Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia Michele Pezzoni

1. Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?A study on the determinants of editorial board membership in economics Raffaele Miniaci University of Brescia Michele Pezzoni University Milano-Bicocca, KITeS and OST

2. Reputation, reward and peer-review process in science • Publication is the most valuable asset for the scientist -> publication boosts reputation -> reward depends on reputation -> ”publish or perish” • Quality and novelty of a scientific work is granted by the peer-review process -> “the goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge” (Merton) (Merton 1942,1957,1968; Stephan 1996; Stephan and Levin 1992; Daguspta and David 1994, …) • Peer-review process in leading journals is not run by the scientific community but by an elite of scientists SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

3. The role of Editorial Boards (EB) • Editors influence -> success of research lines, success of institutions, careers of scientists, qualitative standards of the discipline, ... (Rockwell 2006, Stigler et al. 1995) • They are influenced by: their past research, their taste for specific subjects, the current fashion in the discipline, their educational background, the policy of the journal, ... • Ideal model: scientists with best publication scores should be appointed as editor for at least three reasons: • They are the most entitled to judge on other scientists’ publications • As reward for their past scientific work • To legitimate their authority (Cole and Cole 1973) • Scholars cast doubts on the process of EB selection (Horan et al. 1993, Hyman 2009, Bedeian et al. 2007). • .. risks of a model far from the ideal

4. Paper agenda RQ1) An overview of the leading journals in economics: is there ‘institutional oligopoly’ within journals? Is there a specialization of contents? RQ2) Evidence of EB role in influencing: • Contents (Coats 1971). Are journals contents more similar when journals share the EB members (boards interlocking)? • Institutionspublishing on the journals (Kocher and Sutter 2001). Similar questions for institutions... RQ3) How are editors appointed? (Burgess Shaw 2010, Bedeian et al. 2009). Is the ideal model a good approximation of reality? We focus on the effects of social proximity between scientists and editors already appointed (Pezzoni et al. 2012). SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

5. Data • We select 108 Journals according to the ranking by Lee et al. (2010) • It is based on bibliometric indicators • It classifies journals as ‘mainstream’ and ‘heterodox’ • We focus on 10 EBs of leading journals in economics. We include Editors, co-editors and associate editors. • 2 sources of data, at the level of publication and of EBs: Raw data on publications: Publications from ECONLIT (Bibliog. dataset of AEA) Time extent: 1969-2007 Raw data on EBs: EB members listed on journals Time extent: 1995-2004 Authors’ identity Disambiguation EB members’ identity Disambiguation Matching authors/EB members 10 years (1995-2004); 42016 published articles; 17453 scientists SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

6. DATA: Number of editors of 10 leading journals SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

7. Methodology • RQ1) at journal level ; 10 leading journals; 2 intervals, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 • ‘institutional oligopoly’ -> Herfindahl index computed on authors’ affiliations • specialization of contents -> Herfindahl index computed on JEL codes • RQ2) at the level of journal pair; 9 journals; 36 pairs, 1995-2004 Boards interlocking • EB Interlocking index -> % of editors shared by each pair of journals • Contents distance -> Euclidean distance between 2 vectors of relative shares of JEL codes for each pair of journals • Institutional distance -> Euclidean distance between 2 vectors of relative shares of author’s affiliations for any pair of journals

8. RQ1) Is an there ‘institutional oligopoly’ within journals?Is there a tendency of specialization of contents?

9. RQ2) EB interlocking and contents JF and JFE before 2000 JECM • Euclidean distance of JECM from the other journals = 0.34; Euclidean distance of JECM from ECMA = 0.27 • interlock between EBs of JF and JFE, about 40% of the editors are appointed in both the editorial boards

10. RQ2) Is there an effect of interlocking between journals on contents and institutions? YES • 50% of the journals boards are connected by at least one editor in common • Reverse causality is possible • Does turnover of EB members affect journals contents or institutions? NO SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

11. RQ3) How are editors appointed? • we move from the journal level to the scientist level of analysis • Unbalanced panel -> 17453 scientists observed (on average) for 7.27 years. 553 scientists areappointed as editors at least once during their career • Dependent variable: EB dummy, equals 1 when the scientist is appointed as editor, 0 otherwise • Ideal model: Past productivity as main determinant of EB appointments • Quantity (number of articles published) • Quality (maximum impact factor of the journal where the scientist published) • At least one publication on 10 leading journals SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

12. RQ3) How are editors appointed? • Other determinants may be at play.... • Career length (years since the first publication) • Institutional prestige (top 30 institutions in terms of publications) • Of the current affiliation • Of the first affiliation (proxy for the Ph.D. affiliation) • Subject affinity • Publication in Heterodox journals (heterodox definition form Lee et al. 2010) • Publications on the same subjects of the 10 leading journals (at least one JEL code in common) • Network variables -> based on co-authorship relations among scientists • Scientific network -> centrality degree, proxy for the intensity of the connection of the scientist to her/his scientific community • Minimum social distance form current editors -> social proximity to the scientists entitled to decide for the EB appointments SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

14. Probability of EB membership VS Affiliation to prestigious institutions in the beginning of the career and career length SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

15. Probability of EB membership VSSocial distance from EB members and productivity SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?

16. Conclusions • Some evidence that Institutional concentration within journals is decreasing (stable), when they are managed by associations (departments) • Interlocking of journals through editors favors the homogeneity of contents and institutions publishing • Leading journals are becoming more homogeneous in recent years, both in terms of institutions and contents • Scientific productivity is one of the main determinants of the probability of being appointed as editor of one of the 10 leading journals in economics • Social distance from editors plays a role: the higher the social distance, the lower the chances of becoming an editor. SIEPI, Ancona Is publication in the hands of outstanding scientists?