Lecture 7

1. Lecture 7 • Boethius • Introduction to Aquinas • Aquinas on Happiness

2. Boethius: synthesizing Christianity with Plato/Aristotle • All human beings seek happiness -- the supreme good. • Like drunkards, we have lost the way home and stumble into errors, identifying happiness with position, power, honor, wealth, or pleasure. • True happiness consists in possessing (by a kind of participation) God, who is absolute, self-sufficient goodness.

3. Discussion Questions • Why does Boethius not mention anything specifically Christian in The C of P (e.g., Jesus, the Bible, the Church)? • Is Boethius closer to Plato or Aristotle? • What common denominator recurs in all of Boethius’ refutations of false conceptions of happiness?

4. False Conceptions of Happiness • Wealth • Position • Power • Fame • Pleasure

5. Crucial tests • Does it make one self-sufficient, independent? (wealth creates dependencies, new wants, power depends on allies, supporters) • Can it be used for bad, even self-destructive purposes? (wealth, power -- clearly can be) • Is it a source of anxiety? (power, pleasure) • Can it have bad effects? (pleasure)

6. Boethius’s Definition of True Happiness • Once one possesses it, one has no further needs, wants, or reason for anxiety. • It can never be used for anything but good purposes. • It can never have anything but good effects. • It cannot be deceptive or false.

7. Happiness = God • God is the very essence of happiness. • If we can “possess” God, then God would fulfill every need or want, and provide perfect security. • God cannot be the source of evil.

8. Boethius on the Simplicity of God, the Good • Boethius draws heavily on some late (3rd c. AD) Platonists -- the Neo-Platonists, especially Plotinus. • According to Plotinus, the ultimate source of being is the One. • The One is Goodness itself, Being, Beauty, Power. These are just different names for the same, undifferentiated reality.

9. Simplicity, cont. • Consequently, for Boethius, God does not have goodness -- He is goodness itself. • If God merely had goodness, we would have to seek a cause or explanation of why He does. • Since God is goodness (and beauty and power and happiness), no such explanation is possible. God is the First Cause.

10. Boethius & Aristotle • To a degree, Aristotle would agree with Boethius: the intellectual apprehension and comprehension of God is the highest good for human beings. • However, Aristotle did not believe that human beings were capable of a permanent “possession” of God. So, human happiness is inherently insecure, fleeting, dependent on circumstances.

11. Introduction to Aquinas • Europe emerging from Dark Ages (700-1000) • Scientific works of Aristotle: Byzantium ->Islamic world -> Spain -> Jews ->Western Europe • Challenge of 13th century: Aristotle or Christianity?

12. St. Albert the Great -- Paris, Cologne, 13th century. Revived use of observation & experimentation. • Thomas Aquinas -- student of Albert. Born near Naples. Joined Dominican order.

13. Structure of Summa Theologiae • Work of theology. Appeals to both theological authorities (Bible, Augustine) and to natural reason. • Encompasses the conclusions of philosophy. • Organized by questions.

14. Typical question • Is ....? (the question) • It seems.... (thesis) • [Several plausible arguments, numbered] • On the contrary,.... (antithesis) • Response [Sets out Thomas's opinion -- typically, agrees with the antithesis, or accepts both as partially true.] • [The numbered plausible arguments are rebutted or corrected, one by one.]

15. The Natural and the Supernatural • Natural • Imperfect happiness (“felicity”) • Can be attained by our own, natural powers • Can be understood scientifically • Supernatural • Perfect happiness (“beatitude”) • Requires God’s “grace” (special assistance) • Can be understood only by “faith”

16. Natural Philosophy & Supernatural (Revealed) Theology • Philosophy (including “natural theology”) is competent to understand the natural order. So, Aristotle is a reliable guide to imperfect happiness, and the structure of the cosmos. • Understanding the supernatural requires special revelation (through prophets, inspired Scriptures).

17. Human Nature • For Aquinas, human nature (the essence of humanity) encompasses both levels. • We are “naturally supernatural”. We cannot be fully satisfied with any natural good. • Our capacity to grasp the idea of infinity or perfection bears witness to our supernatural end. (Cf. Boethius)

18. Theory of Mind and Knowledge • Aquinas is a developmental empiricist: all human knowledge begins with the use of the 5 senses, by which we come to know our physical environment. • We start with the natural sciences, and then move to metaphysics and natural theology. • Natural theology tells only that God (a First Cause) exists. It does not tell us much about the nature of God.

19. Not a Strict, Absolute Empiricist • 1. Mind is not a blank slate: it brings specific, pre-determined powers and potentialities to the business of learning through the use of the senses. • 2. Knowledge is always the product of the joint operation of the senses and the intellect. • 3. Ultimately, we can attain some (very limited) knowledge of things beyond the range of our senses.

20. The Structure of the Soul • Rational • Intellect • Speculative • Practical • Will (rational appetite) • Sub-rational • Senses • Bodily appetites • Concupiscible & Irascible

21. The Sub-rational Soul • The senses give us information about the environment. • The appetite propels us to certain apparent goods or away from certain evils: anger and fear (irascible) and desires for food, water, warmth, sex (concupiscible).

22. Rational Soul • The theoretical (or "speculative") intellect strives toward truth and understanding. It begins with the information delivered by the senses, and "abstracts" universal laws from this data. • The practical intellect deliberates about what is the best course of action. It begins with inclinations provided by the appetites, but corrects and supplements them from a rational assessment of a plan of life.

23. The will receives its direction from the practical intellect -- but the will is needed to effect the transition from thought and feeling to action.

24. Essence vs. Accident • What a thing is most fundamentally, versus what a thing just happens to be. • An oak tree (essence) vs. a hammock hanger (accident). • A human being (essence) vs. a source of household income (accident).

25. The signs or criteria of essences • 1. Essences correspond to a shared nature, that can be the subject of scientific investigation. • We can investigate the nature of humans or oak trees, not of hammock-supports or income-sources. • Essences form a nested structure of kinds: species-genus-family-….category.

26. 2. Essences provide a non-arbitrary principle for dividing the world into distinct, countable individuals. • Contrast: how many human beings are in the room? vs. How many income sources are in my brokerage account?

27. 3. Essences provide a non-arbitrary principle for identity through time. • If I disassemble and re-assemble a wooden hammock support, is it the same support? Who cares? • Is X the same person as Y? This matters.

28. Aquinas on Happiness • The Existence of Happiness: Question 1 • What Happiness is Not: Question 2 • The Nature of Happiness: Question 3

29. The Existence of Happiness • Question 1: Human action has a single, ultimate end that is shared by all people. This end we call "happiness". • Key Articles: • 1. Human action has an end (purpose). • 3.Human action has an ultimate end. • 4. Human action has a single ultimate end. • 7. This end is shared by all people.

30. Article 1: Human action has an end. • An action is human not just because it is performed by a a human being: it must involve the exercise of peculiarly human powers. • These peculiarly human powers are the reason and the will. • The object of the will is called an "end". • Hence, all properly human actions are performed for an end.

31. Article 3: All human action has an ultimate end. • Suppose that a human action occurred for an end (by article 1), but not for any ultimate end. • This would mean that every end for which the action is performed is itself merely the means for some further end.

32. This would further mean that the human action was performed for the sake of an infinite regress of reasons. • An infinite regress of reasons cannot move the will to action (basic metaphysical principle). • Hence, every human action is performed for some ultimate end.

33. Article 4: all human action is performed for a single ultimate end. 3 arguments are given (in Response, pp. 10-11): • 1. Every things’ desires can be satisfied by nothing but the complete fulfillment of its nature. • The ultimate end of any action is that thing which would satisfy every desire. • Hence, there is but one ultimate end of human action (i.e., the complete fulfillment of human nature).

34. 2nd argument 2. The fundamental principle of human life is the will. • The fundamental principle of every kind of thing tends toward a single thing (since, otherwise, the individual members of this kind would not be unified as substances). • Hence, the human will tends toward a single thing. • The human will tends toward the ultimate end of human action.

35. Article 4, 3rd argument • Human actions are classified into species according to their ends (article 3). • Therefore, things belong to the genus human action by virtue of their sharing a common end or purpose. • Therefore, all human actions have the same ultimate end.

36. Article 7: this ultimate end is shared by all human beings. • This follows from the 3 arguments for article 4: all human actions share the same ultimate end: the complete fulfillment of human nature. • Aquinas answers the obvious objection: people seems to strive for a variety of ultimate ends: money, power, pleasure, honor, virtue, knowledge, etc.

37. Explaining the apparent diversity of ends • Aquinas distinguishes between the notion of happiness (the common concept, shared by all) and our ideas of what this happiness consists in. • We share a common ultimate end --- but we differ in our opinions of how to reach it.