NATIONAL POWER

1. NATIONAL POWER Dr. Alan Gropman 14 July 2009

2. RESOURCES AND NATIONAL POWERAn Historical Perspective • Focus will be on resources mobilization historically • Resources mobilization in Ancient Greece • Resources mobilization in Feudal Europe • Modern warfare begins with the French Revolution • The North outmobilized the South during the American Civil War • The United States - the Arsenal of Democracy – contributed to the allied victory in World War I • The United States in World War II nearly outproduced the rest of the world. • The Cold War: Mobilization Planning not taken seriously • Post Cold War: Mobilization Planning Abandoned

3. ENDURING PRINCIPLES NATIONAL INTERESTS & DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OBJECTIVES ENVIRONMENT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DIPLOMATIC MILITARY ECONOMIC INFORMATIONAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS ELEMENTS OF RESOURCES NATIONAL POWER RESOURCE ALLOCATION

4. CORRELLI BARNETT ...The power of a nation-state by no means consists only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight and resolution with which its foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political organization. It consists most of all in the nation itself, the people, their skills, energy, ambition, discipline, initiative; their beliefs, myths and illusions. And it consists, further, in the way all these factors are related to one another. Moreover national power has to be considered not only in itself, in its absolute extent, but relative to the state’s foreign or imperial obligations; it has to be considered relative to the power of other states.

5. Joint Fighting Solid Strategy Solid Doctrine Solid Tactics Unit Cohesion Good Leadership ARE ALL ALSO IMPORTANT RESOURCE MOBILIZATION WHILE CRITICAL IS NOT EVERYTHING IN WAR

6. PEOPLE • People are the most important resource • Examining the culture gives clues to the capacity for mobilizing people • Examining the nature of the government also gives clues to the capacity for mobilizing people • Racism and intolerance are costly

7. RESOURCES MOBILIZATION FROM PERICLES TO LOUIS XIV • Ancient Greece all healthy male citizens fought • In the Peloponessian War resources were a factor • Sound judgment did not prevail regarding resources (it frequently has not) • Imperial Rome was able to fight outside of agricultural cycle using money • Money was important to Rome, and has been ever since • Mercenaries were common from Roman times to today • Mercenaries had to be paid • Paying for mercenaries and other aspects of war often led to bankruptcy • Addition of gunpowder weapons added greatly to the expense of war • Thirty-Years War (1618-1648) hyper-costly in human and economic terms • Led to eighteenth century warfare being fought by social misfits

8. THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONAND THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE • The (real) meaning and effect of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” • The economic gains of the revolution to the state • The “Levy on Mass” • Why other states did not adopt the “Levy on Mass” • What the French revolution did for the French military

9. LEVEE EN MASSE “From this moment until the enemy is driven from the territory of the republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. “The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make tents and clothes and will serve in the hospitals; the children will make up old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried in t the public squares to rouse the courage of the fighting men, to preach hatred of kings and the unity of the republic. “The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions factories; the earthen floors of cellars shall be treated with lye to extract saltpeter [to make gunpowder]. “All firearms of suitable caliber shall be turned over to the troops; the interior shall be policed with shot guns and cold steel. “All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw artillery and supply wagons.” 23 August 1793

10. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR • North won because it had more resources and mobilized them better than the South • North had more than double the railroad mileage • North had a Navy and many times commercial ships and shipyards • North had double the South’s population • North had mobilized 110% more soldiers than Confederacy • North mobilized black soldiers, South refused • North has 110,000 factories, South 18,000 • North far exceeded South’s iron production • Lincoln exploited his powers, Davis constrained because of form of government • North manufactured everything needed for war, the South bought abroad (with declining dollars) • North had better tax and budgeting policies, controlled inflation • Northern troops were better fed, better clothed • Union better controlled railroads and telegraphs • Superiority of numbers is the first principle of war and the North had numerical superiority in everything

11. WORLD WAR I • Allies wanted United States on their side because of American productivity • World War I was a war of total economic mobilization, the first in history • World War I enormous losses in men and equipment demanded total economic mobilization • National Defense Act, 3 June 1916, paves way for United States economic mobilization • President Wilson establishes Council for National Defense in August 1916 to coordinate economy for war if it occurs • War orders for European belligerents aided mobilization • General Staff reorganized to deal with economic mobilization • Establishing and maintaining priorities was central and difficult • Artillery shelling increased by 33 times in about a 50-year period • Industrial College came out of mobilization problems ******

12. TOTAL POPULATION OF THE POWERS1890-1938(millions)

13. PER CAPITA LEVELS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION,1890-1938(relative to Great Britain in 1900=100)

14. ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF THE POWERS1890-1938(in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent)

15. IRON/STEEL PRODUCTION OF THE POWERS, 1890-1938(millions of tons; pig-iron for 1890, steel thereafter)

16. RELATIVE SHARES OFWORLD MANUFACTURING OUTPUT,1890-1938(percent)

17. WARSHIP TONNAGE OF THE POWERS1880-1914

18. WORLD WAR I • Allies wanted United States on their side because of American productivity • World War I was a war of total economic mobilization, the first in history • World War I enormous losses in men and equipment demanded total economic mobilization • National Defense Act, 3 June 1916, paves way for United States economic mobilization • President Wilson establishes Council for National Defense in August 1916 to coordinate economy for war if it occurs • War orders for European belligerents aided mobilization • General Staff reorganized to deal with economic mobilization • Establishing and maintaining priorities was central and difficult • Artillery shelling increased by 33 times in about a 50-year period • Industrial College came out of mobilization problems ******

19. WORLD WAR II * * * • The last mobilization effort of the 20th century (despite five wars since World War II (and two in the 21st Century) • United States produced 1.6 times more aircraft than the entire Axis (and American aircraft were significantly heavier) • United States produced more tanks thank all of the Axis combined • United States and Allies had superiority at the decisive point • Tax and other incentives used to build defense plants • Numerous organizations created by Roosevelt administration to harness mobilization, but these were parallel to cabinet departments • Key agencies were: • Office of Price Administration • War Production Board • Office of War Mobilization • But logistics drove strategy and not the other way around • We did not fully mobilize our people (even if we did it better than others)

20. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION(1939-1945)

21. B-24 18,188 F6F 12,210 P-47 15,579 C-47 10,247 P-51 14,490 TMB-TBF 9,812 P-40 13,700 P-39 9,585 B-17 12,677 P-38 9,585 U.S. AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN GREATEST NUMBERS(July 1940 - August 1945)

22. GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION(September 1939 - May 1945)

23. TANK PRODUCTION Great Britain 23,202 German 19,926 Italian 4,600 Japanese 2,464 Russian 54,500 United States 88,000

24. BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

25. 27 aircraft carriers 110 escort carriers 10 battleships 45 cruisers 358 destroyers 504 destroyer escorts 211 submarines 5,600 merchant vessels 82,000 landing craft 310,000 airplanes 41,000,000,000 rounds of small arms munitions 29,000,000 heavy artillery shells 100,000 10-inch shells 12,500,000 rifles and carbines 434,000,000 tons of steel 126,939 gun carriages and armored cars 2,400,000 military trucks 2,680,000 machine guns 88,000 tanks UNITED STATES ARMS PRODUCTION DURING WORLD WAR II

26. WORLD WAR II • United States outproduced almost the entire world, combined • United States produced 1.6 times more aircraft than the entire Axis (and American aircraft were significantly heavier) • United States produced more tanks thank all of the Axis combined • United States and Allies had superiority at the decisive point • Tax and other incentives used to build defense plants • Numerous organizations created by Roosevelt administration to harness mobilization, but these were parallel to cabinet departments • Key agencies were: • Office of Price Administration • War Production Board • Office of War Mobilization • But logistics drove strategy and not the other way around • We did not fully mobilize our people (even if we did it better than others) * * *

27. The Cold War • World War II followed by virtually planless demobilization • Cold war tensions soon after World War II stir mobilization planning • Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, 1946 • National Defense Act, 1947, created Defense Department, etc etc • National Security Resources Board to coordinate military and industrial mobilization, wrote draft mobilization plan • Invasion of Korea sparks serious mobilization planning • Defense Production Act, September 1950, still on books • Permits President to allocate materials and demand increased production • President after declaring National Emergency creates Office of Defense Mobilization • Director given cabinet rank, and inserted into National Security Council • Production increased prodigiously, but no rationing!

28. The Cold War 0 Eisenhower did not believe in the need for mobilization planning 0 Drops Director of Mobilization from Cabinet rank and removes from National Security Council 0 Makes Office of Defense Mobilization the Office of Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense to defend industry mainly 0 There is no mobilization during Vietnam War, Johnson and Nixon do not want to give impression country is at war 0 Few significant shortages 0 Carter merges Office of Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense with offices dealing with natural disasters and creates Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 1979 0 Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates Persian Gulf I mobilization

29. POST COLD WAR • Persian Gulf War I mobilization efforts coordinated by Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), called Mobilization and Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee • In Pentagon, chaired by Federal Emergency Management Agency Director • During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 135 Defense Priority and Allocations System and other mobilization actions taken, coordinated by Federal Emergency Management Agency by an office ion that agency that no longer exists

30. POST COLD WAR 0 During Bosnia 53 Defense Priority and Allocation System actions taken: 0 47 for NATO countries other than United Kingdom 0 5 for United Kingdom 0 1 for United States 0 Mostly for computers and communication equipment 0 Kosovo called for 20 Defense Priority and Allocation Systems Action, 7 for NATO, 10 for United States Air Force, 3 for United States Army 0 Most significantly guidance system components for JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) involved the contractor, 9 subcontractors, and 20 vendors 0 ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM: 15 Defense Priority and Allocation System actions through February, some for United Kingdom

31. MOBILIZATION FUNDAMENTALS 0 But first a bumper sticker: SHORTAGES IN THE INFORMATION AGE WILL BITE YOU IN THE BUTT JUST AS SHORTAGES DID IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 0 FUNDAMENTALS: 0 Mobilization Planning is essential • National Security Council is mobilization execution authority (Executive order 12656) • Advisor to National Security Council for mobilization and the mobilization coordinator is the Federal Emergency Management Agency • Clinton Administration eliminated office at Federal Emergency Management Agency that advised/coordinated

32. MOBILIZATION FUNDAMENTALS • We argue for resurrection of interagency mobilization preparedness planning, research and coordination activity in support of the National Security Council, to • draft policies develop an exercise program, build familiarity in mobilization preparedness community • During Gulf War an Emergency Planning/Mobilization Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee chaired by Federal Emergency Management Agency Director coordinated mobilization actions—no longer exists

33. MOBILIZATION FUNDAMENTALS • Every national security emergency in 20th century involved some mobilization of national will and also the defense industry • Some were gigantic, others much smaller • But every war had national will and industrial mobilization issues • Today, no agency looks at either national will or industrial mobilization issues holistically

34. MOBILIZATION FUNDAMENTALS 0 Mobilization planning and execution, is properly a civilian endeavor. 0 Domestic politics will intrude on mobilization and demobilization at every turn 0 A competent director of mobilization is essential 0 Allied logistics needs must be planned