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DI-beneficiaries as % of the labor force and DI-expenditures as % of GDP, 1971-2013

A Dutch Miracle? Philip de Jong presentation for the conference Transforming Disability into Ability Copenhagen, November 5, 2014. DI-beneficiaries as % of the labor force and DI-expenditures as % of GDP, 1971-2013. DI entry rates by gender, 1971-2013. Tekstniveau 1

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DI-beneficiaries as % of the labor force and DI-expenditures as % of GDP, 1971-2013

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  1. A Dutch Miracle?Philip de Jong presentation for the conferenceTransforming Disability into AbilityCopenhagen, November 5, 2014

  2. DI-beneficiaries as % of the labor force and DI-expenditures as % of GDP, 1971-2013

  3. DI entry rates by gender, 1971-2013 • Tekstniveau1 • Dit is de tekst op tekstniveau 2 • Tekstniveau3

  4. Beneficiaries per Thousand Workers: US versus NL 1970-2010

  5. Decomposition of the miracle Entries in 2009 70% lower than in 1999 Caused by:- experience rating in DI –13%- gatekeeper protocol in SB –22%- stricter eligibility rules in DI –36% Total –70% Source: Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, Estimating the Effects of Recent Disability Reforms in the Netherlands, 2011 • gatekeeper protocol means: • - firms pay sickness benefits during the 2 year waiting period before DI-entry • the rights and duties of sick employees and firms during that period • are laid down in a protocol that aims at work resumption asap

  6. loss of earningcapacity Full80-100% 74% Partial 35-80% 26% 0-35% No recovery 29% Recovery possible 71% Working 42% Notworking 58% Working 47% Unemployment benefit IVA-benefit Structure and outcomes of the Dutch DI-system First stage: wage related benefit Second stage: If sufficiently working: wage supplement, otherwise social minimum based benefit Working 11% 6

  7. Composition of DI-awards by severity, 2006-2013

  8. Composition of DI-awards by type of worker, 2007-2013

  9. Panel data results:work resumption by regular employees

  10. Panel data results:work resumption by flexworkers

  11. Conclusions • The success of the Dutch policy change lies in early intervention (before DI application) • Its success also lies in strong financial incentives for firms • And in strict administration of eligibility rules by the DI program administrators (denial rate is about 45%, and robust against cyclical variations in applications) • Nonetheless, the Dutch disability benefit system still acts as a social valve for vulnerable groups

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