Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia

1. Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group The 8th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues Sŏgwip’o, Cheju-do, ROK, 17 November 2009

2. Long live the peerless commander General Kim Jong Il who has established our country as one of the world’s nuclear states!

3. Overview • DPRK Missile Capabilities • Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • ROK Cruise Missile Program • MD • Policy Recommendations

4. DPRK Missile Capabilities • DPRK began to produce multiple rocket launchers in the 1960s • Acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG rockets in late 1960s • Produced Scud-B (火星-5; Hwasŏng-5) by mid 1980s • Developed Scud-C (火星-6; Hwasŏng-6) by late 1980s • Tested Nodong (光明星?)in 1993 • Exported Scuds and Nodong to several countries

5. DPRK Missile Capabilities • Flight-tested Paektusan-1 (白頭山-1;Taepodong-1) with attempted satellite launch 31 August 1998 • Missile exercise 5 July 2006, but Paektusan-2 failed • Failed Ŭnha-2 (銀河-2) SLV launch 5 April 2009 • Has tested and deployed improved anti-ship cruise missile KN-01 based on Chinese “Silkworm” • Tested and probably deployed KN-02 or “Toksa (毒蛇)” based on SS-21 “Scarab”

6. Ghuari, Hwasŏng, KN-01

7. New Missile “Musudan” • In 2003, U.S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) • liquid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2,500 km; land-based version has a range of 2,500-4,000 km • Reportedly displayed during 25 April 2007 parade, but not on DPRK television • Ŭnha-2 second stage reportedly a modified Musudan

8. Inventory • About 355-685 Scud-variants; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27-40 TELs • About 220-320 Nodongs; liquid fueled and road mobile; 27-30 TELs • Musudan; no flight tests; 20-30 deployed? 22-27 TELs? • “Toksa” (KN-02); solid-fueled and road mobile • Paektusan-1 program terminated • Paektusan-2 not operational; launched from tower • Land attack cruise missiles?

9. Warheads • Hwasŏng, Nodong, Paektusan-2, and Musudan capable of delivering nukes • DPRK probably has been able to miniaturize warhead package • HE warheads, but only useful with Toksa (KN-02) • CW warheads likely for all systems, but little known about number and doctrine • BW warheads unlikely; but possible UAV delivery systems unknown

13. Institutional Structure • National Defense Commission ultimate authority • Warheads have not been transferred to KPA; separate authority with NDC member Chu Kyu-ch’ang probable head • Second Natural Sciences Academy (第2自然科學院) responsible for applied military research • Second Economic Committee (第2 經濟委員會), nominally subordinate to the KWP Central Committee Munitions Industry Department (勞動黨 中央委員會 軍需工業部), manages weapons production • Fourth Bureau produces rockets and missiles • Ministry of People’s Armed Forces manages training and operations during peace time • Supreme Commander issues orders to General Staff during war

14. Youthful NDC

15. Nonproliferation Concerns • DPRK views missiles exports as “normal business” • UNSCR 1874 “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology” • Sanctions regime under UNSCR 1695, 1718 and 1874 • Bans all arms exports • Financial sanctions • Luxury goods • Travel bans

16. DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism • Building a “Strong and Powerful Country” (强盛大國建設戰略) • Ideology/politics • Military • Economics • Missiles and SLVs have high symbolic value • Regime emphasizes S&T for economic recovery and legitimacy • Missiles serve multiple purposes for domestic politics

17. Modernize and “Informationize” the People’s Economy

18. Paektusan-1(白頭山-1)

19. Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 (光明星-1)

20. Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 Trajectory

21. Ŭnha-2 Launch

22. New Space Center at Tongch’ang-ri

23. Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric • Increasing rhetoric regarding the right to “preemptive self-defense” • Increasing gap in N-S conventional balance • First strike advantages • 10 November 2009 N-S Yellow Sea battle

24. ROK Cruise Missile Program • ROK ballistic missile range limited to 180km by 1979 MOU with the U.S. • ROK joined MTCR in March 2001 • ROK says no range limits with cruise missile payload under 500kg • Began to deploy 1,000km-range LACMs early this year • Developing 1,500km-range LACM

25. MD and NE Asian Security • Japan has highest threat perception; response will be more MD • ROK deploying limited MD • China could respond to deployment of robust, layered MD • Weapons could target MD assets, including those in space • Possible missile build-up

26. Policy Recommendations • Focus on sanctions regime, but… • Negotiated walk-back or erosion through “sanctions fatigue?” • Inter-Korean CBMs desperately needed • ROK should disclose CWC compliance • Cool down preemption rhetoric • Engage DPRK • Link economics and security • Test DPRK intentions • Begin serious discussion on peaceful space cooperation • Deploy limited MD, but realize political sensitivities and technological limits—not a substitute for arms control

27. References • Crisis Group Asia Report N°167, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” 18 June 2009. • Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” 18 June 2009. • Crisis Group Asia Report N°169, “North Korea: Getting Back to Talks,” 18 June 2009. • Crisis Group Asia Report N°179, “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” 2 November 2009. • Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, February 2008). • Daniel A. Pinkston, “North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles during Military Parade, Some for First Time,” WMD Insights, June 2007. • Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea Tests 1,000 Kilometer Range Cruise Missile and Develops 1,500 Kilometer-range Version,” WMD Insights, November 2006. • Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Includes Unveiling of New Cruise Missile,” WMD Insights, October 2006.