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Voting Methods

Brittany Vacchiano. Voting Methods. Voting procedure in which voters can vote for as many candidate as they wish Each candidate approved of receives one vote Single candidate with the most votes wins Not limited to a single vote like Plurality  more expressive. Approval. Ballot 1

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Voting Methods

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  1. Brittany Vacchiano Voting Methods

  2. Voting procedure in which voters can vote for as many candidate as they wish • Each candidate approved of receives one vote • Single candidate with the most votes wins • Not limited to a single vote like Plurality  more expressive Approval

  3. Ballot 1 • x Pepsi x Sprite Coke • Ballot 2 • x Pepsi Sprite x Coke • Ballot 3 • Pepsi x Sprite Coke • Ballot 4 • Pepsi x Sprite x Coke • Winner – Sprite (3 votes) Approval Example

  4. Gives voters flexible options • Helps elect the strongest candidate • Gives minority candidates their proper due (they receive votes alongside majority candidates) • It reduces negative campaigning • Results are easy to understand • Best method for choosing a beat-all-winner, stronger and better system than Plurality Advantages of Approval

  5. Is a Condorcet method of voting winner will always be ranked as the most popular choice • Uses preferential ballots on which voters rank candidates according to their order of preference • Voter can rank more than one choice at the same preference level • A matrix is created that counts the pairwise voter preferences and their rankings Kemeny-Young

  6. Basically…. • Compares every possible sequence of preferential choices and then associates those sequences with a Kemeny Score • Judges which candidate is preferred over others Kemeny-Young Cont’d

  7. Suppose you had a ballot with 4 candidates: Sprite, Coke, Pepsi and Dr. Pepper • Those preferences can be expressed in a popularity matrix Kemeny-Young Example

  8. Popularity Matrix- Pairwise counts are arranged in a table in which choices appear in sequence from most popular (top left) to least popular (bottom right) • Best overall ranking score (AKA Kemney Score) = sum of all counts in the upper-right triangle

  9. Kemeny score of above example is 393 (68+68+58+83+58+58) • Ranking (based on best possible Kemeny score) is Sprite > Pepsi > Coke > Dr. Pepper 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 194 141

  10. A single voter cannot control the outcome • Is a neutral method for the Condorcet criteria • It allows for a fair vote, because all possible preferences and rankings are taken into consideration Disadvantages of K-Y • With large datasets/many different candidates, the calculations for the popularity matrix and the best overall Kemeny score can be VERY time consuming Advantages of K-Y

  11. In a nutshell, K-Y method involves considering every possible order-of-preference sequence, calculating a score for each such sequence, and then choosing the sequence with the highest score as the best fit • From that best fit you can tell how the candidates will be ranked (1st, 2nd, 3rd,…,etc) Still confused about K-Y?

  12. Not much information online besides on Wikipedia pages and this site • http://www.votefair.org/province.html • I had to search through the Purdue Library to find relevant info • Levin, J., & Nalebuff, B. (1995). An introduction to vote-counting schemes. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9. 15-16. • Drissi, M., & Truchon, M. (2004). Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 23. 161-185. Sources

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