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Kodak/Fuji- Questions. Compare the financial performance of Kodak and Fuji for the period 1982 to 1992. What factors explain any observed differences in operating performance for the two firms?. Porter’s Five Strategic Forces. Degree of Actual and Potential Competition. Threat of New
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Kodak/Fuji- Questions • Compare the financial performance of Kodak and Fuji for the period 1982 to 1992. • What factors explain any observed differences in operating performance for the two firms?
Porter’s Five Strategic Forces Degree of Actual and Potential Competition Threat of New Entrants Rivalry Among Existing Firms Threat of Substitute Products Industry Profitability Bargaining Power in Input and Output Markets Bargaining Power of Buyers Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Rivalry Among Existing Firms • Growth • Concentration • Differentiation • Switching Costs • Scale/ Learning Economies • Fixed-Variable Costs • Exit Barriers
Growth -- World Wide Market • U.S. 31% • Western Europe 23% • Japan 16% • Other 30%
Rivalry Among Existing Firms • Growth • Concentration • Differentiation • Switching Costs • Scale/ Learning Economies • Fixed-Variable Costs • Exit Barrier
Concentration • Kodak • Fuji • Agfa • Polaroid • Konica
Concentration Conclusion • Top Three have 98% of the market in color film • Top four have 92.5% of the market in paper • Market is an oligopoly.
Rivalry Among Existing Firms • Growth • Concentration • Differentiation • Switching Costs • Scale/ Learning Economies • Fixed-Variable Costs • Exit Barrier
Differentiation and Switching Costs • Very little quality difference between Kodak and Fuji • Generic 35 mm film introduced in 80s • lower in quality but not bad for many • response improve the quality of brand names • No switching costs involved
Rivalry Among Existing Firms • Growth • Concentration • Differentiation • Switching Costs • Scale/ Learning Economies • Fixed-Variable Costs • Exit Barriers
Scale - Exit Barriers • Very heavy fixed costs • Very high levels of R&D • Exit barriers probably different from a legal perspective depending on the country of operation
Threat of New Entrants • Scale economies • First Mover advantage • Distribution access • Relationships • Legal barriers
Threat of New Entrants -- Photo industry • Scale of economies would appear to almost be prohibitive • First mover advantage -- Kodak is a household name • Distribution access • Fuji has entered into an agreement with Wal-Mart (Currently not at case time) • Kodak has purchased Photo stores (not at case time)
Threat of Substitute Products • Disposable 35 mm cameras • Electronic imaging beginning to be a threat • Some big players: Sony, Canon, Toshiba, DuPont and 3M have moved into this arena • Both Kodak and Fuji are putting R&D dollars in this area
Kodak • Dominated the market until recently • Three primary areas of business • Imaging and information - 57% of sales, 50% of profits • Chemicals - 18% of sales, 23% of profits • Health Division - 25% of sales, 27% of profits
Kodak • Imaging and Information restructured into autonomous business units in 1985 • Revenues increased • Sales and administrative costs increased more • Several peripheral businesses were sold in the 80s, Interactive Systems, Eastman Kodak Credit Corporation, for examples
Fuji • Founded in 1934 • Three main business segments • Commercial Products - medical imaging, ...motion picture film • Magnetic Products • Consumer Photographic Products -- the largest, 70% of the Japanese film market
Fuji • Quality comparable to Kodak • Export sales account for 40% of sales • R&D runs at about 7% of sales
Compare the financial performance of Kodak and Fuji for the period 1982 to 1992. • Go to Excel
Pre-tax margins 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 14.7% 10.2% 4.9% • Fuji 18.1% 18.3% 16.9%
ROA 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 8.6% 5.3% 2.4% • Fuji 7.1% 6.0% 5.2%
Asset Turnover 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 0.977 0.841 0.809 • Fuji 0.893 0.785 0.688
ROE 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 12.5% 12.7% 8.6% • Fuji 12.9% 10.2% 8.5%
Sustained Growth 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 4.3% 3.9% 0.3% • Fuji 12.0% 9.4% 7.9%
Days Inventory 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 110 119 88 • Fuji 135 116 118
Days Receivables 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 65 84 80 • Fuji 73 66 70
Days Payables 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 22 35 33 • Fuji 60 66 71
COS as Percent of Sales 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 58.5% 53.9% 51.8% • Fuji 56.1% 55.0% 53.1%
SG&A as Percent of Sales 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 19.8% 24.3% 27.8% • Fuji 19.4% 21.5% 24.9%
R&D as Percent Of Sales 82-84 85-88 89-92 • Kodak 7.3% 7.9% 7.4% • Fuji 5.8% 6.0% 6.1%
Analysis of NROA-1992 • Kodak Fuji • ROE: 20.5% 7.0% • RNOA: 8.2% 6.9% • NOPAT Mgn:7% 6.5% • FLEV: 2.318 .035 • Spread: 4.7% 3.7% • Op T/over: 1.269 1.066
Accounting Analysis • Depreciation • Fuji uses declining balance • Kodak uses St. line • Inventories • Fuji use weighted average • Kodak uses LIFO for US, FIFO or average costs for rest
Accounting Analysis - Goodwill • Kodak uses 40 year life • Fuji uses 20 year life
What would the ratios have looked if Kodak used the same goodwill amortization • Pretax margin for 89-92 would have been 4.2% • ROA would have been 2% instead of 2.4% • ROE would have been 7.3% instead of 8.6% • Sustained growth would have been .2% instead of .3%
What does the ratio analysis show • Serious concern with Kodak’s pretax margin. Made even worse with the Goodwill change • In recent years Kodak has improved its asset use (Asset Turnover) • Days in inventory differences probably due to different inventory valuation methods
What does the ratio analysis show • Collections of receivables for Kodak have lengthen a bit Fuji has remained about the same • Kodak’s COS ratio is slightly better • Kodak has more SG&A expenses • Kodak spends more on R&D
What does the ratio analysis show • Fuji maintains about an additional month of credit from suppliers • Kodak’s ROE is comparable to Fuji’s. • Kodak has more debt. • Kodak pays out significantly more in dividends than does Fuji
What factors explain any observed differences in operating performance for the two firms? • Organizational differences? • R&D strategy • Business Diversification • Pricing strategy
Organizational Differences • Kodak has traditionally been centrally organized • Recently tried to decentralize its imaging and information businesses • Corporate administrative duplicated SG&A went up • Fuji appears to have been always decentralized
R&D Strategy • Kodak has consistently out spent Fuji by 1% to 2% • Kodak is also involved in the pharmaceutical industry which is heavy R&D
Business Diversification • Kodak is more diversified than Fuji • Revenue% and ROS per segments Revenue ROS 87-89 90-92 87-90 90-92 Imaging 40.0% 36.9% 16.9% 15.3% Information 23.5% 20.8% 1.9% -6.9% Chemicals 18.7% 19.2% 17.6% 14.5% Health 17.8% 24.5% 16.3% 1.5% • Has Diversification been a good thing for Kodak?
Pricing Strategy • Fuji appears to price its product much higher in the domestic market • Gives Fuji cash flows • Allows them to price low in the export market • However 46% of Kodak’s revenue, 90-92, from outside the US came from imaging (Core Business) versus 27% domestic revenues
Differences in financing strategies and performance of the two firms? • Kodak’s payout ratio is about .8 Vs .07 for Fuji • Why the big difference? • Tax Differences? - US taxpayers typically prefer capital gains and so do Japanese • Ownership structure? • Look at Exhibit 6 p. 333
Differences in financing strategies and performance of the two firms? • Debt policy • Kodak’s interest bearing debt to total capital (interest-bearing debt + equity) has ranged from around 7% in 1982 to around 63% in 1991 • Fuji’s interest bearing debt to total capital has ranged at around 14 to 20 % over the entire period • Conventional wisdom seems to be that Japanese firms can afford more leverage than US firms. We don’t find that the case here?
Questions for discussion • Does Kodak retain its non-core businesses? • How does Kodak respond to Fuji’s challenges to their home photo market? • How does Kodak respond to the challenges from the generic label film? • How much R&D effort should be allocated to electronic imaging?
What Kodak has done • In 1993, CEO resigned. Replaced by CEO from Motorola • In 1994 sold its Chemical business • In 1994, sold the Health care businesses • In 1994, CEO announced that Kodak would become a leader in electronic imaging -- The Electronic and imaging Division was formed