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Screening for Counterfeit Electronics Components

Screening for Counterfeit Electronics Components. Glenn Robertson Stephen Schoppe Process Sciences, Inc. Leander, Texas 512.259.7070 www.process-sciences.com. Outline. Introduction Authentication Test Procedures Examples Conclusion. Introduction. Nature and Scope of Problem

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Screening for Counterfeit Electronics Components

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  1. Screening for Counterfeit Electronics Components Glenn Robertson Stephen Schoppe Process Sciences, Inc. Leander, Texas 512.259.7070 www.process-sciences.com

  2. Outline • Introduction • Authentication Test Procedures • Examples • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Nature and Scope of Problem • A growing (and high-profit) industry • Related to - • Globalization • Product Cost • High Demand/Scarcity • Obsolescence • “Spotty” laws and enforcement

  4. Introduction • Nature and Scope of Problem • Includes all types of products, such as: • Pharmaceuticals • Auto parts • Phones/batteries • Golf Clubs • Power Tools • Elevators • Electronic components • And many more…

  5. Introduction • Nature and Scope of Problem • What are counterfeit electronics? • Misrepresented parts • Wrong parts (altered P/N) • Wrong date code • Consumer grade remarked as military grade • Reclaimed parts • Manufacturing defects/surplus production • “Reverse Engineered” copies

  6. Introduction • Risk Reduction by Supply Chain Management • Careful supply chain management will always be the first line of defense • Purchase from franchised distributors • Screening inspection (Authentication) for high-risk components • Parts from “Grey Market” distributors • High Value/Scarce • Obsolete

  7. Introduction • Authentication Procedure(s) Developed for Screening High-Risk Components • Non-Destructive • Destructive

  8. Authentication Procedures

  9. Authentication Procedures • Non-Destructive • Component Database Comparison • Visual Testing • X-ray Inspection • X-ray Fluorescence (Lead Finish, RoHS screen) • Electrical Testing • Destructive • Chemical Decapsulation • Mechanical Delidding

  10. Component Information Database • Information Sources • “Golden” Part • Manufacturers’ Data Sheets • OCMs • Distributors • Other sources (e.g., customer, PSI files) • Date Code histories • Company histories • Chip suppliers • Mergers, name changes, plant closings/relocations • Prior screening history at PSI

  11. Visual Testing • Verify Correct P/N • Verify Date Code Against Database • Compare Font and Symbology Against “Golden” Part if Available

  12. Visual Testing • Inspect package for: • Blacktopping • Sanding Scratches • Discrepancies in Surface Texture

  13. Visual Testing • Marking Permanency Test (MPT) • Mineral Spirits (JEDEC JESD22-B107C) • MEK, Acetone, Alcohol • Degradation of Markings • Change in Surface Texture • Partial Removal of Coating

  14. Visual Testing • Inspect Lead Condition • Surface Appearance • Check Straightness and Coplanarity • Evaluate Solderability

  15. X-ray Inspection • Chip size/count • Wire bond count/pitch • Flip chip bump count/pitch • No need to open package

  16. X-ray Inspection

  17. XRF Testing • Provides rapid semi-quantitative elemental analysis • Typically used for: • RoHS compliance screening • Verify lead finish • Verify Pb presence where required

  18. Electrical Testing • Curve Tracer • Used primarily for discretes • Generates a characteristic curve for DUT • Plots voltage or current response vs. voltage or current stimulus  • Detects shorts, opens, high leakage current

  19. Chemical Decapsulation • Used on epoxy packages • Acid etching most common

  20. Mechanical Delidding • Metal or ceramic packages • Diamond saw or Dremel • Lid pry-off

  21. Verification Examples

  22. Lambda Discrete TO Transistor • 1 “Gold” part, 2 to be tested • Passed visual inspection and MPT • Si Chip Visible by X-ray Inspection • Bond wires not visible

  23. Lambda Discrete TO Transistor • Screening by Curve Tracer • One Faulty Component Quickly Identified Base to Emitter Emitter to Collector

  24. Lambda Discrete TO Transistor • De-lidding Results • No P/N or other markings on chips • Similar surface color and circuit artwork • Conclusion: both samples genuine, with one electrical failure

  25. Altera Ceramic DIP • Two Packages to be tested • Visual Inspection • No evidence of tampering • Markings passed permanency test

  26. Altera Ceramic DIP • Delidding to Examine Silicon Chip • Surface of chips virtually identical • Close inspection shows “WaferScale” on chip 1 vs. “D” on chip 2 • Probably from different fab lines or different revisions Full Chip Chip 1 Close up Chip 2 Close up

  27. Maxim 8-Pin DIP • One package to be tested • Visual Inspection • Markings Passed Permanency Testing • Non-uniform Leads, Evidence of Re-tinning

  28. Maxim 8-Pin DIP • Decapping Results • Manufacturer Logo, Date Code, P/N Identified • chip date code = 1990, and chip ID = “1016” • Corresponds to earlier Linear Tech P/N LT1016 • Component surface has been remarked to a MAX913, which is Maxim’s improved replacement for Linear Tech’s LT1016

  29. Philips 68 Pin PLCC • Two Packages to be Tested • Visual Inspection • Same markings on each component • Surface texture removed by solvent • Parts were black-topped and remarked Component Top As-Received Component Top After SolventResistance Test

  30. Philips 68 Pin PLCC • Decapping Results • Same marking on both chips • Corresponds with portion of external marking • Purpose of remarking possibly to alter date code or P/N variant

  31. Xicor 8-Pin DIP • Two Packages to be Tested • Visual Inspection • All markings removed by MPT • Textured surface also removed Component Top As Received Component Top After MPT Solvent Test

  32. Xicor 8-Pin DIP • Decapping Results • Same marking on both chips • Corresponds with external P/N • Purpose of remarking possibly to alter date code or P/N variant Overall Photo of Chip Chip Markings Close-Up

  33. Samsung 48-pin TSOP • Two Packages to be Tested • 64M x 8 Bit NAND Flash Memory • Visual Inspection • Laser-marked • No Evidence of Tampering Component Top As Received

  34. Samsung 48-pin TSOP • Decapping Results • Same marking on both chips • P/N K9F5608U0A (as marked on chip) corresponds to 32M x 8 Bit NAND flash Memory • Components have been remarked as 64M NAND Chip Markings Close-Up Overall Photo of Chip

  35. Actel Ceramic PGA • One Package to be Tested • Passed MPT, No Signs of Tampering Top component markings Bottom component markings

  36. Actel Ceramic PGA • Alphanumeric and Mfg Logo Located onChip Surface • “21225” on chip matches package marking • Many Actel chips produced by TI in 80s • Actel acquired operations from TI in 1995 • No indication of counterfeit Top Edge Close-Up Upper Right Corner Close-Up Chip Surface

  37. Micro Power Systems 48-pin SOIC • Four Packages to be Tested • Two each of date codes 9812 and 9751 • Passed MPT, No Signs of Tampering Date 9812 Bottom Markings Date 9812 Top Markings Date 9751 Top Markings Date 9751 Bottom Markings

  38. Micro Power Systems 48-pin SOIC • X-ray Inspection Results • Lead frames identical • All bond wires intact X-ray Image - 9751 date code X-ray Image - 9812 date code

  39. Micro Power Systems 48-pin SOIC • Decapping Results • Identical markings on all components Chip Surface – Upper Right Corner Chip Surface– Lower Right Corner

  40. Micro Power Systems 48-pin SOIC • Decapping Results Close-up • Marked with Exar Logo • Date Code 1996 • Exar acquired Micro Power Systems(M Logo) in 1994 • Markings consistent with authentic parts Markings Close-up – Lower Right Corner

  41. Motorola Microwave Transistor • 1 “Gold” part, 2 to be tested • Packages and markings identical

  42. Motorola Microwave Transistor • De-lidded Part Results • Package 3 chip has “MOT” and logo • Packages 1 and 2 are counterfeit Package 1 Package 3 Package 2

  43. Conclusions • Component Verification is Essentialto Supply Chain Management • Many Non-Destructive and Destructive Tests Available • Balance Verification Plan Against Assessment of Risk

  44. Thank You! Glenn Robertson glennr@process-sciences.com Stephen Schoppe sms@process-sciences.com

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