For Peace and Goodwill? Using an Experimental Game and a Social Dilemma to Analyse the Effect of the Desarollo y Paz

1. For Peace and Goodwill? Using an Experimental Game and a Social Dilemma to Analyse the Effect of the Desarollo y Paz Programmes in Colombia. Luca PELLERANO Oxford Policy Management, Oxford Institute for Fiscal Studies, London World Bank Washington, 5th May 2009

2. Introduction • There is an increasing need to evaluate the effects of social interventions on a broad set of “socio-cultural” dimensions that exceed the traditional socioeconomic variables: • values, aptitudes, perceptions, motivations, capabilities, empowerment • relationships, networks, social capital • Rigorous impact evaluation in this domain is extremely challenging as: • Expected socio-cultural changes are often not clearly specified (Theory of Change) • They are difficult to measure • As the analysis moves in the domain of the “intangibles”, the evaluation must be driven my a multi method and multidisciplinary approach. • In this work (Guarin, Navarro and Pellerano, 2009; Attanasio, Pellerano and Phillips, 2009): • We evaluate the effect of a complex an very peculiar CDD-Social Fund type intervention in Colombia on social capital and conflict management • We explore innovative methodological options for the measurement and evaluation of “socio cultural” dimensions.

3. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

4. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

5. The Setting. Conflict in Colombia. • Colombia has been affected by a complex civil conflict along the whole course of its recent history. • The drivers of the conflict have evolved with time (political violence, control over natural resources, coca). • Kidnapping, selective assassinations and internal displacement are amongst the most evident consequences. • Two main illegal factions: Guerrilla(s) and Paramilitary groups (+ new emerging groups after process of desmovilización). • The regional dimension of the conflict: • Despite progress, violence still affects many rural areas of the country in a very clustered way. • An atypical civil conflict, as the illegal groups are small in number and normally “outsiders” to the communities • Strong association between the presence of illegal groups and violence levels, local political instability, inequality (Ibañez and Moya, 2009)

6. The Peace and Development Regional Programmes (PRDPs) • A major Community Driven Development / Community Driven Peace Building initiative • Networks of grassroots organizations formed under the auspices of the civil society (labour unions, the church, private firms) in some of the most poor and violent regions of Colombia • Aim at building conditions of peace and development in these regions • Claim that peace is the result of equitable and inclusive models of development • Support a wide range of development processes informed by the principles of protecting life (“Primero la vida”), equity, solidarity and participatory democracy • The PRDPs work as an “umbrella fund”, financing a series of projects along three main axes: • Productive Development • Institutional Development and Governance • Human Rights and “Culture of Peace”

7. The Peace and Development Regional Programmes • A truly bottom up approach • Projects are promoted, formulated and executed by grassroots organizations in a participatory way • They express the own views and priorities (identity) of the local communities (“La vida que queremos”) • Beneficiaries are normally members of the grassroots organizations • PRPDs operate through a complex structure of networks: • network of grassroots organizations • community networks (nucleos de pobladores, red de jovenes, red de mujeres) • liaising with local public institutions

8. The Peace and Development Regional Programmes • Started in Magdalena Medio in the early 1990s (Jesuits) • Have become such a credible actor to engage in continued debate with international donors, national and local governments, and even in even in direct negotiations with the illegal groups at the local level • 6 PRDPs have been supported by the UNDP, the World Bank (LIL1 and LIL2 grants, 1998-2003; Paz y Desarrollo Loan, 2004-2008) and the European Commission (Laboratorios de Paz I, II and III, 2002-2010) • Total investment of more than 180 million USD • Resources are managed and executed at the regional level by a Organización Socia • Although they are not governmental programmes, they are endorsed in the National Development Plan • The Presidential Secretary for Social Affairs of Government (Acción Social) coordinates the funding

9. The Peace and Development Regional Programmes 6 Regions 9 Departments 125 Municipalities 1363 projects 800 grassroots organizations 180,000 estimated beneficiaries On average: 300 beneficiaries per project 2 years project duration 120,000 USD project value

10. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

11. PRDPs. Theory of Change • How can the PRDPs contribute to development and peace building? • A community-wide process • Through projects (using the projects as an excuse) the PRDPs aim at: • regenerating the social fabric and (re)establishing bonds of trust amongst people • favouring the flourishing of new community level leaderships and “institutions” • (re)activating mechanisms of participatory democracy • … in order to: • make collective action possible • increase local government’s transparency and accountability • promote new means of conflict management • … and achieve in the long run: • peace and development

12. The PRDPs identify Initial Conditions in the regions …and identify Modes of Relationship that correspond to them PRDP PRDPs. Theory of Change

13. New Conditions Peace and Development PRDPs. Theory of Change Traditional Modes of Relationship Initial Conditions Poverty and Violence New Modes of Relationship • With the illegal groups • With public institutions • Within the community

14. Approach • ¿How to address the challenge of evaluating PRDPs’ Theory of Change from • a rigorous perspective? • In this work: • A quasi experimental setting • We evaluate the effect of PRPDs on two crucial dimensions of the “modes of relationship”: social capital and conflict management. • We use two innovative instruments of data collection to explore impacts in the domain of the “intangibles”: • Experimental Games • Social Dilemma Modes of Relationship with the Community (Social Capital) Modes of Relationship with the Conflict (Conflict Management)

15. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

16. Instruments. Social Dilemma • Beneficiaries are invited to express their views on a tale that is read to them in third person • “Juana’s tale” • “una señora de su casa, una campesina común y corriente, hasta el día en que los violentos le mataron a Jacinto, su esposo...” • “... la vecina y el esposo, que eran cultivadores de fique, convencieron a Juana de que también se metiera en se negocio...” • “... su prestigio fue creciendo cada vez más, hasta el punto que Pedraza, un concejal y político muy conocido, le propuso que se lanzara como candidata al Concejo...” • “... sin embargo, antes de la posesión comenzaron a llegar mensajes anónimos con amenazas de muerte, dirigidas a Juana, provenientes del mismo grupo armado que había asesinado a su marido...” • Juana faces a dilemma. How should she manage a threat from an illegal group? • Beneficiaries are expected to identify with Juana. The instrument explores the processes of moral judgement (what is right? what should be done?) on decisions (like conflict management) that can be hardly assessed through direct survey questions.

17. Instruments. Social Dilemma Immediate Displacement Individual conflict management Community conflict management Institutional conflict management Life danger associated to community leadership • Note that options are not mutually exclusive

18. Instruments. Experimental Games Social capital • Competing definitions and competing measuring tools • Standard survey techniques (WB Soccat) • Structural approach (membership) versus motivational/value based approach (trust, reciprocity) • People tend to respond to value based survey questions according to social expectations and social norms (Glaeser et al., 2000). • Our definition: social cooperation (act collectively for mutual gain) • Our measure: a behavioural measure of contribution to a local public good in a field experimental setting

19. Instruments. Experimental Games • Simulated decision scenarios where the beneficiaries face alternative on the use of a monetary endowment • Based on the theoretical framework of the experimental economics: players’ decisions should reveal their preferences/motivations • The rules of the game (institutions) define a potential conflict (a dilemma) between competing motivations • Normally extrinsic self-interested preferences against non self-interested or intrinsic preferences (Deci and Ryan, 2000). • The “controlled” experiments are designed in such a way that decisions only have monetary consequences (no reputation effects) • As the decisions imply a real monetary payoff (on average the equivalent of 3 USD) participants are expected to reveal their preferences more similarly to how they would behave in a real life situation

20. Instruments. Experimental Games Voluntary Contribution Mechanism – VCM (Marwell and Ames, 1979) • Played in group (40 participants on average) • The experiment is a simple public good game in which subjects decide to invest in a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ project (public or private account) • Every token invested in the public account yields benefits for the whole group, while the token inverted in the private account only yields benefits to the owner of the account • The dilemma consists in that there is a conflict between the self interest and the optimum social outcome • If everyone invests in the public project the total earnings for the group are bigger than if everyone invests in the private account • However an individual is always better off by investing in the private account (Nash Equilibrium)

21. The basic structure of the dilemma Not cooperating (~C) is a dominant strategy for the (j-1) player If everyone invests in P If everyone invests in G

22. contribution to local public good communication The game is played in Two Rounds: First Round. Anonymous decision Second Round. 10 minutes communicationInformation feedback after First Round. We also collect data on social networks in the group.

23. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

24. The Data • Two main data sources • (Late) Baseline for the evaluation of PyD and LP (Nov 2006 – Feb 2007). • Treated Locations • 18 months of exposure to the activities of the PRDPs on average • High variability in exposure because of the roll out of the PRDPs both within and across municipalities • Second follow up for the evaluation of Familias en Acción (Nov 2005 – Apr 2006) • Control Locations • Sample for the evaluation of the famous CCT programme. • Targeted to the poor (SISBEN1), mainly women

25. The Data FA Data PRDP Data PRDP Municipalities FA Municipalities Sample of Treated Locations Sample of Control Locations Members of Other Civic Organizations PRPD Project Beneficiaries Sample of non Beneficiaries (Control Group 2) Sample of Beneficiaries (Treatment Group) Sample of Beneficiaries (Control Group 1) Beneficiaries with lower exposure Beneficiaries with higher exposure

26. The Data • The challenge of defining project beneficiaries for projects with universal vocations

27. The Data. Experimental Game

28. Credits • The impact evaluation of the PRDPs is designed and promoted by the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) of the Colombian Government with funding of the WB and the EC • The evaluation plan contemplates 2 rounds of data collection and a mixed qualitative-quantitative methods approach • The first phase of the evaluation was conducted by the consortium SEI-Economertía-IFS • Full results of the evaluation have been published in an official Policy Report by the DNP (DNP (2009), ‘Hacia la consolidación de una propuesta para evaluar el impacto de los Programas Regionales de Desarrollo y Paz.Evaluación de Impacto de los programas Paz y Desarrollo y Laboratorios de Paz: Línea de Base e Impactos Preliminares‘, Evaluación de Políticas Publicas, Bogotá) • This new work draws extensively on the conceptual framework, analysis and results of the Policy Report • A second phase of the study is currently undergoing, coordinated by the DNP

29. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

30. Descriptive Evidence

31. Descriptive Evidence • High degree of heterogeneity in beneficiary characteristics according to project types

32. Descriptive Evidence Social Capital (Contribution to the Public Good)

33. Descriptive Evidence Conflict Management

34. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

35. Evaluation Strategy • Identification strategy a) across locations (treated vs. control matched municipalities) b) within locations (treated vs. control households in treated locations) c) within treated households (based on the intensity of exposure) • Comparison of a) and b) may provide insights on the presence and magnitude of spill-over effects • No random assignment -> Potential endogenous programme placement (selection and self selection) • Across locations • Within locations • Within treated households • No pre-programme information (apart from municipality characteristics) • Multivariate regression models. All models are based on the “selection on observables” assumption • Serious treatment heterogeneity issue • Different time frames

36. Evaluation Strategy. Across Municipalities • We match treatment and control locations on a complete set of pre-programme municipality characteristics • 2 control locations dropped because of missing information • 20 control locations and 16 treated locations are dropped because they fall outside the common support • 2,427 households (58% of the original sample) are on the common support)

37. Evaluation Strategy. Across Municipalities

38. Evaluation Strategy. Within Treated Municipalities • We use all treated locations • We compare outcomes between treated and control households controlling for individual, households and municipality characteristics • We assess the effect of the differential exposure to the PRDPs across treated households: • By comparing households across the median treatment duration (0-12 months versus 13+) • By comparing three groups of households with different treatment duration (0-6, 7-14, 15+) • In a continuous way (allowing for non linear functional forms – cubic and quadratic terms) • We also analyze the effect of average municipality exposure

39. Evaluation Strategy. Within Treated Municipalities

40. The Setting and the Programme • Theory of Change • The Instruments • The Data • Descriptive Evidence • The Evaluation Strategy • Results • Conclusions

41. Results. Experimental Game

42. Results. Experimental Game Effects across municipalities • The level of contribution to the public good is much higher in municipalities where the PRDPs operate, than in other municipalities in the country with comparable characteristics. • Results hold if CS is imposed based on matching on individual characteristics

43. Results. Experimental Game Effects within treated municipalities • There is no significant difference in the contribution rates between treated and control households within treated locations.

44. Results. Experimental Game Exposure effects • We find some light evidence that, ceteris paribus, increased exposure to the PRDPs lead to higher contribution to the public good, particularly in the long run.

45. Results. Experimental Game • The previous findings suggest that there might be some contamination effect in social capital formation at the community level between treated and control households within the same municipality. Examining the case for Spill Over effects. • Exploiting knowledge networks, social capital effects seem to propagate within treated municipality through a spill-over mechanism. • The fact of knowing the PRPD could however be endogenous to social capital.

46. Results. Experimental Game The importance of session composition • Heterogeneity and social capital formation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 1999; Cardenas, 2003)

47. Results. Experimental Game Critical Mass or Conditional Cooperation? • Because of the sampling procedures, the proportion of beneficiaries in the session doesn’t reflect coverage rates in the municipality • These findings confirms the hypothesis that cooperation is conditional to the fact of being interacting with a groups of like-minded socially oriented people (Fischbacher et al., 2000; Gächter and Thöni, 2004; Burlando and Guala 2003)

48. Results. Experimental Game Critical Mass or Conditional Cooperation? • In the second round, the group effect seems to be operative for control households only • This suggests that it is mainly driven by reputation factors (Brosig, 2002) • Complementary evidence suggests that PRPD beneficiaries are actually considered more “trustworthy” than the rest of the population

49. Results. Experimental Game Exploring the “critical mass” hypothesis

50. Results. Social Dilemma • Because of the structure of the data we can only test our hypothesis within treated locations • Even after controlling for observables, there is no evidence of significant differences between treated and control households within treated locations