1 / 25

On Mitigating Covert Channels in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains

School of Engineering and Applied Science Department of Computer Science University of Virginia, Charlottesville Virginia, USA Web: www.cs.virginia.edu. On Mitigating Covert Channels in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains. Kirti Chawla, Gabriel Robins, and Westley Weimer

winter
Download Presentation

On Mitigating Covert Channels in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. School of Engineering and Applied Science Department of Computer Science University of Virginia, Charlottesville Virginia, USA Web: www.cs.virginia.edu On Mitigating Covert Channels in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains Kirti Chawla, Gabriel Robins, and Westley Weimer {kirti, robins, weimer}@cs.virginia.edu This work is supported by U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) grant: CNS-0716635 (PI: Gabriel Robins) For more details, visit: www.cs.virginia.edu\robins

  2. RFID Technology Overview Frequency Form Factor Type RFID Technology Parameters Tag/Transponder Reader Backend System Aerospace Chip Timing Supply Chain Components Some Applications

  3. 02 / 21 Motivating Example – Supply Chains Factory Warehouse YOU Raw Materials Store Reduce Cost Enhance Competitiveness A Supply Chain

  4. 03 / 21 Motivating Example – Supply Chains Adversary Supply Chain Market How ? Passive Competitiveness Active Competitiveness Target Supply Chain

  5. 04 / 21 Supply Chain Attacks – Tag Tracking Tracked tag serves dual-purpose and is a source of covert channel Adversary Supply Chain

  6. 05 / 21 Supply Chain Attacks – Tag Duplication Injected duplicated tag as source of covert channel

  7. 06 / 21 Supply Chain Attacks – Tag Modification M Injected modified tag as source of covert channel

  8. 07 / 21 User Specific Data USER Vendor Specific Data AFI Tag Capability TB TID ISO/IEC 15963 Class Identifier EPC NSI XPC RESERVED XPC_W1I EPC Number UMI PC Access Password EPC Length CRC-16 Kill Password Supply Chain Attacks – Tag Modification EPC Compliant RFID Tag Writeable banks conceal information Memory Layout of the RFID Tag #

  9. 08 / 21 Supply Chain Attacks – Reader Compromise M C Compromised readers as source of covert channel C

  10. 09 / 21 Evaluation I – Implications(1) Brand Loyalty Switch Post-attack scenario Pre-attack Scenario Attacks subtly persuading consumers to switch brands

  11. 10 / 21 Evaluation I – Implications(2) Brand Aversion Pre-attack Scenario Post-attack scenario Attacks subtly persuading retailers to prefer brands

  12. 11 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Model of Supply Chain Supply Chain 1. Item flow = tag flow 2. Multiple Phases 3. Flow verification Purchase Phase Production Phase Distribution Phase

  13. 12 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Model of Supply Chain Phase Sink Global Source Global Sink C1 Phase Source C(Q, R) > 0 C2 C(P, Q) = 0 Q NMOF(A) = max(C1, C2) P A 1. Item flow = tag flow 2. Multiple Phases 3. Flow verification R C: E  + Purchase Phase: GUP Production Phase: GPP Distribution Phase: GDP

  14. 13 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Taint Checkpoints How ? Supply Chain Flow Graph: G = GUP GPP GDP Taint Checkpoint 1. Item flow = tag flow 2. Multiple Phases 3. Flow verification GUP GPP GDP

  15. 14 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Taint Check Cover Taint Check Cover TCC  NP Vertex Cover Polynomial Time Reduction VC P TCC NP-Complete Given a graph G and no. of taint checkpoints T, determine the existence of taint check cover: TCC  G, T GD GU

  16. 15 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Heuristics(1) Use approximate algorithm of VC for TCC Time complexity: O(V+E) Solution size: 2OPT From the set of edges E, pick an arbitrary edge , save its endpoints and remove all edges from E that are covered by those endpoints GD

  17. 16 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Heuristics(2) Algorithm dependent time-complexity Solution size: OPT to |V| Use cuts to partition graph • Cuts based on topology • Cuts based on flow properties • Random cuts GUP GPP GDP

  18. 17 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Heuristics(3) (2) CER =  Use underlying business requirements (1) TNR = |VT| |V| • No. of taint checkpoints • Coverage Vs Efficiency Tradeoff Algorithm dependent time-complexity Solution size: OPT to |V| TNR, CER +, |V|  0 GUP GPP GDP

  19. 18 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Local Verification Algorithm Verifying flow locally at every taint checkpoints • Check flag enables check for duplicate tags • Tag data verification enables check for modified tags GUP GPP GDP

  20. 19 / 21 Mitigating Approach – Global Verification Algorithm Verifying flow globally along a path or at central site Heuristics combined with global verification enables check for compromised readers GUP GPP GDP

  21. 20 / 21 Evaluation II – Cost • Supply Chain flow graph nodes = 2000 • No. of taint checkpoints = 10 to 1000 • Workload = 100 items per case  1000 cases per time interval Cost of solution Local verification time cost as a function of no. of taint checkpoints Local, and global (with constant and variable link cost) verification time cost as a function of no. of taint checkpoints

  22. 21 / 21 Countermeasures to Covert Channels Suggested Countermeasures Passwords Pseudonyms Re-encryption Direct mitigation PUF

  23. References • Hokey Min and Gengui Zhou, Supply Chain Modeling: Past, Present and Future, Journal of Computer and Industrial Engineering, Elsevier Science Direct, Volume 43, Issue 1-2, pp. 231-249, July 2002. • Rebecca Angeles, RFID Technologies: Supply-Chain Applications and Implementation Issues, Information Systems Management, 22:1, pp. 51-65, 2005. • David Molnar, Andrea Soppera and David Wagner, A Scalable, Delegatable Pseudonym Protocol Enabling Ownership Transfer of RFID Tags, Selected Areas in Cryptography, Ontario, Canada, 2005. • Daniel V. Bailey, Dan Boneh, Eu-Jin Goh and Ari Juels, Covert Channels in Privacy-Preserving Identification Systems, 14th ACM International Conference on Computer and Communication Security, Alexandria, Virginia, pp. 297-306, 2007. • Simson L. Garfinkel, Ari Juels and Ravi Pappu, RFID Privacy: An Overview of Problems and proposed Solutions, IEEE Security and Privacy, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp. 34-43, May 2005. • Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Melanie R. Rieback and Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Classification of RFID Attacks, International Workshop on RFID Technology, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 73-86, June 2008. • Melanie R. Rieback, Bruno Crispo and Andrew S. Tanenbaum, RFID Guardian: A Battery-Powered Mobile Device for RFID Privacy Management, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Volume 3574, pp. 184-194, July 2005. • Ira S. Moskowitz and Myong H. Kang, Covert Channels - Here to Stay, In 9th IEEE International Conference on Computer Assurance, pp. 235-243, July 1994.

  24. References • Leonid Bolotnyy and Gabriel Robins, Physically Unclonable Function-Based Security and Privacy in RFID System, 5th International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, New York, USA, pp. 211-128, March 2007. • Thomas H. Cormen, Charles E. Leiserson, Ronald L. Rivest and Clifford Stein, Introduction to Algorithms – Third Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2009. • EPCGlobal, UHF C1 G2 Air Interface Protocol Standard, http://www.epcglobalinc.org/standards/uhfc1g2/uhfc1g2_1_1_0-standard-20071017.pdf • EPCGlobal, Tag Data Standards Version 1.4, Revision June 11, 2008, http://www.epcglobalinc.org/standards/tds/tds_1_4-standard- 20080611.pdf • Anylogic Professional 6, AB-SD Supply Chain Model Simulator, http://www.xjtek.com • Gildas Avoine, Cedric Lauradoux, and Tania Martin, When Compromised Readers Meet RFID, Workshop on RFID Security, Leuven, Belgium, 2009. • Mike Burmester and Jorge Munilla, A Flyweight RFID Authentication Protocol, Workshop on RFID Security, Leuven, Belgium, 2009. • Khaled Oua, and Serge Vaudenay, Pathchecker: A RFID Application for Tracing Products in Supply-Chains, Workshop on RFID Security, Leuven, Belgium, 2009. • A. Karygiannis, T. Phillips, and A. Tsibertzopoulos, RFID Security: A taxonomy of Risks, Conference on Communications and Networking in China (ChinaCom), Beijing, China, pp. 1-8, 2006.

  25. Questions

More Related