Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?:

1. Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography, Religion and Radicalization Eric Kaufmann, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk

2. Religiosity

3. Religious Fertility vs. Religious Decline "One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious." (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

5. Hypothesis: a combination of higher religious fertility and immigration will lead to a growth in the religious population (defined in terms of belief) that exceeds the net loss of communicants through religious apostasy.

6. Results: Proportion Without Religion Assuming: High secularization trend Constant secularization trend Low secularization trend

9. Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.

10. N.B. 'BP' refers to Bangladeshi and Pakistani; 'UK' refers to British-born and 'Foreign' to foreign-born

13. Canadian Religion in Decline • Canada 2004: 66% attend less than monthly, 19% no religion, up from 12% in 1985. • Europe 2004: 72% attend less than monthly. 39% no religion. • US 2004: 51% attend less than monthly. 14% no religion. • 40% of Canadians have a low degree of religiosity, 31% are moderately religious and 29% are highly religious.' (Schellenberg & Clark 2006)

14. Future Religious Return? • Immigrants more religious than native-born, and show no similar inclination to secularism • Canadians with 'no religion' declined from 20% in 2000 to 19% in 2004. First decline since 1985. Could immigration and higher immigrant fertility be a possible factor? • Would suggest demographically-driven religious revival in Canada, as in Europe and USA

16. Source: Belanger 2006

17. Source: Belanger 2006

18. Canadian Immigration • Currently and Historically 60% Asian, dominated by non-Muslims (Chinese, Indians, Philippinos) • Demographic Transition and development may shift sources to Middle East and Africa in the future

19. Canadian Muslim Demography • Moderate Sized Religious Group • Fast-growing, perhaps at same rate or slightly slower than in W. Europe • Falling fertility, modest level of immigration • Urban concentration, as in Europe • More middle-class character, as in USA • I am unclear about 'demographic polarization' trends between moderates and fundamentalists

20. Demographic Radicalization Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007

22. Decline of Liberal Protestants

23. USA: Denominational Projections to 2050

24. Zero Immigration Scenario

26. Muslim World • The religious cleavage between Islamists and Others (Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals) • Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists with political leverage into the future? • Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant but modest link between Madrassa attendance and fertility in four countries • This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 7-15 countries (depends on question)

27. Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

28. Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

29. Islamist Religiosity • Younger, Educated are less Islamist, but effect is complex and there are exceptions (i.e. under 24s, university students) • Urbanites more Islamist than rural population • Higher education levels may modestly lower Islamism, but urbanization may raise it. Generational change will have little effect • GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity • Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible

30. Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 1649 respondents with High School or More, 3318 respondents with Less than High School. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

31. Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

32. Islamist Fertility • Islamists in Muslim countries are more fertile; some evidence for sharpened fertility effect in more 'modern' contexts, i.e. cities, the educated • But the growth of the Islamist population through higher fertility is still a long-term process, unlike Israel

33. Canada • Will we see religious polarization ('demographic radicalization') within the Jewish, Christian and Muslim populations, as elsewhere? • Anecdotal evidence of evangelical Protestant and ultra Orthodox Jewish demographic vitality, set against backdrop of secularization • Canada generally reflects global fertility and retention trends in Abrahamic faiths • Demographic radicalization not an imminent prospect in Canada, but cannot be ruled out for the longer term (i.e. to 2050)

34. Conclusion • Canadian Muslim population is in the medium range for Western countries, with similar demography to other western Muslim populations • Canada undergoing secularization process, but immigration will probably lead to a reversal in the future • Global Evidence of higher fertility among religious literalists/fundamentalists • Effect strongest in Judaism, followed by Christianity and Islam • Canada will be affected by these developments