Parallels and Divergences of Integration

1. Parallels and Divergences of Integration • SLIDE 2 • In my paper: to study postcommunist transition of the past 15 years on level of formal political institutions • Goals of today: • It might be interesting to assess disparate institutional development & parallels of integration after 1991 • Structure of presentation: • - Ifrst of all; I want to evaluate institutional definition of Ukraine and Belarus vis-à-vis the EU and the CIS and compare a bit their divergent institutional development • - Secondly; in order to detect parallels of integration, I also want to briefly look into the Union between Russia and Belarus. • I not so much intend to look at how all of this is taking place, but more specifically want to look for the reasons behind divergences and parallels of integration • Slide 3 • If we now look at both countries and compare their institutional definition  interesting insights and contrasts • In both countries: a quadruple transition had to take place; state building, nation building, democratisation and marketisation all at the same time • both in Ukr & Bel: initial focus on nation building: establish independent state with fixed borders & strong national identity. • Because of this; heightened attention for identity formation that actually initially overshadowed institutional change

2. Ukraine • Factors that complicated insitutional change: • Soviet legacy & • Chaos surrounding independence • implosion of Soviet Union: unprecedented & unexpected; it left Ukraine institutionally unprepared  which led to institutional confusion • Another csq of this was that: Ukr policymakers resorted to old Soviet institutions for inspiration  because of this, failed to validate opportunity for institutional redesigning and settled for a political system that combined old and new;a hybrid of old (Soviet) and new (more western inspired) elements  which implied institutional contuity •  therefore we can say that institutionally, the critical juncture for Ukraine only came on 28 June 1996: when the Constitution was voted, since –at least partially- this ended a protracted struggle of constitution-making which delayed reforms and clarity on institutional competences among main gvt institutions • This critical juncture on domestic level  would eventually also influence Ukraine’s FP • Because although in 1st years of independence: lots of institutional confusion and discussion going about competences of the different state institutions, still: very presence of discussions indicated a certain dynamism that might open up a path to reforms, this was somewhat confirmed by the voting of the constitution. • The usefulness of the presence discussion was also reflected in Ukraine’s FP; which was bolder and also had more dynamism than Belarusian FP • Belarus • institutional paralysis until 1994 (like Ukraine) > failure of BPF; was not as successful as Rukh,  combined with rise of the Party of Power (led by Kebich) resulted in institutional stagnation, which also implied absence of discussion (unlike Ukraine). • after 1994: things radicalised after election of Lukashenka • Lukashenka introduced institutional reforms, yet • - way he did it was deemed unconstitutional & illegitimate (referenda) • - goals were not exactly democratic, more aimed at strengthening the institution of presidency to detriment of other institutions (esp. parliament) • So critical junctures: 1995 and 1996 referenda  legitimised L’s power grab & undemocratic institutional reforms which significantly determined domestic & FP of Bel for next years, alienated Belarus from West: EU, OSCE, CoE condemned Lukashenka’s actions.

3. Comparison • mid-nineties signalled divergence in countries’ institutional development and in their foreign policy orientations • Divergence in institutional development • In Belarus, institutional ‘reforms’ by Lukashenka • - strengthened his power base by eliminating the pro-reform, pro-western opposition through dissolution parliament & hand picking members of new parliament • - Referenda used to ‘legitimise’ actions  generally considered unconstitutional • In Ukraine, 1996 constitution limited president • - did not give him as much powers as the Russian or Belarusian president • - Unlike in Belarus, president did have to account for his policy decisions to Verkhovna Rada • In Belarus, president deprived opposition from a voice by replacing them with less critical deputies  gave him free hand in decision making without being amenable to another institution •  so in comparison to Belarus, institutional structures in Ukraine = more proportioned  country scored a better balance between legislative & executive institutions – although relations have been strained and dissenting opinions will always remain, pres & parl have more mutual checks & balances since 1996 constitution that Belarusian pres & parl will ever have • 2) Second divergence: on level of institutional creation in relation to foreign policy orientations • past decade: new sections added to existing institutions (MFA, parliamentary committees) as a csq of institutional definition that supports Bel & Ukr’s FP priorities. Also specific inter-institutional cooperation structures created between countries & org fields surrounding them (EU & CIS)

4. Slide 4 • Ukraine table • Ukraine: active institutional dynamism towards EU integration: specific institutions focus on EU. parliamentary committee for EU Integration, now Vice-PM for Eur integration, special divisions for EU integration in MFA), and presidential level (delineating strategies for EU integration), also specific institutional cooperation structures like the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council and Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. • So increased interaction between Ukr& EU org field • clear emergence of interorganisational structures • significant increase in information load between Ukraine & EU: numerous official documents describing and clarifying Ukraine’s strategy of integration into EU • development of a mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise proved by Ukraine’s often repeated European ambitions on one hand, and EU’s Common Strategy & ENP on other hand  Ukr fulfills basic conditions that can signal institutional approximation Slide 5 • Belarus table • Belarus: lacks Ukraine’s institutional dynamism towards EU org field • increased interaction and emergence of interorganisational structures during 1st years of Belarusian independence;  but all these processes reversed after Lukashenka became president • information load = limited & mostly stresses negative aspects of relation with EU & negative consequences of EU enlargement • absolutely no mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise (EU sanctions, Belarus reacts defiant against Eur criticism) • BUT dynamism of Belarus that is missing in Eur policy; present in its relations with CIS  since start consistently friendly & open policy towards CIS. policy intensified considerably when Lukashenka became president; his neo-Soviet attitude is also reflected in Belarus’s FP • stronginteraction & elaborate inter-institutional structures with CIS: national (sections for CIS & Union affairs in MFA, commission for CIS in parliament) & inter-institutional level (summits, interparliamentary assembly, executive committee,…) • numerous official documents illustrate Belarus’ orientation towards CIS org field & esp. Russia; signals mutual awareness of building organisational structure in CIS region of which Union State: serves as model for closer integration

5. stark contrast: Ukraine’s relations with CIS lack momentum of Belarus-CIS/Russia cooperation • Although Ukraine’s eastward policy is not as strained as Belarus’ relations with the EU  clear that Ukraine limit its political involvement in CIS institutions to a minimum. • although inter-organisational structures between Ukraine & CIS are present, no particular official documents delineate specific strategy towards CIS & no increased interaction of org in fied • Ukraine’s reputation as distinctly unenthusiastic member of CIS implies that level of mutual awareness to be involved in a common enterprise = low as wel • SO to conclude: • EU • Ukraine: institutional dynamism towards EU integration • Belarus: lacks institutional dynamism towards EU • CIS • Belarus: consistently open policy towards CIS • Ukraine: relations with CIS lack momentum. political engagement in CIS institutions limited. •  So there is a clear divergence between Ukraine and Belarus on this topic • What are causes for such divergence in policy choices, especially since countries have similar history&background?

6. Slide 6: • History / socio-cultural factors • - Belarus’s history shows: almost never independent, always part of either Great Duchy of Lithuania or Russian Empire (3 months independent: then part of USSR)  much lower national identity than Ukraine • - Ukraine: Western Ukraine stronger national identity because part of Habsburg Empire – but probably also because of presence of big russian minority to which W Ukrainians react by asserting their identity even stronger • Leadership • - Ukraine: not such predominant leadership • - Belarus: Lukashenka, strong leader, who determines Belarus’s Eastern orientation almost completely • Combined with • Civil Society • - Belarus: BPF failed to appeal to wider public because of anti-Russian stance • - Ukraine: Rukh initially more successful, civil society also played (albeit limited) role in powerswitch in Nov-Dec 2004 • Foreign interest • - Ukraine: West has economic-strategic interest  Orange Revolution sponsored • - West has no economic strategic interest in Belarus; leaves it therefore in Russian sphere of influence •  !!!! This is one of the main reasons for Belarusian-Russian Union State, about which I will talk briefly now, going into the second part about parallels of integration.

7. Slide 7 • To finish this presentation, I will go briefly into parallels of integration (as opposed to divergent integration) • Example: Union State • Often claimed to be mirroring the example of European integration – research shows mirroring is relatively limited- how is not studied here; what interest me here is: Why would B-R Union state be mirroring? Several reasons for parallel integration • Rontoyanni: R-B integration: not coincidental  happened at same time as Central European states filed for accession to EU & NATO • The appeal of the EU institutional model > due to high prestige of EU in the eyes of Belarusian and Russian elites;  EU model associated with growing prosperity of member states. • BUT complexity of the EU enlargement process led Belarusian & Russian elites to conclusion that capacity of existing supranational structures could not be stretched to geographical or cultural limits of European continent – at least in the foreseeable future. • This realisation prompted strategy of parallel integrative processes combined with growing interaction with European ‘core’ Slide 8 • Reasons: political-strategic (Yeltsin) economic-strategic (Luka); every step of integration coincides with political need for boost from Luka or Yeltsin • 21 February1995 Agreement on Friendship, Goodneighbourly Relations and Cooperation between Belarus and Russia • Community2 April 1996 Agreement on the formation of a Community of Belarus and Russia • Russia’s president Boris Yeltsin sought to use unification process for political purpose  1) to compensate for Russia’s failures during the Chechen war’ 2) Yeltsin’s chances for re-election = minimal  advisors offered number of plans to bolster his position, one of which: unification with Belarus. Because Duma opposition: calls for integration of the post-Soviet space  Belarus = convenient means to achieve this goal • April 1997: Union – Soyuz 2 April 1997 Treaty on the Union between Belarus and Russia • Union negotiations again manipulated for political purposes held hostage to the settlement of political issues: journalist Pavel Sheremet case

8. December 1999: Union State – Soyuznoe Gosudarstvo8 December 1999 Agreement on the formation of a Union State between B&R • 1998 integration lull  Kremlin saving integration option for parliamentary elections of 1999 & presidential election of 2000 • BUT Russian economic crisis of 17 August 1998 became herald of another move towards integration • New PM Putin expressed hope that new treaty would be signed before Russia’s presidential electionduring visit to Minsk • September: Lukashenka statement: found draft laughable, would only sign agreement if Moscow would fulfill ‘its economic obligations towards Belarus’. He insisted on high-ranking position in political hierarchy if united  attempted to use agreement for concrete political gains Slide 9 • Yeltsin & Luka: pretended preference for integration to increase popularity when needed • BUT: when time for serious reforms (implying limitation of power)  integration process be suspended for indefinite period • ‘integration game’  ultimate goal of game is not integration, but what? • idea of integration: convenient tool for political manoeuvre • Luka: concrete political and economic advantages; cancellation of Belarusian debt to Russia in 1996, cheap energy from Russia, and the sale of Russian weaponry BUT Luka avoids adopting laws that allow Russian industrialists to privatise Belarusian enterprises. Luka says: property means power • ‘integration efforts’ always intensify at eve of elections • Russia: pragmatic goal of keeping Belarus in Russia’s sphere of influence.

9. Yet the instit mirroring or parallels of integration: in reality, limited. • ‘mirroring’ of EU: • predominantly on level of economic integration (free market, harmonization of tariffs, …) • and in political discourse (objectives declared in integration treaties mirrored the agreements of EU to considerable extent – objectives, not actions) • Nevertheless effective integration: harmonisation of foreign policy • - since 1998, MFAs introduced ‘Programmes of Coordinated Actions in the Field of Foreign Policy’ joint collegial sessions began in February 2000 • Belarusian diplomats receive training at Diplomatic Academy of Russian MFA and MGIMO •  but! This is not institutional mirroring, since coordinating FP among members = one of weaker points of EU (look at GB) Slide 10 • Copying, institutional mirroring: a natural process, even historical tradition in East-West context. • Wider perspective of parallels between CIS & EU : • - Uncomparable because of time disparity, but influence on countries periphery is normal • - nominally formal structures & institutions of EU and CIS are similar, • but as I demonstrate in my paper a) level of integration and b) reasons for integration differ substantially. • Level of integration: CIS, only since 1991, loose construction, many subregional initiatives • reasons for integration: European integration after war: idealistic-economic reasons / CIS: damage control after implosion USSR  pragmatic – economic  So far my ideas on parallels and divergence of integration