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Navigation Database Integrity Issues. Dan Hawkes JAA. Scope. Aeronautical Data Chain Processes Navigation Data Origination problems observed Navigation Data Preparation Database Integration Role of the Aircraft Operator Standards Regulatory Oversight. Processes. Derive & Publish
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Navigation Database Integrity Issues Dan Hawkes JAA
Scope • Aeronautical Data Chain Processes • Navigation Data Origination • problems observed • Navigation Data Preparation • Database Integration • Role of the Aircraft Operator • Standards • Regulatory Oversight.
Processes Derive & Publish e.g. states’ AIPs Origination Preparation by Data Service Provider Receive Assemble Link to target equipment in required format Translate Select Application Integration Format Load & Maintain current End Use Distribute Aeronautical Data Chain Processes
ICAO Integrity Requirements The data is classified by ICAO Annex 15: • runway threshold coordinates require an integrity value of 10-8 • coordinates of navaids and waypoints, aerodrome elevation, station declination, geoidal undulation, magnetic variation, require an integrity value of 10-5 • the remaining data items require an integrity value of 10-3. CRITICAL: ESSENTIAL: Routine:
The Problem • The quality of aeronautical data used in aircraft navigation databases is critical to safe area navigation operations. • The requirements for data content and integrity are set out in ICAO Annex 15*. • However, the processes of the data chain do not have regulatory oversight. • A study by EUROCONTROL revealed a data integrity level lower than that required by the ICAO Standards. * Also Annexes 4 and 11, and Doc 9674
The EUROCONTROL Study • Since September 2000, data has been collected from three sources: • the national AIPs of the 38 ECAC member states plus 18 surrounding states; • military AIPs of 3 ECAC member states (Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK); and • en-route Supplements of the Flight Information Publication used by the UK Royal Air Force. • From 2002, the collection involved only data from ECAC states but extended to include instrument procedures.
Results of the Study (1) 25357 records, each with 49 data items, from the civil AIPs, and 2420 records from military AIPs were studied. • Some 11.5% civil AIP records included at least one identified inconsistency. • Many of the inconsistencies can be summarised as follows: • format and resolution, both between different sections within the same document and among different AIPs; More..
Results of the Study (2) • different values for the same waypoint in AIPs of neighbouring countries; • incomplete or no co-ordinate data for some runway thresholds and waypoints; • inconsistent, incomplete, and contradictory use of acronyms for navaid type (e.g. VOR, TDVOR), and function (En-route, Aerodrome); • inconsistent format of temperatures or no aerodrome reference temperatures; …and more
Results of the Study (3) • inconsistent and incomplete publication of navaid technical characteristics (e.g. effective radiated power, operating frequency, magnetic variation); • inconsistency between civil and military source documents for same navaid data; and • inconsistent use of metrics and formats for elevation and distance (in particular, metres, feet, km, nautical miles).
Annual Reports • In January 2002, inconsistencies in the data of ECAC states were 2178 but revised to 1653 after review. • In January 2003, for a total of 20334 data records collected from ECAC states; • 374 new inconsistencies were added; • 445 were resolved with 118 of these relating to waypoint issues. • Remainder unresolved = 1582.
Conclusion to the Study • While states are addressing existing inconsistencies, each 28 days of the AIRAC cycle introduces new errors. • Data integrity remains a significant cause of concern. • It is acknowledged that due to the difficulties in collecting the data, some errors and omissions in the report are to be expected.
Consequences • If this is not improved, Precision RNAV implementation, which is currently well advanced in Europe, and the RNP-RNAV mandate planned for 2010 could be delayed. • The European experience must cast doubt on the wisdom of granting operational approvals for critical RNAV operations world-wide !
Navigation Data Preparation • Performed by Data Service Provider. • Data received from originator, normally states. • The Data Service Provider assembles, translates, selects, and formats data elements to produce data configured for distribution to the next link in the chain. • ARINC Specification 424: Navigation System Data Base, is a commonly used format.
Integration and Distribution Geo Area, Airports, Procedures, etc. Tailored Data Customers Customers Customers Database Selection Tool Lido EAG Jeppesen Data Verification and Validation Tool FMS Spec Data Spec Selected Library Duplication and Distribution Tools Data Format & Packaging Tools Unique Database • Floppies • Tapes • PCMCIA • EDT Data Modification Tool Data Filtering and Adjustments AIP Data Data Service Providers MasterLibrary Content & Quality
Navigation Database Production Th 8 Fr 9 Sa 10 Su 11 Mo 12 Tu 13 We 14 Th 15 Fr 16 Sa 17 Su 18 Mo 19 Tu 20 We 21 Th 22 Fr 23 Sa 24 Su 25 Mo 26 Tu 27 We 28 Th 1 Fr 2 Sa 3 Su 4 Mo 5 Tu 6 We 7 Receive ARINC 424 Source Data Deliver to Customer Update Master Library Run Verification Programs Perform Quality Checks Update Master Library • Process Customer Request • Tailored data • Database definition • Distribution Output can involve thousands of database variants each Cycle Customer Selection and Format Run Verification Programs Tailored Data Verification 28 Day Cycle Distribution
Data Integrity for Precision RNAV • For the current situation, the operator, as the “end-user”, has the burden of verifying the integrity of the data. • JAA TGL No. 10 requires operators to obtain navigation data from an “Approved Supplier” or provide an alternative method for data integrity checking. • Today, there are no approved suppliers.
Aerodrome Air Traffic Service Provider Met Service Provider Comm Service Provider SAR Service Provider Procedure & Airspace Designer Aeronautical Information Service AIPs Other State Sources, Geographical Institute, Equipment Services End-User e.g. Airlines, Aircraft owners FMS Data Application Integrator e.g. Thales, SI NOTAM Data Service Provider e.g. Jeppesen, LIDO, EAG End-User e.g. Airlines, Aircraft Owner Simulation Data Application Provider Flight Planning Data Application Provider Aeronautical Data Tailoring Requirements Aeronautical Data Chain
AIPs End-User e.g. Airlines, Aircraft owners FMS Data Application Integrator e.g. Thales, SI NOTAM End-User e.g. Airlines, Aircraft Owner Compare ? Operator Verification (1) What operators are attempting today…
Operator Verification (2) • The problem is that manual checking by operators is impractical due to the many database variants and short AIRAC cycle. • Operators report that they do not have the resources or suitable tools to perform this task. • The task will become even more difficult once numerous P-RNAV procedures are implemented.
Pilot Checking of Loaded Data • The display of the instrument procedure should be compared by the pilot against the chart information. • Could be different providers but both could be produced from same (wrong) ARINC 424 data. • Are we expecting too much at the end of a weak chain? • Navigation data integrity is an obstacle on the critical path for P-RNAV.
A Way Forward? • With the goal of relieving the operator’s burden, data quality needs to be ensured at all stages of the chain. • Electronic data capture and processing to avoid transcription errors can help. • An electronic AIP would assist comparison of the final database with the original data. • Who should make this comparison? • Regulatory oversight needed end-to-end.
The European AIS Database • EUROCONTROL has sponsored an electronic database development with 8 pilot clients, both state and commercial. • The product can be offered in ARINC 424 format or the Aeronautical Information Conceptual Exchange Model (AIC- XM). • The service was demonstrated on 9th May 2003. • Tentative operational start is scheduled for 6th June 2003.
Regulatory Oversight and Approval • The balance of responsibilities between all entities involved in the data chain would be improved by compliance with recognised standards and regulatory oversight. • A means of identifying a database as compliant with prescribed standards and released from an “approved supplier”.
Receive Assemble Translate Select Format Distribute Standards DO-201A/ED-77 accuracy, resolution, criticality, calculation, designed procedures. Origination DO-200A/ED-76A Aeronautical Data Preparation DO-178B/ED-12B Software processes and tool qualification Application Integration Airworthiness & Operational Requirements End Use
Regulatory Provisions • An Advanced EUROCONTROL Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (A-ENPRM) has been issued (May 2003) that discusses and considers the regulatory provisions that would secure data of the required integrity from the Aeronautical Information Service. • JAA is considering how best to ensure that the RTCA/EUROCAE Standard DO-200A/ED-76 is applied in the subsequent database production processes.
Action by FAA • In cooperation with EUROCONTROL and JAA, the FAA is actively considering how the DO-200A/ED-76 Standard could be applied to US organisations involved in the database chain. • Differences between the European and US regulatory environment would lead to different but compatible strategy.
Recognition of Approvals • Need to have a transparent system whereby operators can source navigation data from any company • There needs to be compatibility between JAA and FAA processes to enable mutual recognition of JAA/FAA approvals • Action required to bring about approvals in same timeframe – supporting P-RNAV implementation.