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The September 2005, E.coli O157 Outbreak in South Wales

The September 2005, E.coli O157 Outbreak in South Wales. Paul J Mee, Service Director for Public Health & Protection & Julie Barratt, Director CIEH Wales. Wrexham Outbreak – August 2009. Surrey Outbreaks-September 2009. Introduction. Outbreak Control Plan Declaration of the Outbreak

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The September 2005, E.coli O157 Outbreak in South Wales

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  1. The September 2005, E.coli O157 Outbreak in South Wales Paul J Mee, Service Director for Public Health & Protection & Julie Barratt, Director CIEH Wales

  2. Wrexham Outbreak – August 2009 Surrey Outbreaks-September 2009

  3. Introduction • Outbreak Control Plan • Declaration of the Outbreak • Initial Investigation & Control • J Tudor & Son, Bridgend • Control Measures • Detailed Investigations & Results • Communications, Politics & the Media • Chief Medical Officers Review • Police Investigation • The Local Authority Prosecution • What have we learned? • Response to Public Inquiry Recommendations

  4. Highly virulent – low infective dose 1-14 days incubation period Can cause complications such as HUS and is sometimes fatal Young and elderly particularly vulnerable Prolonged asymptomatic excretion High risk of secondary spread E.coli O157

  5. Outbreak Control Plan • Devolved administration – Welsh Assembly Government • 22 Unitary Local Authorities • Local Health Boards • National Public Health Service for Wales • Consultant in Communicable Disease Control • NPHS laboratory services • Regional Epidemiologists & CD Surveillance Centre • Model Outbreak Control Plan • Lead Officer for Communicable Disease

  6. The Outbreak Control Team (OCT) • Chaired by CCDC, supported by regional epidemiologists, consultant microbiologist • EH representatives of all LA’s • Local Health Board – Local Public Health Director • Food Standards Agency • Also from Rhondda Cynon Taf: • Local Education Authority • Catering Direct • Communications

  7. Outbreak Declaration • Friday 16th September 2005 – first 8 cases notified to NPHS following hospital admissions • Further 2 cases confirmed by NPHS laboratory via +ve stool specimens • Incident meeting convened that afternoon – 2 further cases added to list • Outbreak declared and OCT formed

  8. Initial Investigation & Control Measures • Fast Food Outlet • Swimming Pool • School Meals • Menus • Milk • Water coolers • Fruit tuck shops • Cooked sliced meats • Meat supplier • School kitchens/School Inspections

  9. Initial Investigations & Control • Sunday 18th September – decision to remove all cold cooked & sliced meat from school meals • Catering staff urgently contacted so that meat removed and stored separately for collection by EHOs • Inspections of meat supplier on 19th & 20th September • Emergency prohibition notices – risk of cross contamination from vac packing process; unsanitary condition of premises

  10. Tudor & Son Butchers, Bridgend • Vacuum packer & weighing scales used for raw & cooked meats • No sanitizer on the premises so equipment could not have been cleaned between use • Cooked meat brought into raw meat preparation area to be weighed and packed • Cooked meats stored in boxes previously containing raw meat • Vacuum packer located immediately adjacent to mincing machine • Failure to follow HACCP document stipulating separation of raw and cooked meat

  11. Vacuum packer dirty & greasy Fly killer positioned directly above vacuum packer Floor covering in poor condition Walls dirty and marked with blood splashes Grills to floor drains had gaps allowing past access Band saw unit dirty with food debris Walk in freezer iced up & stocked haphazardly Wash hand basin leaking causing water to pool on floor Meat slicer dirty Table dirty Walls of walk in chiller were dirty Drain blocked with food debris Light covers were dirty with flies & insects Numerous food hygiene offences

  12. Control Measures • Removal of cold & cooked sliced meats from school meals • FSA - Food Alert for Action – 21st September – removing all cooked meat supplied by Tudors Butchers from the food chain

  13. Control Measures – Spread of Infection • Verbal advise and advisory leaflets to all cases • Exclusion of cases & case contacts from school & work • Risk groups identified in accordance with national guidelines • Suspected cases & contacts until screened • Children under 6 years of age within affected families • 2 –ve samples at least 48 hours apart obtained

  14. Control Measures – Spread of Infection • Control measures within schools • Withdrawal of cooking activities • No plasticine, sand or water play • Advice on cleaning measures • Advice on good hand washing • No food brought into schools other than for own consumption • Harvest festivals, Christmas parties etc.

  15. Detailed Investigations • Epidemiological Investigations • Case definition • Case ascertainment • Descriptive epidemiology • Analytical epidemiology • Microbiological Investigations • Faecal specimens • Food stuffs • Environmental samples • Environmental Investigations • Inspections

  16. Results of Investigations • Widespread contamination – no single school • Pattern of cases reflected distribution of meat • All cases had consumed school meals • Samples of meat removed from schools contained the same strain of E.coli O157 as many of the cases • E.coli O157 genotype unique to this outbreak • Inspection revealed significant shortcomings at meat supplier • Primary cases ceased to present within one incubation period of withdrawal of meats • OCT confirmed source as cooked sliced meats supplied by J Tudor & Son Butchers

  17. Communications • Proactive release of information • Parents given priority • Direct contact • Letters to head teachers & schools • Letters to parents • E.coli O157 Helpline • School meetings • Daily press updates • All releases agreed by OCT • Single speaker to ensure consistent message • Web sites • Communication with health professional • Communication with public officials & elected members

  18. Summary & Statistics • Declared over on 20th December 2005 • 157 cases meeting case definition, 118 microbiologically confirmed • 44 schools affected across 4 local authorities • 109 cases strain of E.coli O157 unique to the outbreak • 31 cases hospitalised, 1 death • Largest outbreak in Wales, 2nd in UK

  19. Politics & Media • Very high profile • Constant & insatiable media attention • Intrusive and distracting • Role of media & public figures in a public health crisis – social responsibility

  20. Communications and Media Sub judice nature of much of the information to hand General public concern regarding E. coli Need for information and informed comment Need for professional response to political comments Need for the profession to be seen – by the public and by the profession

  21. Chief Medical Officers Review • Commissioned by Minister for Health & Social Services • Fettered by the ongoing criminal investigation and requirements of confidentiality • Evidence gathered was anecdotal and from parties outside the investigation • Recommendations of little value

  22. The death of Mason Jones4th October 2005

  23. “… the sad news today about the death of young Mason Jones from Bargoed, is devastating to us all. Please can I express my personal gratitude for everything you, and your team, are doing to arrest the E.coli outbreak. I have heard nothing but complimentary remarks about the professional way in which you have conducted yourselves and can reassure you that you have my complete confidence” Keith Griffiths, Chief Executive of Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council (4th October 2005)

  24. Police Investigation • Statements from employees of J Tudor & Son • Poor practices revealed: • Only ever been one vacuum packer at premises used for raw & cooked meats continually • Weighing scales, vacuum packer never cleaned • In 3 years a member of staff had never seen any sanitizer at the premises • Staff had never seen any temperature readings being taken • No stock rotation, staff instructed to reuse decomposing meat • High risk equipment only cleaned with a cloth • Meat returned by customers would be reused in between slices of good meat

  25. Police Investigation “There is a large amount of evidence, in the form of witness statements, to indicate that cross contamination from raw to cooked meat was an almost certainty” – Prof. C Griffiths “It is…my opinion that W Tudor misled and/or gave false information to enforcement officers during visits to the premises. In particular…he had no intention to provide a separate vacuum packing for cooked meats to minimise the risks of cross contamination” - Colin Houston

  26. Dual Investigation • Evidence necessary to make out local authority case available very early • Police evidence gathering very complicated, lengthy and expensive • Decision on manslaughter charge made by CPS • Prosecution took place 2 years after outbreak • Much information sub judice for 2 years • Public and media frustration at delay • Public and media failure to understand charge and sentence

  27. The Local Authority Prosecution • Jointly brought by Rhondda Cynon Taf, Caerphilly & Bridgend County Borough Councils • 5 charges for placing on the market unsafe food relating to 5 positive meat samples • 1 charge for placing on the market unsafe food – relating to Deri Primary school and Mason Jones • 1 charge relating to the operation of the food business – failing to ensure that raw & cooked meat was protected against contamination

  28. Guilty Plea – 7th September 2007 • William J Tudor admitted to offences • Sentenced to 12 months imprisonment • Prohibition from managing a food business • No costs awarded • Actually served 12 weeks of sentence before release • Cost to LAs - £596,000

  29. What have we learned? • The Outbreak • The Prosecution • The Public Inquiry

  30. The Outbreak • Key characteristics of E.coli O157 • Low infective dose/severe symptoms • High risk of secondary spread at home • Asymptomatic cases/excretion • Decision to keep schools open vindicated • Communications – internal & external • Staff welfare during the outbreak • Impact on service delivery • Role of Environmental Health – a job well done!

  31. The Prosecution • Difficult to reconcile two investigations • Frustrating - confidentiality • Public Health vs. Criminal • Significant resource implications • Valuable evidence gathered which supported LA prosecution • Could we have brought our prosecution without the Police evidence?

  32. Response to recommendations Food Law Enforcement & Inspections Procurement School Toilet Facilities The Public Inquiry

  33. Food Law Enforcement & Inspection • Food businesses & HACCP • Separation of raw & cooked meat • “Light touch” enforcement • Audit based inspection of HACCP plans • Training, experience & competency of EHOs • HACCP • Management • “Red flagging” issues/concerns • Evidence based decisions on management confidence • Discussions with employees • Quality vs. Quantity, Outcomes vs. Process • Better quality regulation not less!

  34. Procurement of Food • Costs vs. quality & safety • Third party audit of suppliers • EHO involvement • Scrutiny of inspection reports • Tendering process • Contract monitoring & evaluation • Complaints systems Where is the real risk? – supplier assurance What about commissioned services & non approved suppliers? – residential care homes, independent schools

  35. School Toilet Facilities • Provision of hot water, soap, hand drying facilities • Audit/inspection of facilities • Capital programme of improvements • What about management? • About infection control in schools per se, not this outbreak!

  36. “Dodgy business people are going to be around forever and a day. And the only thing protecting the public against them is EHPs. But there aren’t enough of them to do this essential job” – Prof. H. Pennington Sept 2009 I am very worried about this continued decline in the esteem EHOs are held in when it comes to their role in protecting public health” – Prof. H. Pennington – May 2009 “Over the years I’ve worked with a lot of EHOs and I’ve got enormous respect for their practical intelligence and common sense and the way they try and apply themselves. I think it would be very regrettable if the conclusions about any deficiencies that may or may not have occurred in inspection focus on what individuals may or may not have done, because it seems to me that there are a number of institutional issues here that are highly relevant” - Dr Roland Salmon

  37. Lessons for EHPs Check everything and evidence the response Record everything (including reasons for recording nothing) Verify what you are told Check practice, not process Identify trends and follow them up Flag up and follow up concerns Believe nothing, trust no one, check everything, record everything

  38. Issues Pennington -v- LBRO Competencies of managers Dealing with criminals Red flagging - how suspicious is suspicious? FOI implications Restrictive inspection protocols – data collection etc Procurement

  39. Contacts Paul J Mee Paul.J.Mee@rhondda-cynon-taff.gov.uk 01443 425514 Julie Barratt j.barratt@cieh.org 01633 865533

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