Human Space Exploration –

1. Human Space Exploration – Is International Cooperation the Solution? the Problem? Chris Gilbert Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, 2011-2012 August 30, 2012

2. The Basis for this Presentation • The NASA human space exploration program is currently funded at about $3 billion per year. • The program objectives reflect national goals, but the funding level for the foreseeable future is insufficient to enable NASA to achieve these goals alone. • There appears to be a general expectation that additional support will be available to enable NASA achieve its goals, without having the resources to do it themselves. • The solution: “International cooperation” • International cooperation is frequently quoted as the obvious solution because it has made the International Space Station possible • But relying on international cooperation as a keystone in a global space exploration undertaking introduces considerable additional risk • The U.S. program might not survive without international commitments to support it, but potential partners may not be willing to support the program without a commitment on the part of the United States to continue it. • Only the U.S. currently has the resources, the technology and the will to explore. There is no international consensus to motivate cooperation, and other space agencies have other priorities. • So is international cooperation the solution or the problem?

3. Human Space Exploration – An Uphill Endeavor • Since the Apollo Program ended in 1972, the United States has made three • further attempts to send humans beyond Earth orbit: • In 1969 the Space Task Group reporting to President Nixon hoped to gain approval for a long-term human space exploration program with Mars as the ultimate goal. • The only element of the program proposal that was approved was the Space Shuttle • In 1989 President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) announced his Space Exploration Initiative. The cost was estimated to be between $400 - $600 billion. • The Initiative quickly died • In 2004, President George W. Bush (Bush 43) announced his Vision for Space Exploration, and the Constellation program was approved by Congress in bipartisan Authorization Bills in 2005 and 2008. • In February 2010 (FY2011 Budget Proposal), President Obama canceled the Constellation program and attempted to replace it with technology development programs. This was resisted by Congress, which retained core exploration elements in its 2010 NASA Authorization Bill. • The SLS and Orion vehicles continue to be funded today (but not named Constellation).

4. The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was based on four objectives: • Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond; • Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; • Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and • Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.

5. But the implementation of the VSE had unpleasant consequences for international partners: • Issue 1: • “Retire the Space Shuttle as soon as assembly of the International Space Station is completed, planned for the end of this decade.” • The Space Shuttle was viewed internationally as the flagship of U.S. space capabilities, and a major force for international cooperation. • The ISS utilization plans were formulated on the basis that the Shuttle would be the prime logistics transportation vehicle, able to take up and return major components of the ISS and the research facilities. • It was planned to bring back integrated experiment racks containing the research facilities for refurbishment, upgrade and checkout on the ground before sending them back to the ISS. • Without the Shuttle, maintenance of the ISS would be more difficult, long-term utilization of the ISS would be compromised, and sample return would not be possible (until commercial services were provided).

6. But the implementation of the VSE had unpleasant consequences for international partners (contd.): • Issue 2: • “Conduct International Space Station activities in a manner consistent with U.S. obligations contained in the agreements between the United States and other partners in the International Space Station.” • In the original Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGA’s) the U.S. agreed to operate the ISS through 2016. • The NASA budget presented at the time of the VSE announcement showed no budget for the ISS after 2016. • But the Columbia accident introduced major schedule delays to the ISS assembly sequence. The European and Japanese laboratory modules were among the last of the elements scheduled for launch. • Columbus and Kibo were launched in 2008. De-orbiting the ISS in 2016 would mean the investments by ESA and JAXA could not be fully exploited. • The NASA leadership was “too busy” with the Constellation program to hold serious discussions with international partners on ISS operations after 2016 until 2009.

7. But the implementation of the VSE had unpleasant consequences for international partners (contd.): • Issue 3: • “Focus U.S. research and use of the International Space Station on supporting space exploration goals, with emphasis on understanding how the space environment affects astronaut health and capabilities and developing countermeasures.” • Major areas of the NASA microgravity and physical sciences research program were cut to free up budget for Constellation • Pre-existing inter-Agency agreements with ESA and JAXA provided for scientific cooperation in the use of ISS research facilities. • Without proposals from NASA for microgravity and physical sciences experiments, the user base for the large research facilities shrank, casting doubt on their operational concept.

8. But the implementation of the VSE had unpleasant consequences for international partners (contd.): • Issue 4: • “Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.” • Potential international partners balked at cooperating in order to support U.S. scientific, security and economic goals • A new attitude developed: “The U.S. supports international cooperation in order to make its partners do what it wants, not what they want.” • And: “Cooperation is just a more subtle form of competition.” Message to potential partners: Increase your budget so you can cooperate with NASA AND do what you want

10. Human Space Exploration Program in 2005: NASA vs. ESA • NASA, Authorization Act 2005: • In December 2005, Congress incorporated the VSE into U.S. law through the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. • FY 2005 human space exploration budget: $2.6 billion • ESA, C-Min 2005: • A number of political resolutions were adopted • Agency's Long-Term Plan for Discovery and Competitiveness • Mandatory Activities budget 2006 - 2010 • Evolution of the European launcher sector • Management of the Kourou spaceport until end of 2008 • Evolution of the Agency, and • International Space Station Programme • And a number of programmatic decisions were made • A European human space exploration program was not discussed

11. Human Space Exploration Program in 2008: NASA vs. ESA • In October 2008, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 was enacted. • Sec. 401. Sense of Congress • It is the sense of Congress that the President of the United States should invite America's friends and allies to participate in a long-term international initiative under the leadership of the United States to expand human and robotic presence into the solar system……. When appropriate, the United States should lead confidence building measures that advance the long-term initiative for international cooperation. • FY 2009 human space exploration budget: $3.3 billion • ESA C-Min 2008: • The 2008 ESA Ministerial meeting focused on: • The need for European space activities to support EU’s response to global challenges. • European exploitation of the ISS, together with the ExoMars program. • The Ariane 5 Mid-Life Evolution program (Ariane 5 ME) • Future evolution of Galileo was agreed. • A cargo return system for ATV was approved but in 2011 a proposal for ESA-NASA cooperation was adopted. • A study for a small lunar lander was approved at the insistence of Germany • Total funding approved: €10 billion (e.c. 2008) • A European human space exploration program was not discussed

12. Human Space Exploration Program in 2012: NASA vs. ESA • NASA, Authorization Act 2010: • In October 2010, President Obama signed the 2010 NASA Authorization Act which was enacted as PL 111-267. • Principal elements: MPCV/Orion, Space Launch System, first flight 2017, second flight 2021. • FY 2011 human space exploration budget: $3.868 billion • ESA C-Min 2012 • The following programmatic decisions are planned: • Human Spaceflight and Exploration • Earth Observation • Launchers • Telecom & Applications • Technology Support Program • Space Situational Awareness • Navigation • Total funding, if approved: €11.6 billion (e.c. 2012)

13. Total: €11.6 billon

14. Total: €3.6 billion

15. Uhh……. ya wanna cooperate? Sure, we can cooperate……

16. Past Issues with International Cooperation • 1977 - The International Solar Polar Mission / Ulysses (NASA – ESA) • 1991 – The SOFIA Project (NASA – DLR) • 1996 – The X-38 / CRV Project (NASA – ESA – DLR) • 2012 – The ExoMars Project (NASA – ESA)

17. So What‘s Next? • High-Level Meeting in Lucca, Italy, in November 2011 • Expanded the scope for international discussions on cooperation beyond the European scene • Did not result in any agreements, except to meet again • Next meeting will be hosted by the U.S. at the end of 2013, in DC. The 2013 meeting could be critical for the United States and NASA • NASA needs firm indications of interest in cooperation to convince the Administration and Congress that international cooperation is a viable strategy for space exploration • There are innumerable issues to be discussed and agreements will take years to negotiate • International cooperation is not just Agency agreements – it requires sound political planning and support at the highest level • NASA needs to present detailed plans to attract and secure offers of cooperation, together with firm indications of long-term commitment