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Civilian GNSS Security: 10 Years of Progress and the Future of Receiver Certifications

This article reflects on the progress made in civilian GNSS security over the past 10 years and discusses the need for receiver certifications in order to authenticate Position, Velocity, and Time (PVT) information. It focuses on the importance of standardizing security requirements for commercial receivers and proposes the creation of a US-EU task force to address the needs of the civilian GNSS community.

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Civilian GNSS Security: 10 Years of Progress and the Future of Receiver Certifications

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  1. from the Volpe report to a future for securereceivercertifications: 10 years of civilian GNSS security Oscar Pozzzobon Technical Director, Qascom ION GNSS 2011, September 23, Portland, US

  2. Where are we? GPS no civilian authentication. Egnos, no authentication, Galileo CS might not provide a ranging signal and Galileo SOL has been designed for different purposes, so we will have to rely on user segment authentication services for a while. The GNSS authentication community has dedicated the last 10 years to develop complex signal spoofing and signal authentication techniques, but it’s time to get back to the problem: how do we authenticate PVT? The GNSS community wants a clear answer for every application. Whilst following the security life cycle, PVT spoofing threats and mitigation can now be categorized to begin a process of receiver certification for PVT authentication.

  3. From an hypothetical classification of attacks…

  4. Towards a standardization of security requirements for commercial receivers? (example)

  5. Conclusions While the research will continue towards new proposals for signal authentication, the industry should have a plan B for the next 10 years, developing algorithms at receiver level. A US-EU task force should be created to give clear responses (security requirement standards) to the civilian GNSS community.

  6. Thank you! Oscar Pozzobon Qascom S.r.l. oscar.pozzobon@qascom.it

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