A Swift, Elusive Sword

1. A Swift, Elusive Sword What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense Review? Welcome to a presentation loosely based on my book A Swift, Elusive Sword. Sword was written in February through about May of 2001 and published in July. This presentation was created for a conference at the Marine Corps Association during early October of that year. As you are all aware, peoples’ interests changed greatly on September 11th, so I have made a small number of modifications to add more emphasis on fourth generation warfare and to modify Chart 47 to include the type of mass but conventional (not biological, chemical, or nuclear) attack perpetrated on that day. The flyer for the conference encouraged participants to download a copy of the book or to request a hard copy and read it before the conference. This allows me, as you will see, to take great liberties in this presentation and make it something more than just an outline of the book in PowerPoint format. I would strongly suggest that if you have not done so, please stop now and read A Swift, Elusive Sword. You might also want to gather a translation of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (most of my quotations are from Thomas Cleary’s) and consider downloading John Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict from http://www.d-n-i/net.Welcome to a presentation loosely based on my book A Swift, Elusive Sword. Sword was written in February through about May of 2001 and published in July. This presentation was created for a conference at the Marine Corps Association during early October of that year. As you are all aware, peoples’ interests changed greatly on September 11th, so I have made a small number of modifications to add more emphasis on fourth generation warfare and to modify Chart 47 to include the type of mass but conventional (not biological, chemical, or nuclear) attack perpetrated on that day. The flyer for the conference encouraged participants to download a copy of the book or to request a hard copy and read it before the conference. This allows me, as you will see, to take great liberties in this presentation and make it something more than just an outline of the book in PowerPoint format. I would strongly suggest that if you have not done so, please stop now and read A Swift, Elusive Sword. You might also want to gather a translation of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (most of my quotations are from Thomas Cleary’s) and consider downloading John Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict from http://www.d-n-i/net.

2. 2 What is Maneuver Warfare? The constant theme of this, as all Boyd Conferences, is maneuver warfare. For those not familiar with the term, here is a well-known description from one of its originators, retired Marine Colonel Mike Wyly. I was going to just extract a few illustrative phrases, but every time I got ready to delete one, there seemed to be a good reason to leave it in. So just take your time and absorb the flavor of maneuver warfare. This quote is from Col Wyly’s paper, “Thinking Like Marines,” well worth reading in its entirety and available from http://www.belisarius.comThe constant theme of this, as all Boyd Conferences, is maneuver warfare. For those not familiar with the term, here is a well-known description from one of its originators, retired Marine Colonel Mike Wyly. I was going to just extract a few illustrative phrases, but every time I got ready to delete one, there seemed to be a good reason to leave it in. So just take your time and absorb the flavor of maneuver warfare. This quote is from Col Wyly’s paper, “Thinking Like Marines,” well worth reading in its entirety and available from http://www.belisarius.com

3. 3 Summary of John Boyd’s Writings on 3rd Generation (Maneuver) Warfare In other words, Boyd never used the term. This is interesting, since he was certainly familiar with it. The next three charts show what Boyd did cover in Patterns of Conflict. Lack of space prohibits a complete treatment here, so interested readers are invited to review his “Categories of Conflict” section in Patterns, pages 110 to 125.In other words, Boyd never used the term. This is interesting, since he was certainly familiar with it. The next three charts show what Boyd did cover in Patterns of Conflict. Lack of space prohibits a complete treatment here, so interested readers are invited to review his “Categories of Conflict” section in Patterns, pages 110 to 125.

4. 4 Essence of Maneuver Conflict Create, Exploit, and Magnify Ambiguity: Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be. Deception: An impression of events as they are not. Novelty: Impressions associated with events/ideas that are unfamiliar or have not been experienced before. Fast Transient Maneuvers: Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to another. Effort (Cheng/Ch’i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt): An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist. Payoff Disorientation: Mismatch between events one observes or imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to. Disruption: State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder. Overload: A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure. What he did address was “maneuver conflict.” Note that the first statement of the “Aim” applies to any form of conflict, including business. The second “equivalently,” focuses more on what might be called maneuver “warfare.” Also, look for a pattern in the list of highlighted words on the left. To me, they seem to go from mental to physical. I can assure you that Boyd sometimes put a lot of effort into something as seemingly trivial as the order of words in a list. Sometimes the order is deliberately random. In this particular list, the first four items apply to any conflict, while the last seems appropriate mostly to war. The inclusion of “irruption of violence” shows that maneuver warfare may involve armed conflict—that is, killing—which may be intense at times, but directed at a more sophisticated aim than just body counts or other types of physical destruction. One way to characterize maneuver conflict is the use of mental and physical activities to create effects (“payoffs) that are largely mental and moral (e.g., disruption of cohesion). Even the one mention of a “physical” payoff — physical capacity to adapt or endure — seems to be secondary to or even reinforcing of the mental and moral effects.What he did address was “maneuver conflict.” Note that the first statement of the “Aim” applies to any form of conflict, including business. The second “equivalently,” focuses more on what might be called maneuver “warfare.” Also, look for a pattern in the list of highlighted words on the left. To me, they seem to go from mental to physical. I can assure you that Boyd sometimes put a lot of effort into something as seemingly trivial as the order of words in a list. Sometimes the order is deliberately random. In this particular list, the first four items apply to any conflict, while the last seems appropriate mostly to war. The inclusion of “irruption of violence” shows that maneuver warfare may involve armed conflict—that is, killing—which may be intense at times, but directed at a more sophisticated aim than just body counts or other types of physical destruction. One way to characterize maneuver conflict is the use of mental and physical activities to create effects (“payoffs) that are largely mental and moral (e.g., disruption of cohesion). Even the one mention of a “physical” payoff — physical capacity to adapt or endure — seems to be secondary to or even reinforcing of the mental and moral effects.

5. 5 Essence of Attrition Warfare Create and Exploit Destructive Force: Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim, and/or otherwise generate widespread destruction. Protection: Ability to minimize the concentrated and explosive expression of destructive force by taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles, by dispersion of people and resources, and by being obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion. Mobility: Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or move away from adversary’s destructive focus. Payoff  Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis to: Break enemy’s will to resist Seize and hold terrain objectives Although he did not talk about maneuver “warfare,” he explicitly considers attrition “warfare,” thus proving that “maneuver conflict” is not an accident. Note that (unlike maneuver conflict) the only elements are physical: destruction, protection from destruction, and movement. Taken together, these activities are pretty much limited to “war,” especially when carried out over a period of time by large groups of people. We might characterize “attrition warfare” therefore as the use of physical activities to achieve physical and moral (“break enemy’s will to resist”) purposes. As with Clausewitz, it is more sophisticated than simply killing all or even a majority of the enemy. Although attrition warfare is warfare, there are analogues in other forms of conflict. Measures of merit in attrition warfare, for example, tend to be mostly quantitative — body counts, miles moved, etc. There are similar schools of business, the “you can’t manage what you can’t measure” philosophy, for example, or those that are purely focused on short-term financials. They are just as susceptible to their maneuver conflict competitors—those practicing “lean production,” for example—as their attrition-focused counterparts are to maneuver warfare on the battlefield.Although he did not talk about maneuver “warfare,” he explicitly considers attrition “warfare,” thus proving that “maneuver conflict” is not an accident. Note that (unlike maneuver conflict) the only elements are physical: destruction, protection from destruction, and movement. Taken together, these activities are pretty much limited to “war,” especially when carried out over a period of time by large groups of people. We might characterize “attrition warfare” therefore as the use of physical activities to achieve physical and moral (“break enemy’s will to resist”) purposes. As with Clausewitz, it is more sophisticated than simply killing all or even a majority of the enemy. Although attrition warfare is warfare, there are analogues in other forms of conflict. Measures of merit in attrition warfare, for example, tend to be mostly quantitative — body counts, miles moved, etc. There are similar schools of business, the “you can’t manage what you can’t measure” philosophy, for example, or those that are purely focused on short-term financials. They are just as susceptible to their maneuver conflict competitors—those practicing “lean production,” for example—as their attrition-focused counterparts are to maneuver warfare on the battlefield.

6. 6 Essence of Moral Conflict Negative Factors Menace:Impressions of danger to one’s well being and survival. Uncertainty: Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc. Mistrust: Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes. Counterweights Initiative: Internal drive to think and take action without being urged. Adaptability: Power to adjust or change in order to cope with new or unforeseen circumstances. Harmony: Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way. There is a tendency to see the categories as a ladder: attrition on the bottom, then mental, and finally moral at the top. Although not totally incorrect – first and second generation warfare had a lot more attrition than maneuver —Patterns, however, takes a more complex view. First, recall that even attrition warfare aimed at a moral purpose (breaking the enemy’s will to resist.) Also, Boyd sometimes put the same people in multiple categories. General Hermann Balck, one of the most successful practitioners of maneuver conflict, as Boyd indicates on Chart 111, is also the primary illustration for moral conflict on Chart 118. The Mongols also appear in both categories. However, nobody appears to have practiced both attrition warfare and moral conflict at the same time. A close look at the charts suggests one’s mind is either on attrition warfare or on maneuver conflict, but cannot be on both. This said, there are still many possible ways to combine attrition warfare, maneuver conflict and moral conflict.. One can conduct moral conflict to prepare an enemy for a campaign (attrition or maneuver) to follow. One can continue the practice of moral conflict during the campaign (attrition or maneuver) to keep draining away the enemy’s resolve, while increasing our own (think of Winston Churchill or Abraham Lincoln.) It may even be possible, under certain circumstances to wage a successful war through moral conflict and the first four elements of maneuver conflict, with no physical violence at all – to achieve Sun Tzu’s goal of winning without fighting.There is a tendency to see the categories as a ladder: attrition on the bottom, then mental, and finally moral at the top. Although not totally incorrect – first and second generation warfare had a lot more attrition than maneuver —Patterns, however, takes a more complex view. First, recall that even attrition warfare aimed at a moral purpose (breaking the enemy’s will to resist.) Also, Boyd sometimes put the same people in multiple categories. General Hermann Balck, one of the most successful practitioners of maneuver conflict, as Boyd indicates on Chart 111, is also the primary illustration for moral conflict on Chart 118. The Mongols also appear in both categories. However, nobody appears to have practiced both attrition warfare and moral conflict at the same time. A close look at the charts suggests one’s mind is either on attrition warfare or on maneuver conflict, but cannot be on both. This said, there are still many possible ways to combine attrition warfare, maneuver conflict and moral conflict.. One can conduct moral conflict to prepare an enemy for a campaign (attrition or maneuver) to follow. One can continue the practice of moral conflict during the campaign (attrition or maneuver) to keep draining away the enemy’s resolve, while increasing our own (think of Winston Churchill or Abraham Lincoln.) It may even be possible, under certain circumstances to wage a successful war through moral conflict and the first four elements of maneuver conflict, with no physical violence at all – to achieve Sun Tzu’s goal of winning without fighting.

7. 7 To Summarize To employ maneuver conflict, we use force within a fog of ambiguity and a web of deception to disrupt, disorient, and collapse an opponent. Attrition warfare, on the other hand, has a single tool - physical destructiveness - to batter the opponent into submission. Boyd never wrote that attrition warfare doesn’t work, but the cost is often high and “widespread destruction” can sow the seeds of future conflict. The factors and counterweights of moral conflict apply to either.

8. 8 Why a Fourth Generation? continued exponential increase in the world population decline in standards of living in certain Third World countries continuing international AIDS epidemic rise of mega-cities (Jakarta, Cairo, Delhi, Mumbai, etc.) increasing scarcity of arable land and water explosion in drug trafficking, with associated money flows & corruption fall of the Soviet Union and continued instability in the FSU end of the bipolar world order and of the interpretation of events through a Cold War filter ready availability of small arms and other inexpensive weapons resurgence of violent transnational ideological groups continued growth in wealth and influence of transnational corporations emergence of US as the only conventional / economic superpower growth of worldwide connectivity (CNN and the Internet, for example) ease of global transportation (24 hours between any two points) Readers should add to or revise this list, or even make up their own. Here are some pointers The earth’s population is now at 6 billion, give or take a few hundred million (i.e., the margin of error is probably larger than the population of the United States.) Yet, arable land in many countries is actually shrinking through urbanization or poor (non-existent) soil management, and rivers are being tapped dry, which can lead to conflicts with downstream users. In parts of the Third World, AIDS infection rates exceed 25%, and un-/underemployment among youth in some urban areas exceeds 50%. Effective governments in many areas of the Third World have ceased to exist and have been replaced by drug lords, tribal leaders, traditional war lords, ideological regimes (e.g., Taliban) and simple criminals. Practically anybody who wants them has access to a variety of small arms, land mines, and explosives All these folks can watch the United States on flickering television sets in their villages or urban slums. A vision of the world as a clogged pressure cooker or ticking time bomb may not be far wrong.Readers should add to or revise this list, or even make up their own. Here are some pointers The earth’s population is now at 6 billion, give or take a few hundred million (i.e., the margin of error is probably larger than the population of the United States.) Yet, arable land in many countries is actually shrinking through urbanization or poor (non-existent) soil management, and rivers are being tapped dry, which can lead to conflicts with downstream users. In parts of the Third World, AIDS infection rates exceed 25%, and un-/underemployment among youth in some urban areas exceeds 50%. Effective governments in many areas of the Third World have ceased to exist and have been replaced by drug lords, tribal leaders, traditional war lords, ideological regimes (e.g., Taliban) and simple criminals. Practically anybody who wants them has access to a variety of small arms, land mines, and explosives All these folks can watch the United States on flickering television sets in their villages or urban slums. A vision of the world as a clogged pressure cooker or ticking time bomb may not be far wrong.

9. 9 What Will the Fourth Generation Look Like? start with third generation warfare, ponder changes, e.g. from the previous chart, overlay the three “Categories of Conflicts,” let it all evolve (networks are good at this) – test occasionally, keep what works Point is that 4GW is still evolving, and the folks doing the evolving are learning from the failures and successes of their predecessors. Fourth generation warfare will probably include a large measure of what we now think of as “guerilla warfare,” which almost by definition is the form practiced by transnational groups and networks. For our purposes, the primary difference between “terrorism” and “guerilla warfare” is that the former is directed at civilians or non-combatants. Military guerilla units may also engage in terrorism, as did the Viet Cong when they assassinated village leaders loyal to the government. If they begin to control territory and maintain more conventional military forces, the groups become susceptible to 3rd (or even 2nd) generation warfare. For more information on the generations of war, please consult the Fourth Generation Warfare page at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net, particularly the papers by Lind, et. al. and Hammes.Point is that 4GW is still evolving, and the folks doing the evolving are learning from the failures and successes of their predecessors. Fourth generation warfare will probably include a large measure of what we now think of as “guerilla warfare,” which almost by definition is the form practiced by transnational groups and networks. For our purposes, the primary difference between “terrorism” and “guerilla warfare” is that the former is directed at civilians or non-combatants. Military guerilla units may also engage in terrorism, as did the Viet Cong when they assassinated village leaders loyal to the government. If they begin to control territory and maintain more conventional military forces, the groups become susceptible to 3rd (or even 2nd) generation warfare. For more information on the generations of war, please consult the Fourth Generation Warfare page at Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net, particularly the papers by Lind, et. al. and Hammes.

10. 10 Meanwhile, We’re Locked In Why might we need to make some radical changes? Can’t we just use what we have, although it might not be ideal for 4GW? In fact, as this is written, there are calls for adding $100 billion per year to the US defense budget. One question you might ask your self is whether what we’re buying with this money—large, complex weapons like the F-22, V-22, F-18 E/F, and shortly the Joint Strike Fighter, as well as 10 active duty Army divisions and 12 aircraft carriers—will help us in 4GW?. All these programs and forces were originally conceived to fight the armored formations of the Soviet Union in some type of 2nd Generation Warfare. Another question is whether all this focus on spending our way to military effectiveness is blinding us to the factors that actually produce victory in war.Why might we need to make some radical changes? Can’t we just use what we have, although it might not be ideal for 4GW? In fact, as this is written, there are calls for adding $100 billion per year to the US defense budget. One question you might ask your self is whether what we’re buying with this money—large, complex weapons like the F-22, V-22, F-18 E/F, and shortly the Joint Strike Fighter, as well as 10 active duty Army divisions and 12 aircraft carriers—will help us in 4GW?. All these programs and forces were originally conceived to fight the armored formations of the Soviet Union in some type of 2nd Generation Warfare. Another question is whether all this focus on spending our way to military effectiveness is blinding us to the factors that actually produce victory in war.

11. 11 But Shouldn’t We be Spending More, Now That There’s a War On? Leverage is going the wrong way. It isn’t the money, per se. We’re a rich country and could afford it. With the country sliding into recession, more government spending might be a good idea. However, the problem is that this spending focuses the attention of military leaders and planners just like the effort put into the Maginot Line locked the French into a doctrine built around it and blinded them to the threat of maneuver warfare from the east. People in the U.S. Air Force don’t get promoted for questioning the requirement for the F-22 and few within the Army openly debate the merits of maintaining heavy units in some form (“Crusader is a ‘must field’” – recent statement by CSA).Leverage is going the wrong way. It isn’t the money, per se. We’re a rich country and could afford it. With the country sliding into recession, more government spending might be a good idea. However, the problem is that this spending focuses the attention of military leaders and planners just like the effort put into the Maginot Line locked the French into a doctrine built around it and blinded them to the threat of maneuver warfare from the east. People in the U.S. Air Force don’t get promoted for questioning the requirement for the F-22 and few within the Army openly debate the merits of maintaining heavy units in some form (“Crusader is a ‘must field’” – recent statement by CSA).

12. A Way Out:Sun Tzu and John Boyd Timeless strategy, based on the nature of conflict. Sun Tzu: c. 500 B.C. Col John Boyd, USAF: 1927 - 1997 So let’s see how Sun Tzu and John Boyd offer a way out. In a sense, these two represent endpoints in a strategic thread extending over 2,500 years. If you are interested in whether or not a historical figure named Sun Tzu actually existed and whether the book attributed to him is the work of a single individual, you’ll find discussions in the introductions to all the major translations. The defining characteristic of this school is the focus on the nature of human beings in conflict. They deal with broad concepts like ambiguity, surprise, and deception, emotions like fear, panic, and love, and moral forces like cohesion and trust. In their estimation, these are the key to understanding the nature of all conflict, particularly war. Since the human brain has not changed noticeably in 2,500 years, Sun Tzu should be as relevant today as he was then. Boyd examines then accepts virtually all of Sun Tzu after showing how military commanders who operate in harmony with his insights have amassed a remarkable record extending into the present day.So let’s see how Sun Tzu and John Boyd offer a way out. In a sense, these two represent endpoints in a strategic thread extending over 2,500 years. If you are interested in whether or not a historical figure named Sun Tzu actually existed and whether the book attributed to him is the work of a single individual, you’ll find discussions in the introductions to all the major translations. The defining characteristic of this school is the focus on the nature of human beings in conflict. They deal with broad concepts like ambiguity, surprise, and deception, emotions like fear, panic, and love, and moral forces like cohesion and trust. In their estimation, these are the key to understanding the nature of all conflict, particularly war. Since the human brain has not changed noticeably in 2,500 years, Sun Tzu should be as relevant today as he was then. Boyd examines then accepts virtually all of Sun Tzu after showing how military commanders who operate in harmony with his insights have amassed a remarkable record extending into the present day.

13. 13 Sun Tzu 101 Early “Warring States Period” (453 – 211 B.C.): 18 states in central China, each at war with all the others Based on classical Taoism: Harmony on the inside is The Way Create confusion in minds of enemy Goal: Win without fighting (i.e., but win) If fighting becomes necessary, win quickly, with fewest casualties on each side. In particular, Sun Tzu fits into the philosophy known as Classical Taoism (to distinguish it from later innovations, as you may recall from movies like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.) The Art of War, as it is universally known in the West, harmonizes well with the other texts from that tradition, particularly the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu book. Later, Zen borrowed heavily from Taoism, adding a mixture of Buddhism, and taking root in Japan. Thus the Sun Tzu School easily incorporates the Japanese samurai texts, most famously Musashi’s Book of Five Rings (1645).In particular, Sun Tzu fits into the philosophy known as Classical Taoism (to distinguish it from later innovations, as you may recall from movies like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.) The Art of War, as it is universally known in the West, harmonizes well with the other texts from that tradition, particularly the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu book. Later, Zen borrowed heavily from Taoism, adding a mixture of Buddhism, and taking root in Japan. Thus the Sun Tzu School easily incorporates the Japanese samurai texts, most famously Musashi’s Book of Five Rings (1645).

14. 14 Sun Tzu and Intelligence Foreknowledge is key Cannot obtain from “ghost and spirits, analogy, calculation” Only from people who know the conditions of the enemy Rewards for spies equal or exceed those for other members of the army Commander is own Director of Intelligence, not a passive “consumer” Although Sun Tzu (we shall treat him as the historical author of the work, primarily because this simplifies my writing task) devotes a chapter to spies, the need for good intelligence permeates the work. Intelligence cuts through the fog of ambiguity and reveals deception, both prime strategic tools employed by successful commanders. It is a critical part of “knowing the enemy as you know yourself.” It is so important that Sun Tzu regarded it as one of the primary duties of a commander. When a general is not conducting military operations (and often when he is), he is conducting intelligence operations both to collect information and to plant deception and discord.Although Sun Tzu (we shall treat him as the historical author of the work, primarily because this simplifies my writing task) devotes a chapter to spies, the need for good intelligence permeates the work. Intelligence cuts through the fog of ambiguity and reveals deception, both prime strategic tools employed by successful commanders. It is a critical part of “knowing the enemy as you know yourself.” It is so important that Sun Tzu regarded it as one of the primary duties of a commander. When a general is not conducting military operations (and often when he is), he is conducting intelligence operations both to collect information and to plant deception and discord.

15. 15 John Boyd Created “energy-maneuverability” to compare fighter aircraft in a mathematically valid way Discovered shortcoming; correction led to “agility” Applies to more than just combat Emphasized: Manipulate time to create ambiguity Milieu for surprise, deception, panic, etc. Boyd began his career as a fighter pilot and then, while an instructor at the Fighter Weapons School in the 1950s, began to ponder ways to develop a logically consistent theory of air combat to replace the bags of tricks pilots accumulated at the time. His solution, based oddly enough on an insight from the Second Law of Thermodynamics, became known as “energy-maneuverability.” It is still the most widely used tool for training fighter pilots and comparing the potential performance of two competing fighter aircraft. Although the theory proved wildly successful, closer examination of data from Korea and then from the fly-off between the YF-16 and YF-17 (1975) revealed some anomalies. There were times when the aircraft with lower EM values did better. After more examination, Boyd expanded the theory to include “agility” (the book explains the difference.) As he continued to work it, Boyd generalized agility (originally a physical concept) to encompass ways of manipulating an adversary’s perception of time. This invariably disoriented the opponent making him vulnerable for a brief period. Finally, Boyd proposed the “Observe, Orient, Decide, Act” loop as a model for explaining “agility” in the most general setting. Boyd began his career as a fighter pilot and then, while an instructor at the Fighter Weapons School in the 1950s, began to ponder ways to develop a logically consistent theory of air combat to replace the bags of tricks pilots accumulated at the time. His solution, based oddly enough on an insight from the Second Law of Thermodynamics, became known as “energy-maneuverability.” It is still the most widely used tool for training fighter pilots and comparing the potential performance of two competing fighter aircraft. Although the theory proved wildly successful, closer examination of data from Korea and then from the fly-off between the YF-16 and YF-17 (1975) revealed some anomalies. There were times when the aircraft with lower EM values did better. After more examination, Boyd expanded the theory to include “agility” (the book explains the difference.) As he continued to work it, Boyd generalized agility (originally a physical concept) to encompass ways of manipulating an adversary’s perception of time. This invariably disoriented the opponent making him vulnerable for a brief period. Finally, Boyd proposed the “Observe, Orient, Decide, Act” loop as a model for explaining “agility” in the most general setting.

16. 16 The OODA “Loop”Sketch Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.

17. 17 Pumping up OODA “Loop” Speed Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.

18. 18 Sometimes, You Just Have to Make a Decision Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to speed turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, noted in Sword.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage.

19. 19 Boyd and Intelligence Closed systems die; must remain open Pull in information from all sources Because Observation is the only feed from outside world, any corruption will infect entire loop Will not spot mismatches (until it is too late!) Commanders must take positive measures to ensure they are not being fed what staff thinks they want to hear Boyd rarely used the term “intelligence” (I counted 3 times), but as you can see from the OODA loop, he placed great emphasis on the Observation component (which is the only input into the system.) Problems here will corrupt the entire loop. Japanese strategists during the samurai period rated “right perception” right up with “mind that does not stick” (Orientation that orients.) The trick is that in any hierarchy, people at the top get told what the people below them think they want to hear. As late as June 21, 1941, the head of the Soviet Secret Police (the NKVD, precursor to the KGB), was writing sycophantic notes to Stalin praising his wise judgment for ruling out a German attack in 1941. Agents who reported otherwise were sometimes recalled and shot. An extreme case, perhaps, but it will happen to you unless you take active measures to prevent it. Again, it comes backs to Sun Tzu’s admonition that the commander must actively manage the intelligence process, as he does the combat function, not just “consume” it. For some ideas, look at Boyd’s “Organic Design”, pages 28 and following, and Martin van Creveld’s 1982 classic, Command.Boyd rarely used the term “intelligence” (I counted 3 times), but as you can see from the OODA loop, he placed great emphasis on the Observation component (which is the only input into the system.) Problems here will corrupt the entire loop. Japanese strategists during the samurai period rated “right perception” right up with “mind that does not stick” (Orientation that orients.) The trick is that in any hierarchy, people at the top get told what the people below them think they want to hear. As late as June 21, 1941, the head of the Soviet Secret Police (the NKVD, precursor to the KGB), was writing sycophantic notes to Stalin praising his wise judgment for ruling out a German attack in 1941. Agents who reported otherwise were sometimes recalled and shot. An extreme case, perhaps, but it will happen to you unless you take active measures to prevent it. Again, it comes backs to Sun Tzu’s admonition that the commander must actively manage the intelligence process, as he does the combat function, not just “consume” it. For some ideas, look at Boyd’s “Organic Design”, pages 28 and following, and Martin van Creveld’s 1982 classic, Command.

20. The Role of Military Force The Aquarian Age is not yetupon us. We’ve covered, briefly, the nature of modern warfare, including maneuver warfare and 4GW, and looked at how Sun Tzu and Boyd approached the use of military force. The next section continues this theme by looking specifically at what we want military forces to do. The following section will explore “concepts of effectiveness,” that is, how we can tell if they are actually doing it.We’ve covered, briefly, the nature of modern warfare, including maneuver warfare and 4GW, and looked at how Sun Tzu and Boyd approached the use of military force. The next section continues this theme by looking specifically at what we want military forces to do. The following section will explore “concepts of effectiveness,” that is, how we can tell if they are actually doing it.

21. 21 Is There Still A Threat? Missile attack by weapons from FSU Missile attack by other states Another WMD attack by “rogue states, terrorists” Conventional engagements Attack on “vital national interest” Attack on state with US domestic support Fourth generation warfare (4GW) – evolving philosophy that uses guerilla warfare / LIC plus above tools plus … This is a Boydian list. When I wrote it, the order was supposed to be from least likely to most likely. However, the events of 11 Sep have made the priority more complex. Still the point is that there are a range of potential “threats,” and we can scare ourselves to death trying to imagine how to defend against every possible way they could be implemented. As we will see later, not only is playing defense not the total solution, or even the lion’s share, there are better ways to approach the problem than in terms of “offense” and “defense.” This is a Boydian list. When I wrote it, the order was supposed to be from least likely to most likely. However, the events of 11 Sep have made the priority more complex. Still the point is that there are a range of potential “threats,” and we can scare ourselves to death trying to imagine how to defend against every possible way they could be implemented. As we will see later, not only is playing defense not the total solution, or even the lion’s share, there are better ways to approach the problem than in terms of “offense” and “defense.”

22. 22 Using Military Force Sun Tzu Attack strategy Attack alliances Attack military forces Attack cities Boyd Goal is survival on own terms May result in conflict (e.g., for limited resources) Worst case: must eliminate enemy So we’ll drop back and consider the role of military forces in a more general setting. Sun Tzu starts The Art of War by proclaiming military action is “the ground of life and death” and so it is important to study it. He then proceeds directly to strategic assessments. Later, in Chapter 3, “Planning a Siege,” he provides the list shown and says that the order of preference is top to bottom. As I noted in the book, translators and commentators differ on what the first point means. The differences are significant. In Boyd’s scheme, zero-sum competitions can precipitate military action. He did not say this is the only way, but did indicate that in such a competition, things may (not “must”) reach the point where it is necessary to make it impossible for the adversary to survive at all. Even if things are not this dire, one side or the other may choose to employ military force at some point in the conflict, and things have been known to start small then escalate out of the control of either side.So we’ll drop back and consider the role of military forces in a more general setting. Sun Tzu starts The Art of War by proclaiming military action is “the ground of life and death” and so it is important to study it. He then proceeds directly to strategic assessments. Later, in Chapter 3, “Planning a Siege,” he provides the list shown and says that the order of preference is top to bottom. As I noted in the book, translators and commentators differ on what the first point means. The differences are significant. In Boyd’s scheme, zero-sum competitions can precipitate military action. He did not say this is the only way, but did indicate that in such a competition, things may (not “must”) reach the point where it is necessary to make it impossible for the adversary to survive at all. Even if things are not this dire, one side or the other may choose to employ military force at some point in the conflict, and things have been known to start small then escalate out of the control of either side.

23. 23 Unexpected Consequences of Military (Destructive) Activities Military force causes death and destruction & always breeds resentment In many conflicts, no clear “good / bad” People often resent having their homes and families destroyed so that the US can protect access to cheap oil and other “vital interests.” So when resort to military force is necessary, it must be blended with other elements of national power to produce the desired outcomes without provoking a backlash (at home or abroad) or sowing the seeds for future conflicts. Accomplishing such blending is a job for “grand strategy” (next chart)People often resent having their homes and families destroyed so that the US can protect access to cheap oil and other “vital interests.” So when resort to military force is necessary, it must be blended with other elements of national power to produce the desired outcomes without provoking a backlash (at home or abroad) or sowing the seeds for future conflicts. Accomplishing such blending is a job for “grand strategy” (next chart)

24. 24 Boyd’s Grand Strategy Support national goals Pump up our resolve, drain away the adversary’s resolve, and attract the uncommitted to our cause End the conflict on favorable terms Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide the seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict These are what grand strategy is supposed to do. Boyd doesn’t write much about how to create a grand strategy, but he does give some advice on pages 138-140 of “Patterns” and pages 53-57 of “Strategic Game.” Interested readers may also be interested in the brief introduction to the subject under “Fourth Generation Warfare” on Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/boyd_grand_strategy.htm The main theme of grand strategy is to pump-up our own resolve, attract the uncommitted (or at the very least keep them neutral), break up the opponent’s alliances, and undermine his resolve. A strong grand strategy will also make our HUMINT efforts more effective because it will make it easier to recruit agents from among the populations of actual and potential adversaries and from the uncommitted. In particular, the “grand ideal or noble philosophy” will attract some fraction of these populations. One only has to look at the numbers of Americans who were attracted by the noble, but ultimately false, promises and ideals of communism during the 1930s and 40s (later recruits were largely motivated by financial or personal reasons.)These are what grand strategy is supposed to do. Boyd doesn’t write much about how to create a grand strategy, but he does give some advice on pages 138-140 of “Patterns” and pages 53-57 of “Strategic Game.” Interested readers may also be interested in the brief introduction to the subject under “Fourth Generation Warfare” on Defense and the National Interest, http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/boyd_grand_strategy.htm The main theme of grand strategy is to pump-up our own resolve, attract the uncommitted (or at the very least keep them neutral), break up the opponent’s alliances, and undermine his resolve. A strong grand strategy will also make our HUMINT efforts more effective because it will make it easier to recruit agents from among the populations of actual and potential adversaries and from the uncommitted. In particular, the “grand ideal or noble philosophy” will attract some fraction of these populations. One only has to look at the numbers of Americans who were attracted by the noble, but ultimately false, promises and ideals of communism during the 1930s and 40s (later recruits were largely motivated by financial or personal reasons.)

25. What Makes a Military Force “Effective”? Given this brief overview of what we want military forces to do (and for a more detailed discussion, please refer to the book), how can we assure ourselves that forces we create can actually do it? In particular, given two forces, potential adversaries or alternative friendly forces, which one should we pick? By “forces,” we follow Boyd’s convention of people, ideas, and hardware.Given this brief overview of what we want military forces to do (and for a more detailed discussion, please refer to the book), how can we assure ourselves that forces we create can actually do it? In particular, given two forces, potential adversaries or alternative friendly forces, which one should we pick? By “forces,” we follow Boyd’s convention of people, ideas, and hardware.

26. 26 Sun Tzu’s Perspective Which ruler has the Way? Which commander is the more able? Consider: intelligence, trustworthiness, bravery, humaneness, and sternness. Which army can better exploit the advantages of climate and terrain? Whose troops are the stronger? Whose discipline is more effective? In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out? Whose officers and soldiers are better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer? Sun Tzu gives several answers. This is his second list from the first chapter of The Art of War. The first is similar, but contains only 5 elements. Commentators disagree on whether they are actually meant to serve different purposes or are the works of two separate authors. The “Way” means harmony with the Tao, which implies, among other things, that the commander and the troops have the same goals. Note that with the possible, partial exceptions of the third and fourth points, all relate to personnel matters or to doctrine (ideas.)Sun Tzu gives several answers. This is his second list from the first chapter of The Art of War. The first is similar, but contains only 5 elements. Commentators disagree on whether they are actually meant to serve different purposes or are the works of two separate authors. The “Way” means harmony with the Tao, which implies, among other things, that the commander and the troops have the same goals. Note that with the possible, partial exceptions of the third and fourth points, all relate to personnel matters or to doctrine (ideas.)

27. 27 Boyd on Effectiveness Unity / mutual trust (Einheit) Intuitive competence (Fingerspitzengefühl) Mission orientation (Auftragstaktik) Focus and direction (Schwerpunkt) Boyd originally called these the “Principles of the Blitzkrieg.” Boyd originally called these the “Principles of the Blitzkrieg.”

28. 28 Effective Forces Play the Cheng / Ch’i Game Sun Tzu: “Making armies able to take on opponents without being defeated is a matter of unorthodox (ch’i) and orthodox (cheng) methods … give rise to each other like a beginning-less circle – who could exhaust them?” Boyd: “… to gain a feel for the ways the cheng / ch’i game has been (and can be) played.” Can be played on multiple levels, i.e., if opponent knows we like cheng /ch’i, we can exploit that fact also (Hitler at invasion of France, 1944) Cheng / ch’i is translated as normal and extraordinary (Griffith) engaging and winning (Griffith) orthodox and unorthodox (Cleary) straightforward and surprise (Cleary) regular and irregular (Huang) orthodox and extraordinary (Denma Group) direct and indirect (Giles) common and uncommon (Sonshi.com) exposing and exploiting (Boyd) Nebenpunkte and Schwerpunkt (Boyd) One must be careful not to fall into patterns – such as always using conventional forces as cheng and special operations as ch’i. As Sun Tzu notes, each can become the other at the drop of a hat, and commanders must use their fingerspitzengefühl to know when to switch. This is what Boyd called “playing the cheng/ch’i game.” If one operates inside an opponent’s OODA loops, one will be able to win at the cheng / ch’i game because one will be able to detect when it is time to switch, then actually make the switch much more quickly and so “quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weakness.” (POC 13)Cheng / ch’i is translated as normal and extraordinary (Griffith) engaging and winning (Griffith) orthodox and unorthodox (Cleary) straightforward and surprise (Cleary) regular and irregular (Huang) orthodox and extraordinary (Denma Group) direct and indirect (Giles) common and uncommon (Sonshi.com) exposing and exploiting (Boyd) Nebenpunkte and Schwerpunkt (Boyd) One must be careful not to fall into patterns – such as always using conventional forces as cheng and special operations as ch’i. As Sun Tzu notes, each can become the other at the drop of a hat, and commanders must use their fingerspitzengefühl to know when to switch. This is what Boyd called “playing the cheng/ch’i game.” If one operates inside an opponent’s OODA loops, one will be able to win at the cheng / ch’i game because one will be able to detect when it is time to switch, then actually make the switch much more quickly and so “quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weakness.” (POC 13)

29. 29 Is Technology Irrelevant? No, but must fit into historical pattern: People, ideas, technology in that order Integrate into this pattern by: Robust and continual testing Prototyping and experiment Free play exercises Rewards and incentives to find and fix problems At national level, close off front loading, political engineering, revolving door — legal but ethically marginal practices for influencing program decisions “Technology” may be defined as the application of science and engineering to solve problems. Since we do want to solve problems, why wouldn’t we place the emphasis on technology. One answer is that technology is not the only way to solve problems. Another is that it’s the people, not the technology, that does the actual solving (“application”) and they use their minds. Hence Boyd’s exhortation to consider forces as “people, ideas, and hardware in that order!” To create useful technologies requires a lot of work and a personnel / organizational structure prepared to admit that most “solutions” don’t work very well at first — some never do — and that intelligent opponents will be trying to figure out ways around them. In fact, a healthy defense R&D system would reward finding problems with new technology and weapon systems as highly as it does finding solutions. As the final bullet suggests, our current systems have exactly the opposite orientation. These “power games” corrupt our decision-making processes to ensure that money flows into hardware programs, independent of their wartime utility. They may be thought of as AIDS viruses that infect our defenses against buying weapons that we don’t need, that don’t work, that add to complexity, or that cost vastly more than any marginal contribution they may make. “Technology” may be defined as the application of science and engineering to solve problems. Since we do want to solve problems, why wouldn’t we place the emphasis on technology. One answer is that technology is not the only way to solve problems. Another is that it’s the people, not the technology, that does the actual solving (“application”) and they use their minds. Hence Boyd’s exhortation to consider forces as “people, ideas, and hardware in that order!” To create useful technologies requires a lot of work and a personnel / organizational structure prepared to admit that most “solutions” don’t work very well at first — some never do — and that intelligent opponents will be trying to figure out ways around them. In fact, a healthy defense R&D system would reward finding problems with new technology and weapon systems as highly as it does finding solutions. As the final bullet suggests, our current systems have exactly the opposite orientation. These “power games” corrupt our decision-making processes to ensure that money flows into hardware programs, independent of their wartime utility. They may be thought of as AIDS viruses that infect our defenses against buying weapons that we don’t need, that don’t work, that add to complexity, or that cost vastly more than any marginal contribution they may make.

30. Creating Forces Variety Rapidity Harmony Initiative Later in “Patterns,” Boyd comments that these four qualities allow one to operate inside an adversary’s OODA loops and so generate the moral forces (menace, uncertainty, mistrust) that will lead to collapse. They are critical in creating forces that are able to “play the cheng / ch’i game.” (pp. 175-177)Later in “Patterns,” Boyd comments that these four qualities allow one to operate inside an adversary’s OODA loops and so generate the moral forces (menace, uncertainty, mistrust) that will lead to collapse. They are critical in creating forces that are able to “play the cheng / ch’i game.” (pp. 175-177)

31. 31 Which is the name of the game. So we will use those four qualities as a rough template to help us select among alternative forces.Which is the name of the game. So we will use those four qualities as a rough template to help us select among alternative forces.

32. 32 People Issues Pass a new Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. Replace “up or out” with “up or stay” for O-3 and above. Reduce the size of the officer corps in the land forces to 5 percent over 10 years. Replace the “all or nothing” retirement system with a “Vest at 10, collect at 55” approach. Design the land forces structure around a regimental system (for cohesion). Flatten the force structure, eliminating many HQs above brigade. Integrate reserve and active components into each regiment. Empower leaders [compare: Boyd’s “mission concept,” derived from the German Auftragstaktik]. Change the personnel management system. Accessions and entry. Education. Decentralize management and promotion policies. MAJ Don Vandergriff, Revolution in Human Affairs People, of course, are the most important single ingredient. Not only will a reformed personnel system provide better war fighters, who can win with a wide variety of technologies, but eventually such people will demand forces, doctrines, and weapons better suited for their needs. MAJ Vandergriff has done an excellent job of laying out what changes we need to make to personnel system to prepare us for 3rd and 4th generation warfare. I have basically just accepted his recommendations. Interested readers wishing to study this issue in more depth might examine the series of articles in the book edited by MAJ Vandergriff, Spirit, Blood, and Treasure.People, of course, are the most important single ingredient. Not only will a reformed personnel system provide better war fighters, who can win with a wide variety of technologies, but eventually such people will demand forces, doctrines, and weapons better suited for their needs. MAJ Vandergriff has done an excellent job of laying out what changes we need to make to personnel system to prepare us for 3rd and 4th generation warfare. I have basically just accepted his recommendations. Interested readers wishing to study this issue in more depth might examine the series of articles in the book edited by MAJ Vandergriff, Spirit, Blood, and Treasure.

33. 33 The Officer Corps Base promotions only on demonstrated competence in free play exercise cycle or actual operations Reduce to <5%; increase responsibilities for NCOs, WOs, individual soldiers Most commissions through OCS after demonstrated performance in ranks Service academy option after enlisted tour End credentialism! As a retired officer, I put extra emphasis on reforming the officer ranks. Similar recommendations could apply to the NCO and warrant officer corps. Sword did not address fundamental issues, such as, “Do we still need the officer / enlisted distinction?” There simply wasn’t room, nor do I feel any special expertise in areas such as these. It is possible to produce greatly more effective forces without such reforms, so I shall leave them to a later generation.As a retired officer, I put extra emphasis on reforming the officer ranks. Similar recommendations could apply to the NCO and warrant officer corps. Sword did not address fundamental issues, such as, “Do we still need the officer / enlisted distinction?” There simply wasn’t room, nor do I feel any special expertise in areas such as these. It is possible to produce greatly more effective forces without such reforms, so I shall leave them to a later generation.

34. An Evolutionary Force Structure A starting point.A starting point.

35. 35 The “Strike Force” is responsible for all combat on land. To reduce complexity and streamline decision making, we give it all elements of combat power for that purpose – tactical air, tactical airlift, theater air and missile defense, conventional ground forces, and special operations. The force is sized to achieve a rough balance between conventional and unconventional capabilities, or at least a better one than we have today. The current USMC forms the core (no pun intended … not) because it is already an integrated combined arms force with a significant conventional combat capability and it is the service farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Then we add US Army Special Forces, Rangers, Airborne, Delta Force and so on, and the special operations elements from the Navy and Air Force. The point is NOT that the legacy USMC is the expected/orthodox/cheng force and the others are ch’i. Such a pattern would be quickly detected by an intelligent opponent. Rather such a force offers a wider variety of options for playing the cheng / ch’i game. By the way, I am in the market for a better name than “strike force.”The “Strike Force” is responsible for all combat on land. To reduce complexity and streamline decision making, we give it all elements of combat power for that purpose – tactical air, tactical airlift, theater air and missile defense, conventional ground forces, and special operations. The force is sized to achieve a rough balance between conventional and unconventional capabilities, or at least a better one than we have today. The current USMC forms the core (no pun intended … not) because it is already an integrated combined arms force with a significant conventional combat capability and it is the service farthest along in adopting maneuver warfare concepts. Then we add US Army Special Forces, Rangers, Airborne, Delta Force and so on, and the special operations elements from the Navy and Air Force. The point is NOT that the legacy USMC is the expected/orthodox/cheng force and the others are ch’i. Such a pattern would be quickly detected by an intelligent opponent. Rather such a force offers a wider variety of options for playing the cheng / ch’i game. By the way, I am in the market for a better name than “strike force.”

36. 36 To move the strike force, we start with the current USN, keep all the mobility and assets and some as yet to be determined portion of our combatants. To this, we add inter-theater airlift (C-5 and C-17). The mission of the mobility force is to move the strike force, and to ensure that no opponent can interfere with this mission – hence the combatants. At some point in the (distant) future, it may become necessary to ensure that potential opponents cannot similarly move their land combat forces.To move the strike force, we start with the current USN, keep all the mobility and assets and some as yet to be determined portion of our combatants. To this, we add inter-theater airlift (C-5 and C-17). The mission of the mobility force is to move the strike force, and to ensure that no opponent can interfere with this mission – hence the combatants. At some point in the (distant) future, it may become necessary to ensure that potential opponents cannot similarly move their land combat forces.

37. 37 Finally, somebody needs to be responsible for all those nukes, and we might as well include space assets and “information warfare.” Start with the current USAF, give the tactical assets to the Strike Force and take the SSBNs from the Navy. This force would also include any strategic defensive system, including any national missile defense technologies that might eventually prove useful as weapons. ———— The National Guard and Reserve would serve 2 main purposes. The first is to act as a reserve, particularly for conventional capabilities, just in case. But it would be an elite force, as is today’s Air National Guard and Reserve (the author is a retired USAF reservist), with entry restricted to those who have completed at least one active duty enlistment (or period of service as a commissioned / warrant officer) and who have been invited to join. It would be much smaller than today’s reserve, would have the latest equipment, and be provided with bountiful funds for training. People might move back and forth freely between active and reserve status. The other role, primarily for the Guard, would be homeland defense.Finally, somebody needs to be responsible for all those nukes, and we might as well include space assets and “information warfare.” Start with the current USAF, give the tactical assets to the Strike Force and take the SSBNs from the Navy. This force would also include any strategic defensive system, including any national missile defense technologies that might eventually prove useful as weapons. ———— The National Guard and Reserve would serve 2 main purposes. The first is to act as a reserve, particularly for conventional capabilities, just in case. But it would be an elite force, as is today’s Air National Guard and Reserve (the author is a retired USAF reservist), with entry restricted to those who have completed at least one active duty enlistment (or period of service as a commissioned / warrant officer) and who have been invited to join. It would be much smaller than today’s reserve, would have the latest equipment, and be provided with bountiful funds for training. People might move back and forth freely between active and reserve status. The other role, primarily for the Guard, would be homeland defense.

38. 38 This chart is supposed to illustrate why today’s structure is not well suited for challenges of the 21st century. It should be self evident.This chart is supposed to illustrate why today’s structure is not well suited for challenges of the 21st century. It should be self evident.

39. 39 In the same sense that inventory is evil in production systems. It adds another layer of complexity and bureaucracy that make it even more difficult to institute the types of fundamental changes that are needed. Rather than trying to make it work better, as so many people in DoD strive mightily to do, a much better approach is to eliminate the need for it entirely. This is an important point. So long as we are organized the way we are today, we have no choice but to try to make “jointness” work. By the way, just shrinking the services proportionally by, say, 50% and handing everybody a purple suit does not eliminate “jointness.” This was the Canadian model. Actually, it probably makes the “tooth to tail” ratio even worse. What I have tried to do is start with the service that seems most like what I have in mind, in this case the USMC, and build up from there. The institutional Army disappears entirely, although some of its units and traditions would continue on in the strike force or in the new, all-elite Guard and Reserve.In the same sense that inventory is evil in production systems. It adds another layer of complexity and bureaucracy that make it even more difficult to institute the types of fundamental changes that are needed. Rather than trying to make it work better, as so many people in DoD strive mightily to do, a much better approach is to eliminate the need for it entirely. This is an important point. So long as we are organized the way we are today, we have no choice but to try to make “jointness” work. By the way, just shrinking the services proportionally by, say, 50% and handing everybody a purple suit does not eliminate “jointness.” This was the Canadian model. Actually, it probably makes the “tooth to tail” ratio even worse. What I have tried to do is start with the service that seems most like what I have in mind, in this case the USMC, and build up from there. The institutional Army disappears entirely, although some of its units and traditions would continue on in the strike force or in the new, all-elite Guard and Reserve.

40. 40 As I promised, a breathtaking reduction in complexity. Note that there is still coordination and harmonization needed between the strike and mobility forces, but it is very similar to that between the Army and Navy in WW II.As I promised, a breathtaking reduction in complexity. Note that there is still coordination and harmonization needed between the strike and mobility forces, but it is very similar to that between the Army and Navy in WW II.

41. 41 Patton is one of the few US commanders who understood maneuver warfare.Patton is one of the few US commanders who understood maneuver warfare.

42. 42 Intelligence Always engaged (unlike combat forces) Career paths must equal combat forces’ Current highest intel officers are 3-star Open Source (OSINT) becoming more important “Technical means” in pretty good shape (SIGINT, ELINT, IMINT, etc.) Huge gap in HUMINT Money not the only problem (inbreeding probably worse); long development time Competition is good, but covert operations belong to DoD How do we fix intelligence? Start by according it the importance it deserves and holding it responsible for results. If intel is really as important as operations, then shouldn’t the rank structures be comparable? And if we’re conducting intelligence all the time, but operations only occasionally, wouldn’t it make sense to put operations under intelligence? As Sun Tzu noted, at the senior levels, the differences blur, “intelligence” and “combat” are two tools available to the commander for achieving the mission. As for human source intelligence (HUMINT), the big problem is that because of their covert natures, organizations that conduct it become inbred. Essentially, they corrupt themselves. They become stultifying bureaucracies, where one’s ability to play political games at HQ become at least as important as the results one generates in the field. Aldrich Ames is a case in point, but recently obtained material from the KGB files shows that it was endemic to Soviet intelligence also. How do we fix intelligence? Start by according it the importance it deserves and holding it responsible for results. If intel is really as important as operations, then shouldn’t the rank structures be comparable? And if we’re conducting intelligence all the time, but operations only occasionally, wouldn’t it make sense to put operations under intelligence? As Sun Tzu noted, at the senior levels, the differences blur, “intelligence” and “combat” are two tools available to the commander for achieving the mission. As for human source intelligence (HUMINT), the big problem is that because of their covert natures, organizations that conduct it become inbred. Essentially, they corrupt themselves. They become stultifying bureaucracies, where one’s ability to play political games at HQ become at least as important as the results one generates in the field. Aldrich Ames is a case in point, but recently obtained material from the KGB files shows that it was endemic to Soviet intelligence also.

43. 43 Application: National Missile Defense The mission is not NMD; it is to ensure that the US is not attacked (again) by any WMD Keep the initiative, always play cheng / ch’i Employ grand strategy to isolate states / groups suspected of developing WMDs; undercut their domestic and international support Keep all options open (deterrence, offensive operations, defense) Pump up intelligence directed against suspects Engage in selective covert/overt operations After September 11th, this chart became perhaps the most important in the briefing. The key point is not to concede the initiative. Terms like “offense” and “defense” may not have much significance in 4GW against a non-state opponent, by initiative, cheng, and ch’i are as important as ever. Grand strategy, as in all 4GW, maintains its importance. If we or a coalition have to go in and stop a WMD program, the other major countries need to support our coalition or at least remain neutral. Grand strategy in this regard works best as an ongoing effort to limit the spread an the use of such weapons.After September 11th, this chart became perhaps the most important in the briefing. The key point is not to concede the initiative. Terms like “offense” and “defense” may not have much significance in 4GW against a non-state opponent, by initiative, cheng, and ch’i are as important as ever. Grand strategy, as in all 4GW, maintains its importance. If we or a coalition have to go in and stop a WMD program, the other major countries need to support our coalition or at least remain neutral. Grand strategy in this regard works best as an ongoing effort to limit the spread an the use of such weapons.

44. 44 Direct Threats to the USAn Attacker’s View This is my assessment of the WMD threat to the United States. Note that building an ICBM is essentially a program to develop and test a spacecraft as well as to create, test, and integrate a nuclear device. This is not a trivial task, and the testing program should telegraph intentions years in advance. At some point, we and our coalition can take actions. By contrast, a cruise missile is an airplane, basically. There are thousands of such weapons in the world today and they could be launched from container vessels a few miles off the US coast. The cost and technical challenge lies in building the nuclear device and integrating it. A manned aircraft uses the same device, hence essentially the same destructiveness. It could either be a suicide mission or the weapon could be ejected or simply pushed out an open door or cargo bay. It would be a little cheaper than a cruise missile because the weapon would not need to be integrated with the vehicle and it would not need a separate guidance system (other than the pilot). Finally, you could put it in a rental truck. Or you could pack plutonium around a core of explosives to create a “poor man’s nuke.” It wouldn’t create a nuclear explosion, but it would spread radioactive and highly poisonous material over a wide area. could be very destructive in an urban environment. The numbers are my estimates. But they do suggest that if one wanted to set off a nuke in the US, a missile is the most difficult and expensive way to do it.This is my assessment of the WMD threat to the United States. Note that building an ICBM is essentially a program to develop and test a spacecraft as well as to create, test, and integrate a nuclear device. This is not a trivial task, and the testing program should telegraph intentions years in advance. At some point, we and our coalition can take actions. By contrast, a cruise missile is an airplane, basically. There are thousands of such weapons in the world today and they could be launched from container vessels a few miles off the US coast. The cost and technical challenge lies in building the nuclear device and integrating it. A manned aircraft uses the same device, hence essentially the same destructiveness. It could either be a suicide mission or the weapon could be ejected or simply pushed out an open door or cargo bay. It would be a little cheaper than a cruise missile because the weapon would not need to be integrated with the vehicle and it would not need a separate guidance system (other than the pilot). Finally, you could put it in a rental truck. Or you could pack plutonium around a core of explosives to create a “poor man’s nuke.” It wouldn’t create a nuclear explosion, but it would spread radioactive and highly poisonous material over a wide area. could be very destructive in an urban environment. The numbers are my estimates. But they do suggest that if one wanted to set off a nuke in the US, a missile is the most difficult and expensive way to do it.

45. 45 Proven Weapons of Mass Destruction While we’re on the subject of mass destruction, one doesn’t need a sophisticated weapon to achieve it. One can still kill hundreds of thousands of people, it just takes longer.While we’re on the subject of mass destruction, one doesn’t need a sophisticated weapon to achieve it. One can still kill hundreds of thousands of people, it just takes longer.

46. 46 Conclusions We can create forces that evolve with, as well as shape, maneuver & 4 GW People are most important, followed by ideas, then hardware Evolutionary Force shows what could be accomplished, at least as a starting point People + ideas + selection mechanism (e.g., free play exercises, war) lead to evolutionary improvement The idea is not to reach the ultimate solution but to clear out the structure that is keeping us from evolving forces that are effective in dealing with 21st century challenges.The idea is not to reach the ultimate solution but to clear out the structure that is keeping us from evolving forces that are effective in dealing with 21st century challenges.