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New Zealand’s Strategic Perspective

New Zealand’s Strategic Perspective. An enigmatic approach to strategy?. An imperial past. The legacy Since 1840: 100 years within imperial umbrella Upheavals: WWI, WW2 End of British Empire: continuing collective security arrangements 1945-2007 . Strategy: practice. Not a vacuum

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New Zealand’s Strategic Perspective

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  1. New Zealand’s Strategic Perspective An enigmatic approach to strategy?

  2. An imperial past • The legacy • Since 1840: 100 years within imperial umbrella • Upheavals: WWI, WW2 • End of British Empire: continuing collective security arrangements 1945-2007

  3. Strategy: practice • Not a vacuum • Practitioners: do strategy, however imperfectly, in the face of constantly altering conditions… • Strategy over four decades… • Flexibility, continuity, discontinuity, seeking advantage.

  4. The New Zealand Strategic Context • Tension of apparent/actual remoteness. • Extent of NZ’s direct geography. • Thin dimensions of NZ’s trading interests: thin and long threads, easily broken. • Alliances (CP, ANZUS, FPDA), direct obligations, indirect obligations.

  5. Northern & Southern extensions… • Cook Is. & Nuie & Tokelaus • Ocean area larger than F & T. • Sub-antarctic: Ak Is, Campbell • Ross Dependency beyond 60 dg south • Australian Antarctic Territory • More than half Antarctica… • North Pole…

  6. Improvisation • Strength, merits & difficulties of No.8 wire. • Recognition of NZ priorities. • Constantly fitting in… with whom? • Mutual interest, seldom single interest business.

  7. Gaining strategic advantage • Is different for NZ than for larger powers. • Maximisation of gains and minimisation of losses. • Taking measures to do this, & letting advantage fall NZ’s way.

  8. Collaborative, collective • Underlying approach to use of the armed forces: dictated by necessity; • NZ does not have the economic, diplomatic, or military strength to easily act alone. • Both actual (geographical) & conceptual.

  9. NZ armed forces in transition… • RNZAF, RNZN, NZ Army • 3 professional services: operational synergy • With other armed forces… • Own patrols… • Interoperability between our own services & with others is the key. • Strategic intentions signalled partially by capabilities maintained. • Unspoken assumption: USN, ADF.

  10. Foreign Policy & operation of the armed services • Foreign policy is not just trade, although trade is a core strategic requirement. • The Austronesian (ANZ + Pac Is) neighbourhood; • The wider realms: distant places, varying roles…

  11. Promotion of NZ’s interests • Grappling with different matters in wide variety of places. • Gaining long-term advantage. • Working to prevent diminution of those interests.

  12. Future directions for NZ’s armed forces • Patrol of the bits of the neighbourhood that belong to NZ + assisting others in distant places… • From tropics to Antarctic: a necessarily Australasian series of enterprises + other powers (US, France, Britain…) • Flexibility to be increased. • Frequency of MRCs: less lead time. • Low level/small campaigns/wars; larger ones. • Awareness of the unlikely possibilities as well as the likely (CTKP). • Breadth & depth argument: future will require both.

  13. Where & how • Bipartisan approaches & differences… • The local, the regional, & further afield… • Geography is king: physical & human. • Breadth of NZ’s commitments exemplifies our requirement for engagement: ultimately this comes down to freedom to trade & direct security.

  14. Shaping the practice of strategy • Political context: within & outside NZ: sets boundaries. • Absolute requirement to reflect as well as to practice within the daily pressures. • If the practice of strategy becomes defunct: risk of becoming an adjunct of others powers’ strategy. • To a degree NZ is always vulnerable to that consideration. • NZ response has generally been to take cases on merits: strengths & flaws in this approach.

  15. Friction, chance… • Murphy • The irrational • No-one has a monopoly on wisdom • Fast moving pace of events require thoughtful contemplation of all sorts of circumstances (most of which won’t occur) long before an eventuality arrives.

  16. Consequences of strategy… • The foreseen & the unforeseen… • Less directly difficult when strategy done with partners… • Likely to be more difficult with unilateral action.

  17. Dealing with unfavourable circumstances • An inability to be able to effectively respond, not just NZ but crucially, other usual partners… • Dec.1941 one manifestation: 5 mths in 1942 an absolute vulnerability.

  18. The Nuclear future… • Proliferation. • Terrorism. • Nuclear war. • WMD troubles. • Major regional conflict interventions involve nuclear armed powers. • Nuclear power.

  19. Interstate limited war • One state against a collection • Collection against collection • Flexiblity of coalitions: less trouble about getting formed & started: • More difficult to end. • Long term commitment… • Discretionary warfare: Middle East • Necessary war: Australia • Other commitments along the operational spectrum…

  20. Intrastate trouble • Greater the trouble, the more intractable the problems are??? • Help under these circumstances. • Management of intractable situations… • Long term commitment. • Discretion: to go in, to leave, to stay out. • Outcomes: serving NZ’s interests + those of the international community.

  21. Use of resources in direct assistance • Economic • Diplomatic • Military • Deleterious effects: to effectively contribute, need to minimise ongoing damage to NZ’s own resources. • Increase in size, number of platforms, capabilities.

  22. Position of the United States. China/India rivalry. Reg. nuclear war. China/Taiwan Korean Pen. Fiji. Pac Is. Possession of maritime estates. Middle East. Indonesia. Demographic alterations. Economic depression. Environmental shifts. Simultaneous conflicts on different levels of war. Political change in major states… Next 40 years…

  23. The bleak future • The disruptive world. • A disrupted neighbourhood. • Military, political, economic, demographic, climatic upheavals in series… • Weak powers even at a distance will be challenged.

  24. Being prepared • To avoid being merely reactive. • To minimize impact of situations of disadvantage to NZ. • Contributions: military, diplomatic, economic, political, social. • Keeping challenges away: distant solutions are better for NZ: assisted by physical geography (but in modern warfighting, distance is not an absolute guarantee).

  25. Into the murk… • NZ has some discretion thanks to geography & two shields… • Setting priorities but considering the widest range of possibilities, however unlikely. • Bedrock geography: NZ is a maritime nation, & needs maritime partners (great & small). • China, India, US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, SE Asia, Austronesia.

  26. Conclusions • NZ’s strategic perspective is custom-made. • Promotion of distant peace & security protects NZ’s vital interests abroad (trade) & at home. • If the sea is a highway, NZ needs to be the secure farm at the end of the road. • This will only be the case with careful attention to strategy, & continued good fortune.

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