, Zhou’s Moscow trip; • Prelude of “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”.

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