1 / 71

Public Meeting November 22, 2006 Explosion at CAI/Arnel in Danvers, Massachusetts May 9, 2007

Public Meeting November 22, 2006 Explosion at CAI/Arnel in Danvers, Massachusetts May 9, 2007. Investigation Team. John Vorderbrueggen, PE Johnnie Banks, CFEI Angela Blair, PE Robert Hall, PE Katherine Leskin Jeffrey Wanko, PE, CSP. Meeting Agenda. Incident Summary

Albert_Lan
Download Presentation

Public Meeting November 22, 2006 Explosion at CAI/Arnel in Danvers, Massachusetts May 9, 2007

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Public MeetingNovember 22, 2006 Explosion at CAI/Arnel inDanvers, MassachusettsMay 9, 2007

  2. Investigation Team • John Vorderbrueggen, PE • Johnnie Banks, CFEI • Angela Blair, PE • Robert Hall, PE • Katherine Leskin • Jeffrey Wanko, PE, CSP

  3. Meeting Agenda • Incident Summary • Investigation Activities • Companies Involved • Preliminary Findings • Board Questions • Public Comment

  4. N Google Earth

  5. Photo: J. Whitmore/Boston Globe

  6. Emergency Response • Danvers fire and police departments • Salem, Peabody, Beverly, and other fire and police departments • Massachusetts Environmental Police • U.S. EPA • U.S. Coast Guard

  7. Emergency Response • U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives • Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection • Massachusetts State Fire Marshal • Massachusetts State Police

  8. Community Impact • Ten treated at hospital for lacerations and bruises • Multiple homes and two adjacent businesses damaged beyond repair • Structural damage to homes and businesses as far as 1/4 mile • Window breakage as far as one mile • Dozens of boats at marina damaged

  9. Community Impact • About 300 residents were evacuated • 77 families originally displaced • 50 families still unable to return home • 16 homes razed, more expected • Two nearby businesses destroyed • Five nearby businesses heavily damaged

  10. Investigation Activities • Interviews and discussions • CAI and Arnel employees • CAI electrical contractor • Contractor working at Abbey Fence • Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline • KeySpan (natural gas utility)

  11. Investigation Activities • Local residents • Local businesses • Town of Danvers • Town Manager • Police and Fire departments • Department of Code Administration • Public Health department

  12. Investigation Activities • Documentation • CAI and Arnel • Duke Energy and KeySpan • Town of Danvers • Raw materials suppliers • EPA remediation records • State regulations

  13. Investigation Activities • Photographs • Community • CAI/Arnel Facility • Township fire and police photos • Aerial photos

  14. Investigation Activities • Evidence Collection/Review • Facility equipment • Raw material chemical samples • Liquid/solid material samples • Fragments from the CAI/Arnel building found in the community • Explosion dynamics modeling • Chemical testing

  15. Companies Involved • Building constructed in early 1900’s • 1985 - Danvers Chemical divided • CAI, Inc. • Arnel Company, Inc.

  16. CAI, Inc. • Private company operated since 1985 • Headquartered in Georgetown, MA • 25 employees • Manufacture water and solvent based printing inks

  17. CAI, Inc. • Georgetown facility • Administration, marketing, sales • Water based ink manufacturing • Product warehousing and shipping • Danvers facility • Solvent-based ink manufacturing • Daily production shipped to Georgetown

  18. Arnel Company, Inc. • Operated in Danvers facility since 1985 • Nine employees • Products • Solvent-based stains, lacquers, coatings, and paints • Polyurethane coatings and adhesives • Water based urethane coatings

  19. Covered outside storage 1100 sq. ft. 1200 sq. ft. 5100 sq. ft. 5 Offices, labs, restrooms 4000 sq. ft.

  20. CAI Hazardous Materials Handling • Flammable solvents • Three underground storage tanks • Four 3000-gallon production mix tanks • Eight 500-gallon containers (totes) • Several ink product mixers • Many 55-gallon drums and small containers

  21. CAI Hazardous Materials Handling • Flammable solid (nitrocellulose) ~150 fiber drums stored in truck-trailer • Fuel oil tanks Relocated from courtyard into the building one week before explosion Photo: ICI Nobel Enterprises

  22. C 5100 sq ft

  23. 5

  24. Arnel Hazardous Materials Handling • Flammable solvents • Underground storage tanks • 1000-gallon product mixer • Two 300-gallon totes • Several paint product mixers • Many 55-gallon drums and small containers

  25. Arnel Hazardous Materials Handling • Flammable solid (nitrocellulose) 14 drums in truck-trailer

  26. CAI equipment 1200 sq ft 5 1100 sq ft

  27. 5

  28. Fuel Sources Considered • Nitrocellulose • Fuel oil • Natural gas • High-pressure pipeline • Low-pressure city gas system • Flammable liquids

  29. Nitrocellulose • Industrial grade • Flammable solid • Fiber drums stored in trailers, not in the building • Drums burned in place

  30. Fuel Oil • Located in isolated, closed section of building • Tanks intact after explosion • No mechanism to form flammable vapor cloud

  31. Natural Gas • Lighter-than-air gas • Rises when released • Odorized for public safety • CAI/Arnel did not have gas service • Two sources in Danversport • Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline • KeySpan city gas system

  32. Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline • 215 feet south of CAI/Arnel • 1440 psi Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) • 30-inch diameter • 0.618 inch wall thickness • Welded carbon steel construction • Four years old • Odorized

  33. Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline • High-pressure leak would escape very close to the buried pipe

  34. Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline • No “conduit” to travel underground to building 215 feet away • No post-explosion natural gas fire or leak

  35. KeySpan Gas System • Not connected to CAI/Arnel • Not connected to nearby Abbey Fence or Danversport Bottle Gas • 150-200 feet away, on Water and Bates streets • Very low pressure (0.36 psi) • Odorized

  36. KeySpan Gas System • 90+ years old • Cast iron pipe • “Bell and spigot” joints

  37. KeySpan Gas System • Explosion caused many leaks • Leaks after the incident were too small • No natural gas fires during or after the incident

  38. CSB Blast Modeling • Neighborhood damage surveyed and quantified • Overpressures estimated • Compare to available explosion energy to natural gas

  39. Blast Pressure Damage Estimates

  40. 2.3 psi 365 ft 1.2 psi 581 ft

  41. CSB Blast Modeling • Fuel accumulation in production area (volume ~ 110,000 cubic feet) • Estimate explosion energy in the explosive range • Compare explosion energy estimates to observed community damage

More Related