More Powerful Way to Change North Korea

1. More Powerful Way to Change North Korea Sergei O. Kurbanov ICAS Fellow Professor, St. Petersburg University Visiting Scholar, GWIKS Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2016-OLU-2250002)

2. 1. Introduction. NorthKorea as international player. • Countries and cultures remains different. (Despite the process of globalization and the adoption of "universal human values”). • The behavior of different countries in the world arena is also different. • The perception of each other's behavior by different countries is also different. • And each of the countries (their governments) believe that their perception of the external world and perception of the behavior of other countries is "true”. • North Korean leaders are considering their behavior (politics) being “true”. • The United States together with the Western World and the Republic of Korea, with the majority of the UN members consider North Korean external (and internal) behavior (politics) as “wrong” and “threatening”. • They hope for changes in North Korea, its behavior (politics) to become “true” and “safe” and “secure” to the World community. • Is it possible to change North Korea and how?

3. Possible ways of changing North Korea. • 1) If we want to change North Korea, first of all we need to get confirmation that we have the right to do this.(The need to confirm the legality of actions). • After getting confirmation of this right, it is necessary to choose (decide) ways of changing North Korea. • 2) Here it is necessary to have a clear distinction between CHANGING or DESTROYING this country. • 3) If we decide to begin activities aimed only for CHANGING it (not destroying), we must avoid everything (including rhetoric) connected with its destruction. • Paradox: The threat makes the country stronger, the lack of threat leaves it weak. • In principle, there can be two ways of North Korea transformation: • - Direct impact (pressure; influence) from outside or • - Indirect impact on North Korean elite or active strata of population capable to organize others.

4. Direct impact. Sanctions. • Sanctions as direct impact. • Sanctions are powerful instrument for the country which has well developed system of external relations and depends on the external market. • North Korea never had developed system of external relations (except 1945 – 1950s). • North Korea is dependent from the outside world only in the sphere of energy. • Sanctions can lead only to reduction of the population to the level when the country will be able to feed it with its own agricultural resources. • Instead of using cars they will use carts with ox. • They will continue heating with coal which natural reserves aresufficient.

5. Indirect impact. More good foreign made products and fashions. • Goods from the free developed world as a path that facilitates change. • Market moves economy. Market moves culture. Market changes policy. • New products are a locomotive of market development. • New cultural products changes societies. • If there is no market, but there is a product that attracts potential consumer, the market will appear. • Example with the Soviet Union of 1970s – 1980s. • The magic power of the blues jeans bringing individuality and freedom. • ACTIVE TRADE WITH NORTH KOREA PROVIDING IT WITH LARGE VARIETY OF FOREIGN EVERYDAY GOODS and fashions will bring changes in minds of North Korean population. • (Besides it will prepare North Korea to be more sensitive to potential future sanctions).

6. Indirect impact. Providing more varieties of information. Soviet experience. • The second way of indirect impact on North Korea is providing its population with various information of the following categories: • 1. Demonstration of life styles and conditions better than in North Korea. • 2. Stories about personal freedom in comparison with North Korean realities, as well as benefits of freedom. • 3. A HUGE PORTION OF attractive PURE CULTURAL INFORMATION, that can replace the everyday spiritual culture of the citizens of the DPRK, imbued with propaganda and ideology. • SOVIET EXPERIENCE: it was Western goods and Western popular culture that had transformed Soviet people (especially young people), made them unhappy with the realities of their time, led to idea of changing Communist system into democratic (1980s – 1990s).

7. Indirect impact. Images of the future of unified democratic North Korea. • Another important area of information that can push North Koreans to actions is detailed description of DEVELOPMENT PLANS of every North Korean region after unification (under Seoul governance). • It is a very delicate, very difficult but necessary task. • One can send to North Koreans a lot of information about “free and wealthy” life in South Korea or anywhere. • North Koreans can easily react on this information in following way: • “It is life there. This life is not for us. Our fate is live under conditions and circumstances as is.” (This statement is based on my personal Soviet experience). • It is necessary to show possibilities of the better life in their home region.Show people that good life is not somewhere abroad, behind a demilitarized zone, but what is possible here at home, and pretty soon.

8. Indirect impact: teaching people what and how to do. • Besides, there is another important type of information that should be provided to North Korea, if we want that North Korean people deciding to change their political system, society, economics etc. is educational information. • Teaching North Koreans what to do and how to do. • Since their birth North Koreans were taught to follow orders of highest leaders, party leaders of various levels, local administration leaders etc. • They even can not imagine that they have rights and possibilities to behave any other way except obeying. • So it is necessary to: • 1) Develop a strategy for North Korean citizens to change North Korean society. • 2) Then to teach them how to do this.

9. Information structuring and Korean social culture. • In Russia sometimes I am organizing trainings for Russian employees and managers working together with Koreans in Korean enterprises. • Russian employees are experiencing great difficulties with their (South) Korean colleagues, including Korean psychology of negotiations and decisions making. • Russians are always asking me how to influence Koreans so that they can promptly answer the questions posed? • My answer always is: “Don’t force Koreans think about possible decisions or answers. Give them three variants of possible answers and simply ask them to choose”. • Korean culture of traditional “Confucian collectivism” (existing in North Korea too) does not promote decision-making, the ability to think independently (when thinking in Korean language, in which the predicative indexes social stratification). • Example with a North Korean defector who used foreign language to win his conversation with North Korean security officers. • In North Korea traditional culture of collectivism (also reflected in Korean language) is stronger than in South. • Thus, providing North Korea with information it is necessary to structure it in accordance with Korean culture.

10. Power of information from outside and Kim Jong-un concern about this. • Last speech of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivered to the 5th Conference of WPK Cell Chairpersons on December 24, 2017. • In his speech Kim Jong-un has repeatedly addressed to the problem of “corrupt bourgeois reactionary culture”, people “harboring illusions about the enemies' culture” and “ideological and cultural poisoning by the imperialists”. • All these were united by Kim Jong-un under the term indicating new realities in modern North Korean society: “non-socialist practices” (비사회주의적 현상) or “non-socialist realities”. • This speech of Kim Jong-un clearly illustrates partial ideological damage of the present political regime as a reault of outside influence. • There are “new North Koreans” who potentially can become the new power of changes in North Korea.

11. New North Koreans.

12. Information delivery: how? Direct delivery; cultural exchange, trade. • Ways of information delivery to the North. • Direct information delivery throughout the country with the use of ordinary media. • Special role of using Pyongyang dialect in transmissions and simultaneous teaching Seoul dialect. • No direct critique! Only displaying alternative life. Even simple images of other regions nature (Arctic nature, Brazilian nature) can play very powerful role in changing North Koreans minds. • 1. Radio: medium, short waves. It is necessary always changing frequencies (explain). THE MOST SAFE (anonymous) way of receiving information. • 2. TV broadcasts. Less effective. Already in 1980s people who lived near Gaesong watched South Korean TV broadcasts. • 3. DVD, memory cards and other media distribution. • 4. Cultural exchange as one of the strongest and powerful information delivery mean. • 5. Limited trade (export) providing North Koreans everyday life goods.

13. Information delivery: where? • North Korea is not the country where all regions are similar one to another. At the present time and in the past. • When planning information delivery to North Korea, it is necessary to calculate (to plan) where and what kind of information may be the most effective. • North Korea: regional specificity. • 1. Pyongyang. • 2. North-Western region, close to China, near import-export routes. Traditionally the region which originated several rebellions (9th century – Wang Geon; 1811 – 1812: Hong Gyeong-rae rebellion; 1894 – 1895: Northern troops of Donghak peasants war etc.). • Gaesong and Hwanghae provinces. • Hamgyeong, Jagang, Yangang provinces – “weakest regions” with Raseon exception.

14. Conclusion • Information is a significant power, especially in 21st century. • Even North Korean leader Kim Jong-un well understands it and he points to the negative impact of information from outside on the internal "socialist" situation in North Korea. • History of collapse of the Soviet Union proofs power of the information which can lift people to active action.