Rational / Utilitarian Tradition

1. Rational / Utilitarian Tradition James Coleman

2. Last time • March and Simon • Optimizing is impossible or too costly, so people tend towards satisfactory solutions. • Thomas Schelling • Tacit coordination is possible despite lack of direction communication.

3. James Coleman • Events have consequences: • Consequences for those who control the event: internalities • Consequences for those who do not control the event: externalities • It is the latter that brings about need for social coordination.

4. Roommate mess • Messy kitchen costs = x • Cleaning kichen costs = 3x • Jim 3x > x • Jim after sanctioning 3x < 4x • Sanctioning Jim = 2x • Total benefit x < 2x

5. Problem of zeal • Structure of the problem is the same: common benefit enjoyed whether or not an individual contributes. • But when positive sanctions are effective but cost little, can lead to zeal.

6. Problem of voting • B = benefit • P = probability of positive outcome • C = cost • Equation on whether to vote would be: bp = b(p + (delta)p) – c • Conclusion: don’t vote

7. Solution to voting problem • Coleman p.185, conjoint norm among a group of people. (In effect you increase (delta)p by participating in a norm) • Does it work? • No b/c 100 person network would only increase p from, say, .00001 to .0001, still not enough.

8. Overview: Rational / Utilitarian tradition • 2 fundamental characteristics • 1. Methodological individualism. • 2. Substantive emphasis on rationality. • Rationality? • Strong version: indivduals pursue selfish interests through most efficient means. • Weak version: individuals pursue any intersts through most efficient means

9. Evaluation of R / U theory? • Good: doesn’t portray people as ignorant • Weakness? • Doesn’t deal well with structural inequalities. • Doesn’t deal well with cultural differences.