Living with, and acting on, scepticism

1. Living with, and acting on, scepticism Proposing the Sceptic’s Wager to revitalize the ancient ideal of living one’s scepticism

2. Remarks upfront • Will not precisely be philosophy of science, but will be epistemology. • I will propose a solution to a problem, and both whether the problem is a genuine problem and whether my solution solves it will be contentious. • I presuppose that we find the problem of induction compelling. And when I speak of skepticism, I will take it to mean skepticism that casts doubt on all manner of inductive inference.

3. Overview: Living with scepticism • Two main parts: sketching the problem and proposing a solution to the problem. The solution is only intelligible when we agree on the problem, so we postpone that to later in the presentation. • What problem? A number of issues that surround the questions: • Are we sceptics? • Should we ‘live’ a sceptical life? • Can we ‘live’ a sceptical life? • How a ‘sceptical life’ would look remains to be seen, but it would at least consist in suspending belief in those propositions that are problematized by our sceptical arguments.

4. An ancient criticism and an ancient answer • Some ancient sceptics told us to live the sceptical life, which would consist in suspending all judgement and belief. • But, opponents argued, this is not possible, for then the sceptical life would not be a life at all, or at best a life of total lethargy. We say, then, that the standard [for action] of the Sceptical persuasion is what is apparent, implicitly meaning by this the appearances; for they depend on passive and unwilled feelings and are not objects of investigation. […] Thus attending to that which is apparent, we live in accord with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we are not able to be utterly inactive. • Living the sceptical life then is possible, because it does not excessively strays from “everyday observance”.

5. More on the ancient answer • Sextus: We are sceptics, so we should live the sceptical life, and we can live that life, because it outwardly does not generate different behavior. • But, what does it mean to live by appearances? Does this help? No: A statement concerning a physical fact, even if it concerns a simple fact of daily life, never refers to a single fact alone, but always includes some predictions. If we say, “There was a table in my room, before my eyes, at 7:15 P.M.,” this contains the prediction: “If no table passes the doors from 7:15 to 7:20, and no fire or earthquake acts on my apartment, then there will be a table in my room at 7:20.” Or simpler still: “If I put a book on the table, it will not drop.” • The potent form of scepticism is not purely metaphysical, it also concerns the problem of induction and as such predictions regarding appearances.

6. The Humean answer • Hume clearly does consider the inductive problem of skepticism which is so devastating for the possibility of action • So what does he tell us on living the sceptical life: Nor need we fear that this [sceptical] philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. • We are sceptics, but we cannot live the sceptical life, nor should we. Human nature, Habit and Custom resist our attempts to change our beliefs through abstract reasoning.

7. First-person perspective and third-person perspective. • Hume’s answer is sufficient from the third-person perspective. • There is no inconsistency in telling a story about people in the world that, when asked, subscribe to sceptical doctrines and who at the same time, do not act in accordance with this, (seemingly being unable to change their beliefs accordingly). • But, in the first-person, things become more difficult; we are considering the question what should I believe, and how a description of my nature is supposed to help me solve this question is unclear

8. Two readings of the Humean answer, and their problems: 1) Description • The first thing that Hume seems to tell us is that we simply cannot adopt belief in accordance with the dictates of (sceptical) reason • The knowledge that eventually I will wake from the sceptical dream does not help, given that I, self-consciously, judge it to be so that I have no way to justify my beliefs. The external view on my mind only tells me what I will believe when the considerations leave my mind, but does not tell me what beliefs I need to adopt right now. • Hume also seems to jump from a description (an is) to a normative claim about what I should believe (an ought)

9. Two readings of the Humean answer, and their problems: 2) Normative Description • So, I think the Humean is pushed to accept that there is normative dimension to his description of Habit and human nature. • The only option I is see is through an application of ought implies can; turning this principle around, we get that that which is impossible cannot be called for. • So, in the first-personal case, I need to consider that I am unable to believe what reason tells me to believe, and from that conclude that I am not bound to believe those things at all. • But, what then remains of being a sceptic? I judge that I do not needs to assent to the conclusions of sceptical arguments. Does that not mean the same as judging the arguments as not-sound?

10. Excursion 1: Considering skepticism is incoherent • What should we make of our predicament? It seems, at least from the first-person perspective that if we accept the sceptical arguments, we should change our belief accordingly, but at the same time we cannot do so. • One way out is to claim that this points to a problem with the sceptical position itself. If we cannot make sense of the conclusions of the sceptical arguments, we need to accept that those arguments are mistaken, because that is what we de facto say when we say that we will not incorporate it into our beliefs.

11. Some issues • If the problem posed regarding induction are actually how: • Can we explain that we find them convincing, as the ‘supposed sceptics’ apparently find them to be. • Can we explain the worth of philosophical attempts to solve the problem of induction? Or should we discard those completely?

12. Excursion 2: Destroying the first-person • We discussed that the Humean answer does make sense form the third-person. So, Pascal argues, why not attempt to try and avoid taking a reflective, reasoned, attitude towards these issues. • First we wager, i.e. we find what beliefs it would be most profitable to have (Pascal argues that it is more beneficial to believe God to exist than to believe him not to exist.) • Then, we try to induce belief upon ourselves through the explicit invocation of Custom and Habit upon ourselves (Considering continuously what horrors might befall us, or taking mass and taking the holy water, which “lowers your acuteness”)

13. Some, major, issues • This is clearly disingenuous and leads to immoral behavior. • A salesman with knowledge that weighs heavily on his consciousness. • He’d rather make the sale, so he’d rather not have had the knowledge. • He induces this state upon himself by drinking himself into a stupor and thus forgetting the problematic knowledge.

14. Taking stock: Reasons for retrying Sextus’ project? Can we make sense of being a sceptic? • This is problematized because if we are truly incapable of changing our beliefs accordingly, there is no sense to skepticism at all. Either we expulse the first-person, or we accept that skepticism is never really defended or believed and as such dismissable out of hand. • Our three initial questions show the problem: Are we sceptics? Yes. If so, we should live the sceptics life. Can we live the sceptics life? No. If not, we shouldn’t have to live the sceptics life. • This inconsistency can only be resolved by either giving up on scpeticism, or by claiming that we can in fact live the sceptics life. I propose to do the second. Let us build on Sextus’ attempt to achieve that!

15. The sceptics wager: acting as if and the constitutive standards for scepticism • If we want to salvage Sextus’ project, we need to make sense of both believing that we cannot reason inductively, and meanwhile act in a way that accords with human nature. • Hume tells us that we cannot have our beliefs altered by sceptical considerations. But, the only reason to say this is because clearly people, including sceptics, act as if they have not altered their beliefs. • So if we can tell a story on how we can suspend judgement on proposition A and yet reasonably act as if we take A to be the case, we have leeway for claiming that the sceptics life might be possible after all.

16. Getting supplies 1) Sextus If it was a matter of acting where he could see no reason to choose this rather than that, he could toss a coin or simply do whatever one has been brought up to do in the circumstances. In effect, that is what the sceptic does do when he adheres to the conventions of whatever society he lives in without himself believing in them or having any personal attachment to their values. • Every prediction I do has an equal chance to be correct, as per inductive sceptical conclusion • I cannot not act (deciding not to do anything is as much an action as any other). • Every action might have any consequence. So there is no principled way to prefer any action on the basis of belief. • So, since there is no belief compelling us to act on it, we can make sense of acting as if we do believe this or that.

17. Getting supplies 2) Pascal • Now we know that, from an epistemic point of view, every action is just as valuable as any other. This might show how we can act at all (we can act as if), but it does not show how we can justify acting as most sceptics do, namely in accordance with everyday observance (and in accordance with the dictates of human reason). • So, we must consider how to act on the basis of other factors than the epistemic; i.e. we can reintroduce the wager that we first disregarded because it led to loss of intellectual integrity. • But, whether an action is actually effective, depends on how the world is, so how can we find a way to make the wager work in way that does not presuppose the belief we are acting on as if, to simply be true?

18. Getting supplies 3) Einstein • Fine on Einstein proposes motivational realism; in all scientific activity, one presupposes a realist drive. • Despite understanding the problematic character of realism, the scientist needs to implicitly experience realism to make his activity understandable. • Let us try to refurbish this thought for our present purposes.

19. Hopeful scepticism • Do we consider it possible to find a solution to sceptical problems? • Do we consider it best to find a solution to sceptical problems? I propose that we should accept both these claims We should be hopeful sceptics. • We move away from Sextus here; skepticism is always an in-between station, not a final station in one can rest on his laurels.

20. Wagering on hopefulness • We prefer the case in which we find an answer to sceptical arguments above all other cases. • But this can only occur if the world is more or less as it would be outside of radical sceptical considerations. (for if it is not, the sceptical considerations are correct) • So the only way we can act as if that might lead to our proposed gain (solving the sceptical problems) is in accordance with some common sense idea of the world in mind.

21. Putting it together; the sceptics wager • We do not have any epistemic way to prefer one belief over the other. • We now wonder, since I must act, on which belief will I act as if I believed it? • Let us take into consideration the possibility of refuting scepticism, a possibility which we value very highly. • Now, given the weight of this consideration, how should I wager on “the world is more or less as I take it to be”? • Either it is false, in which case not a single course of action could have lead me to solving scepticism, as it is true, so any course of action is as preferable. Or, my wagered proposition is true, in which case the only course of action would be to philosophically investigate scepticism while acting as if the world is more or less as it appears to be. • So: we can reasonably act as if the world is as it seems to be, while suspending judgement on the actual way the world is. This is the sceptics life.

22. What have we gained? • We have tried to make sense of living a sceptical life. • We think that making a sceptical life impossible, makes nonsense of the sceptical position in its entirety • We have tried to argue, through the sceptics wager, that we can live the life of a hopeful sceptic, salvaging some parts of Sextus’ program, but leaving behind the idea of living scepticism as a definitive way of life; it must be (intended as) a stepping stone to the solution of sceptical doubt. • The sceptical life, is a life that aims to dispel sceptical argument by the only means possible; living a philosophical life in accordance with everyday observance.