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computer-aided hazard identification

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computer-aided hazard identification

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    1. Computer-aided Hazard Identification Paul Chung (p.w.h.chung@lboro.ac.uk) Department of Computer Science

    2. Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Studies Established and widely used technique in the process industry for hazard identification Time consuming, labour intensive process: Tedious Expensive

    3. Computer-aided HAZOP Different levels of support: Electronic report form Electronic data (on plant, on fluids, etc.) Automated Hazard Identification Continuous operation Batch operation

    4. Automated Hazard Identification Continuous operation From basic research to commercial product HAZID Basic technology Signed directed graph (SDG) representation Fault propagation Go through a list of deviations systematically and identify the faults that cause the deviations and the consequences that result from the faults and deviations

    5. HAZID Overview Automated extraction of plant design from a CAD system, e.g. Intergraph SmartPlant P&ID Convenient forms for adding any missing process specific information Tick boxes for selecting analysis options: Deviations, e.g. more flow, less flow, etc. Items to HAZOP, etc.

    6. HAZID Overview HAZOP style output in different output formats XML, with HTML web page view. Excel spreadsheet. Query facility for viewing analysis results e.g. viewing faults and consequences relating to a particular plant item e.g. viewing the propagation path between a particular fault and consequence Compare facility for viewing the difference between two HAZID runs Useful for after making a change to the design

    22. HAZOP Style Output from HAZID

    23. HAZID Viewer Queries Standard format questions: What causes could there be for a selected hazard? What consequences are there for a given failure mode? How is a given hazard realised? Show a path of deviations for propagation Display all hazards with a given severity rank or higher

    25. Filtered Output showing Fault Paths for a given Hazard

    26. Automated Batch Plant Hazard Identification Batch operation Early research prototype (CHECKOP) Basic technology Action representation State-based simulation Go through a set of operation instructions systematically and identify potential ambiguities, operating problems and hazards Applying guidewords such as before, after, no action, etc.

    27. CHECKOP System Overview

    28. Simple Batch Reactor Example

    29. CHECKOP Plant Description instance(tank101 isa tank, [content info [reactantA], outports info [out is [pump101,in]]]). instance(pump101 isa pump, [status is offline, outports info [out is [valve101,in]]]). instance(valve101 isa valve, [status is closed, outports info [out is [reactor101, in2]]]). instance(reactor101 isa stirred_tank_reactor, [ outports info [out1 is [valve103,in], out2 is [valve106,in]], heatSink info [hout is [jacket101,hin]], reaction info [reaction_ab_p] ]).

    30. Operating instruction format Natural language Easy for user Requires natural language processing Could be ambiguous Structured template Easy for computer to process Limited expressive power

    31. Operating instruction format Object Action valve101 open Object Action until Condition mixer on until elapsed-time 20 minute Object1 Action Object2 Filler-word Fluid until Condition reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA until volume 30 percent

    32. CHECKOP Operating Procedure Input charge reactor101 with reactantA: { (1) valve101 open (2) pump101 start (3) reactor101 fill_from tank101 with reactantA until volume 30 percent (4) pump101 stop (5) valve101 close } etc

    33. Deviation Generation Combine each single action in the procedure with guide words, from: No action Simple omission. Early/Late action Sequence of procedure changed (how many steps feasible?). Early/Late action termination until condition of action varied. Then, simulate the effect of executing the new procedure on the plant, detect hazards.

    34. Batch HAZOP Output

    35. Batch HAZOP Output

    36. Future Work on CHECKOP A formal structured language for operating instructions More guide words Other Action change other variables of the Action model Rules for reasonable deviations What are the most likely mistakes in operation? Integrate with HAZID HAZID is strong on process hazards, CHECKOP better for operating errors, etc. HAZOP of start-up, shutdown, maintenance, etc.

    37. Conclusions Automated hazard identification continuous operation commercial tool that can reduce the time of HAZOP batch operation promising area of research and development for identifying problems associated with human errors and operating procedures Benefits: Doing HAZOP earlier, and on modifications. Consistent, repeatable, complete hazard identification method.

    38. Acknowledgements The work described in this presentation is being funded by HAZID Technologies Ltd Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, UK Thanks are also due to my colleagues Dr Steve McCoy Mr Dingfeng Zhou

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