Overview: Arms Control and Nonproliferation in East Asia

1. Overview: Arms Control and Nonproliferation in East Asia Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, EANP Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International StudiesOctober 2003

2. Current Issues and Challenges • Historical Background • Current Capabilities • Ongoing Challenges • Possible Arms Control Measures

3. Regional Tension: History • Historical legacies of WWII • Japanese aggression and aftermath • Divided states (Korea, China/Taiwan) • Cold War left-overs • Territorial conflicts • South/East Asian Islands • Changing power relations • Chinese military modernization • US-Japan-South Korea relations • Increasing interdependence

4. NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES • Territorial • PRC - Japan: Diaoyu Islands • Japan-Korea: Takeshima Islands • Russia - Japan: Kurile Islands Sovereignty • Sovereignty • PRC – Taiwan • North Korea - South Korea • Proliferation • North Korea – Nuclearization • North Korea - Export of WMD items • United States - Theater missle defense • China - Items to South Asia and middle East • Dual-use technology • Other • US - Japan defense agreement • US - Taiwan: Taiwan Relations Act

5. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: North Korea • Withdrew from NPT • Nuclear weapons capabilities • Unaccounted fissile material for 1-3 weapons • Secret uranium enrichment program admitted to Oct 2002 • Not yet tested NW, but has done high explosive tests • Potential for significant arsenal in 1-2 years

6. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: North Korea • Ballistic missile capabilities • Scud B and Cs • No-dong MRBMs • Taepo-dong 1,2,3 under development • Miniaturization of nuclear warhead still in question • Proliferation Threat • Missile exports seen as income earner

7. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: China • Nuclear weapons capabilities • Recognized Nuclear Weapon State • First nuclear test 1964 • Last test 1996 • Extensive nuclear weapons capability • Acceded to NPT, Signed CTBT • Member, Zangger Committee • NWFZs, NFU Doctrine, Security Assurances

8. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: China • Ballistic missiles capabilities • 400 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in Fujian • Approx. 90 MRBMs (DF-3 and DF-21/21A) • Approx. 20 IRBMs (DF-4) • Approx. 20 ICBMs (DF-5) • Not member of MTCR, but export controls coincide with regime

9. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Japan • No WMD programs • CBW programs in WWII • Potential capability to produce nuclear weapons and missiles in relatively short time • Nuclear capabilities • Party to NPT and CTBT; Member, NSG and Zangger Committee • After WWII, ‘nuclear allergy’ • Recent debate about nuclear future • Controversial nuclear energy program and plutonium stockpiles

10. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Japan • Ballistic missile capacity • Space launch vehicle program • May 2003 launched spy satellites • Still lacks some key technologies for missiles • Member MTCR • Missile defense • Aegis Destroyers • Expanding BMD cooperation with U.S.

11. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: South Korea • Nuclear capacity • Nuclear weapons program stopped in mid-1980s under US pressure • Member NPT, CTBT • Signed, but never fully implemented, the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula” • Extensive nuclear energy industry

12. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: South Korea • CBW capabilities • Ratified CWC and BWC • Declared CW program in 1997 • Concerns about CBW capabilities of North • Well-developed pharmaceutical and biotech infrastructure • Ballistic missile capabilities • Building SRBMs up to MTCR limits • Member, MTCR • Developing SLVs

13. WMD Capacity in NE Asia: Taiwan • Nuclear capabilities • Nuclear weapons program stopped in mid-1980s under US pressure • Developed nuclear energy program • Ballistic missile capabilities • Had ballistic missile programs in past • SRBM Tien Chi, first test-fired in 1997 • Solid-fueled, two-stage missile with a 300 km range that can reach China’s southeastern coast • Missile Defense • Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) systems • Potentially seeking advanced missile defense • PAC-3 systems and Aegis radar-equipped destroyers

14. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS • Programs began in the 1950s • Signed NPT in 1985; IAEA safeguards agreement 1992 • 1993-1994 nuclear crisis • 1994 Agreed Framework and key provisions • October 2002 revelation of uranium enrichment programs

15. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS • North Korean nuclear and missile brinkmanship • Between 1994 and 2002, Agreed Framework capped North Korea fissile material production • Exchange for light-water reactor under construction • IAEA verification measures • North Korean freeze on ballistic missile flight tests • Static engine tests continuing • Exports of missiles, missile technology continuing • North Korea’s CBW threat • Capacity to hit Japan and South Korea

16. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS • Current Crisis • October 2002: Admits to secret uranium-enrichment program • November 2002: US halts oil shipments to DPRK • November 2002: Confusion over apparent admission • December 2002: Yemen bound boat stopped • December 2002: Breaks seals at Yongbyon; Moves fuel rods; expels IAEA inspectors

17. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS • Current Crisis • January 2003: IAEA demands that North Korea readmit inspectors • January 2003: North Korea withdraws from NPT • January 2003: Fears of reprocessing • February 2003: North Korea claims it has reactivated Yongbyon reactor

18. THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS • Current Crisis: • February/March 2003: North Korea test fires naval missiles • April 2003: UNSC expresses concern • April 2003: Beijing trilateral talks • May to July 2003: Stalemate between US and DPRK; China and other regional players step up diplomacy • Six-party talks in Beijing; next round November

19. NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS • 5-MWe reactor Yongbyon (1985) • 50-MWe reactor (Yongbyon) and 200-MWe reactor (Taechon), both under construction at the time of AF • 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons) • Uranium enrichment facilities?

20. NORTH KOREAN CAPACITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION • Plutonium from 1989 extraction (material for 1 to 2 weapons) • Reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons) • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 kg plutonium per year (approximately enough for 1 weapon per year) • HEU program: approximately 100 kg HEU per year for 6 weapons • Completed 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in Yongbyon-kun: 55 kg of plutonium per year for 7-10 bombs • 200MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant located in T'aech'on: 220 kg of plutonium per year for 30-40 weapons

21. US POLICY TOWARD THE DPRK • 1993-1994 negotiation leading to AF • 1999 Berlin Agreement on missile test moratorium • Marshall Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington, DC • Albright’s visit to Pyongyang • Bush administration’s North Korea policy review; State of Union address and NPR • Kelly visit

22. NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS • Nonaggression pact with the US • Political recognition • Non obstruction of North Korea’s economic development, including removal from terrorist country list, lifting of economic sanctions, and access to int’l financial institutions • Economic assistance in exchange of suspension of WMD programs (“satisfy US security concerns”)

23. US POSITIONS & OPTIONS • North Korea must dismantle its nuclear weapons programs • No bilateral negotiation with Pyongyang • Multilateral forum to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue • Concerted multinational efforts to pressure North Korea; IAEA/UN resolutions • Proliferation Security Initiative • Military options

24. REGIONAL REACTIONS • South Korea - stability; no war; negotiate a peaceful resolution • Japan - peaceful solution; enhance defense; more receptive to sanction measures • Russia - concerned over escalation; seek solution and Russia’s role • China - stability; peaceful solution; NK security concerns addressed

25. RISKS OF CONTINUING IMPASSE • Pyongyang may move from playing nuclear cards to seriously developing nuclear weapons • Continuing impasse gives DPRK time to reprocess fissile materials and HEU for making nuclear bombs • North Korea could export nuclear materials • Nuclear chain reactions in the region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan)

26. RISKS OF MILITARY SOLUTION • Uncertainty about exact locations of nuclear facilities • Danger of unleashing all-out war on the peninsula, with massive casualties • Pyongyang may resort to WMD use • US troops and Japan become targets • Economic devastation, environmental degradation and refugee flows

27. SEEKING SOLUTIONS Solution of nuclear crisis requires phased approaches • Defuse the nuclear escalation through bilateral/multilateral talks • Develop new, comprehensive verifiable arms control & nonproliferation mechanisms • US-DPRK ending war status and mutual recognition • Multilateral security arrangement • International economic & development assistance

28. Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns • China’s previous assistance to Pakistan and North Korea • Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, missiles depended heavily on Chinese assistance • Some technology continues to flow to Pakistan, North Korea • Growing recognition of potential threat to China’s security

29. Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns • China strengthening export controls • New regulations and control lists, 2002 • Use of ‘catch-all’ clauses • Coinciding with NSG, MTCR, Australia Group lists • Continuing concerns about domestic capacity • Increased US sensitivity about spread of WMD materials has provoked sanctions • Seeks reciprocity: Wants limits on US arms sales to Taiwan

30. Regional Arms Control Issues: Proliferation Concerns • North Korean proliferation threat • Important source of DPRK income • Supporting Pakistan, Iranian missile programs • Concerns about transfers to non-state actors • Nuclear domino effect • Increases chance of pushing other Asian countries in direction of defenses and deterrents

31. Regional Arms Control Issues: Reactions to security challenges • Will Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan remain non-nuclear? • Japan sees increasing threat from China and North Korea • South Korea more relaxed • Taiwan feels threatened, but constrained • Increasing interest in offensive options to deter, respond to missile threats

32. Regional Arms Control Issues: Missile Defense • Sino-U.S. strategic relations and missile defenses • China sees U.S. missile defenses as aimed at China’s deterrent • U.S. sees China modernizing and increasing strategic forces • U.S. and allies see missile threat from North Korea • Potential for negative strategic interactions

33. Possible Arms Control Measures • Talks to end current North Korea standoff • Questions about format (bilateral vs multilateral) • All regional players involved • China playing increasingly active role • Agreement still looks distant • Other options undesirable • Sanctions/Blockade • Military Action • Acceptance of a nuclear North Korea

34. Possible Arms Control Measures • Regional Confidence Building Measures • ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • NWFZs • Strategic restraint • Unilateral or reciprocal limits on capabilities • Coupled with political efforts to improve relations • Strategic dialogue • Making force structure interactions clear • Transparency about arsenals, intentions