Global Tensions and Economic Security

1. Global Tensions and Economic Security 2016 CCMR Executive Course in Decision Making Naval Postgraduate School November 8, 2016 Dr. Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Outline • Part I: The Global Economic Environment • Overview of the 2008-09 Crisis • Patterns of Recovery • The Current Situation – Major Economic Trends • Forecasts • Part II: Leading Themes/Major Risks • Geopolitical/Security Threats • Brexit and Anti-Globalization • Oil Price Decline – Debt Problems, Russian Crisis, OPEC Agreement • Emerging Market Difficulties – China Scenarios • U.S. Long Term Budget Patterns – Declining Defense Expenditures • Declining Western Defense Expenditures

3. Main Theme: The Security Trilemma

4. The Global Crisis, 2008-09

5. Global Financial Crisis: Initial Security Concerns

6. Economic Crisis and Security Threats “The global recession is America’s primary near-term security concern.” Admiral Blair – Director of National Intelligence (February 2009) “The single biggest threat to national security is the national debt.” Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (August 2010) “I have to confess, I paid no attention to this (economics) as a cadet and have done nothing to increase my awareness of economics issues between age 22 and 59. I should have paid attention.” General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 2011)

7. Global Economy Overview I The Changing Global System • Before the 2008-09 crisis, the main feature of the global economy was its rapid integration • Has continued, but at a much slower pace since the crisis • In the post- 2008-09 period: • Economic policies largely set at the national level to benefit domestic economy • External effects -- these policies are increasingly affecting other economies in an adverse way • These effects particularly important in the monetary/financial sector due their potential for creating increased volatility in: • Capital flows • Asset prices • Interest rates, exchange rates, and credit availability.

8. Global Economy Overview II • This instability has been compounded by growth models in many advanced economies based on: • Excess monetary expansion/credit, and • Debt-driven domestic aggregate demand • Also, structural flaws such as rigid labor markets, limited competition and inflexible prices, especially in Europe have led to • Instability • An on-going crisis • Large negative shock to the real economy • Emerging economies were subsequently affected by • Credit tightening (including trade finance) • Rapid declines in exports

9. Global Economy Overview III • In the United States, unconventional monetary policy • Lowered cost of credit for debtors and those seeking to borrow for business expansion • Came at the at expense of savers – lower interest rates • Did not work well because investment constrained by deficient domestic demand relative to capacity • Savers sought higher returns in emerging economies • Result: increases in credit and causing upward pressure on exchange rates and asset prices in Emerging Markets (EMs) • EMs responded with • Limits on capital inflows • Reserve accumulation and measures to restrict credit and restrain asset-price inflation

10. Global Economy Overview IV • Situation changed in May 2013 when U.S. Federal reserve indicated it might taper its purchase of long-term assets • Asset prices shifted and in emerging economies • Capital rushed out, • Caused credit markets to tighten, and • Exchange rates to fall • Resulting in a slowdown in short-term growth. • Volatile capital reversals may have longer term adverse effects – although not clear at this point • China the exception: • While China’s output is affected by advanced country economic performance – financial system largely isolated • Capital account less open, foreign currency reserves of $2.5 trillion mean exchange rate is controllable

11. Global Economy Overview V • Decentralized policy and growing externalities will result in a partial de-globalization • Not a good idea to run persistent current account deficits and become dependent on (temporarily) low-cost foreign capital • Open capital accounts may be replaced by rules-based constraints on financial capital flows • Lesson from crisis • Pattern of accumulating reserves via current account surplus will be more pronounced in order to manage exchange rates • Public purchases of domestic assets to stabilize asset prices will become increasingly common. • Successful countries will be those who learn to live with growing policy interdependency without much policy coordination

12. Crisis Has Accelerated Changes in World GDP

13. Decline of the G-8

14. Current Global Patterns I • Today world economy is characterized by divergence • As the charts indicated, while growth was centered in the advanced world in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, more recently it has moved to emerging economies • According to the International Monetary Fund of the eight countries expected to contribute most to global economic expansion over the next five years only U.S. and Korea are advanced economies • The U.S. comes third contributing 10% of total world growth after China and India – who contribute 45% • Turkey is expected to add more growth in dollar terms to global economy over next five years than Germany

15. Current Global Patterns II

16. Current Global Patterns III

17. Current Global Patterns IV

18. Current Global Patterns V

19. EM/DM Growth Convergence • However since 2009, EMs as a group are converging on the advanced countries at a slower pace.

20. Today’s Policy Environment • Policy makers are in a bind in many countries • In the Eurozone and Japan they are still trying to find ways to stimulate demand and avoid deflation • In the U.S. interest rates beginning to increase, but there is widespread concern that any movement back to normal might trigger financial turmoil • However leaving monetary policy loose will encourage excessive borrowing which may create bubbles and another financial crash • In emerging markets the need is to push forward on structural and governance reforms to labor and product markets as well as education and social security to enable more secure and rapid growth • Not easy and mistakes are certain to happen. • The economic environment in many parts of the world is thus quite fragile with forecasts increasingly pessimistic.

21. Current Situation Q4 2016 I • Global Baseline: • Situation characterized by sluggish growth, low yields, little underlying inflation. • Growth remains heavily reliant on the global consumer and major central banks • Both coming under strain • Policy mix still off target • Uncertainty over direction of policy continues to weigh on investment • Only a decisive turn toward fiscal easing or certain types of structural reform (taxes, labor) are likely to break cycle of stagnation • Little sign of optimism in that regard • Monetary tools still provide bulk of current stimulus, but appear to have hit diminishing returns with negative interest rates.

22. Current Situation Q4 2016 II • Fiscal policy less austere, but hardly at full throttle • Governments have generally eased up on austerity measures • The U.S. may join China, Canada, and Japan in moving to an expansionary policy, but not until after the election • The UK’s forthcoming fiscal package will be significant, but benefits largely offset by impact of uncertainty over Brexit negotiations with the EU • Policy uncertainty seems to be rising with markets jittery and investment returns low.

23. Current Situation Q4 2016 III • Policy uncertainty looms large in • Europe • Nationalist sentiment on the rise • Poses a threat to economic policy and long-term investment • Brexit uncertainty will be a drag on the UK and EU. • China • Policy makers continue slow pace of reforms to prop up the economy • Good news for global growth in the near term. • However the government is providing credit stimulus in fits and starts confusing the picture • Concerns now over rising debts and weakening of bank balance sheets

24. Current Situation Q4 2016 IV • United States • Elections for a new president with major implications for domestic, foreign, and energy policy • Both candidates likely to pull back from trade and globalization – sharp break from past policies • Donald Trump’s tax cut proposal would increase federal debt by $4.4 trillion over next decade • Far more stimulus than is required to close current output gap, potentially crowding out private investment • Hillary Clinton’s plans would expand the debt by $1.1 trillion over 10 years but with a lift to both tax revenues and spending

25. The New Abnormal I • The current situation has been called “The New Abnormal” -It is characterized by: • Deficient Demand – hard to generate enough demand to absorb potential global supply – threat of deflation • Stagnant Productivity. In advanced countries productivity fallen from 2% a year to less than 1% • Fragile Finance – system may be even more fragile than before the crisis. Assets to equity very high making banks vulnerable • Unstable Politics – political stresses – hostility towards elites, foreigners, international institutions make finding solutions difficult • Tense Geopolitics – Russia, China, ISIS, Iran, Ukraine – create great uncertainty • Challenge Overload – both domestic and international. Breakdown of global governance when problems mounting – maintain open global economy, climate change, peace.

26. The New Abnormal: II

27. Slow-Down in Global Trade

28. Employment Improving but Stagnant Productivity

29. IMF Forecasts, October 2016

30. Part II • Leading Themes and • Major Risks/Threats

31. Geopolitical/Security Threats • Several security trends/threats likely to have an impact on the business operating environment and thus economic security • Growing anti-establishment sentiment around world -- Brexit • China set to become more, not less assertive over territorial claims in South China Sea following international rulings • Threat of terrorism in Europe from extremist groups and radicalized individuals remains genuine • Terror attacks, combined with migrant crisis fueling rise of far-right groups and pull mainstream parties toward populist fringes • Political and economic crisis in Venezuela expected to worsen with regime change – potentially violent a significant possibility • Oil price drop – complicates debt servicing and government budget decisions • All increase uncertainty and reduce potential investment

32. Brexit and Anti-Globalization I • U.K decision to leave EU in June 2016 a shock to many • Consequences will be long and profound • Amplified by • Lack of clarity surrounding it • The mechanism through which it will occur • Legislation governing the UK’s future relationship with Europe and • The impact of this new relationship; on the global economy • Uncertainty will dampen consumer and business sentiment in world’s fifth-largest economy • Result – deferred investment decisions and a year of recession in 2017

33. Brexit and Anti-Globalization II • For the Longer term, various assessments predict the UK GDP will be lower • From 1.3 to 5.5% per year up to 2020 and • 1.2% to 7.5% by 2030 • Brexit will also exert geopolitical effect • U.S. will need to build stronger relations with France and Germany or risk diminished influence in Europe • Both countries have strong anti-globalization groups • Unlikely that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a US-EU trade agreement will be signed • .

34. Oil Price Decline I

35. Oil Price Decline II

36. Country Reserves

37. Russian Crisis • Russia – Economy in decline for years • Falling population, brain drain, limited investment, small private sector, over dependence on oil revenues, and very limited reforms • Country hit hard by oil price decline • March 1, 2016 Russia introduced its crisis plan for the economy • Major cutbacks in expenditures • Defense and social spending are frequently cited as off-limit areas for cuts so state of economy a major concern. • Government anticipating a second year of recession, but smaller than the 3.7% contraction in 2015 • Still many uncertainties, especially about the level of oil prices

38. Russian Crisis II

39. African Debt I Debt growing problem in Africa • Borrowing in dollars increasingly risky and expensive • As local currencies depreciate on softening commodity prices, repayment costs soar • Threatening added costs of up to 10.8 billion dollars • March 5, 2015 Ghana announced plans for a $1 billion ten year Eurobond to repay part of its debt maturing in 2017 • Extremely low and increasingly negative bond yields in developed economies encouraging capital flows to Africa • Over past two years African states have issued 22 billion dollars in dollar denominated debt • Almost as much as total sovereign issuance across the region in past nine years

40. African Debt II

41. African Debt III • In last several months investors becoming more cautious • Now oil exporters would have difficulty issuing debt on favorable terms • In addition to possible slow oil price recovery, principle risk in dollar bond market is threat of earlier than expected U.S. interest rate increase • Markets could shift very rapidly with borrowing rates increasing sharply • Would make it considerably more difficult for countries to access international capital at affordable rates • Oil exporters will be hit the hardest – suffering high repayment costs due to currency volatility. • The debt situation makes many African countries vulnerable to a fiscal crisis and internal unrest. • Question of how much assistance China willing to give.

42. OPEC Agreement I • September 28, 2016 agreement aims at cutting oil production from roughly 33.24 million to between 32.5 million bpd and 33 million bpd. • Cut marginal, but first since crisis in 2008 • Also first response since price collapse in second half of 2014 – peak $110, bottomed out at $25 January 2016 • Issues to be decided before November 30 meeting: • Who will shoulder brunt of cuts? • How to handle rising production from Iran? • How to reconcile differences between producers?

43. Largest OPEC Producers

44. OPEC Agreement II • Overview • Deal does not necessarily represent attempt to push up prices • Instead, a reaction to market conditions that expect more oil coming online soon • With tentative deal OPEC trying to cushion impact of new supplies – want to prevent prices from dropping below level many OPEC countries are comfortable with • OPEC now largely in defensive stance

45. OPEC Agreement III • Explaining the Shift • Within OPEC Nigeria, Libya, and Iraq seeing small bumps in production and exports • If sustained could add more than 800,000 bpd over next couple of months – more than entire cut OPEC is proposing • These countries likely exempt from any production cut, although Iraq may be subject to a freeze • Libya and Iran have seen their production levels artificially low because of violence and political dispute • Nigeria militant attacks on pipelines have been repaired • Iraq deal between Kurdish leaders and government to jointly export 150,000 bpd from Kirkuk

46. OPEC Agreement IV • Beyond OPEC • Large field in Kazakhstan will start coming online in October • U.S oil production coming back • Between June 2015 and July 2016 production fell from 9.6m bpd to 8.45m bpd due to low oil prices • Production stabilized • Future estimates show a slow rise is prices stay around $50 per barrel • If OPEC tries to maintain a price of $60 would accelerate US production and be self-defeating • OPEC must • Make sure additional production coming on stream does not force price down, while • not sending prices up far enough to stimulate shale production

47. EM Recovery I • Likely a slow painful recovery lies ahead • Global growth environment remains fragile • Commodities will rise only gradually • U.S. monetary conditions are tightening • Debt servicing burdens of EMs are generally high, and • Economic reform is happening at a sluggish pace • Positive indicators • Capital flows into EMs are picking up • Assets have rallied since the start of the year (particularly FX) and • Valuations are undoubtedly cheap

48. EM Recovery II • Hard to make the case for a sustained bull market in either • Equities • Bonds • Currencies • However macroeconomic fundamentals will improve at a slow pace and difficult to identify Ems without weaknesses such as • Large fiscal deficits • Current account shortfalls and • Rising debt levels • For those currencies appreciating the gains will be modest in comparison with heavy losses in recent years

49. EM Recovery III

50. EM Recovery IV • Bright spots – upswing phase of economic cycle with good growth prospects and macroeconomic fundamentals • Philippines, • India, • Chile • Mexico, and • Indonesia • Although Romania and Poland are accelerating this is being powered with excessively loose fiscal policy • Commodity exporters and reform laggards still locked into a slowdown to greater or lesser extent • Oil exporters are suffering severely depleted government budgets and debt issuance is being ramped up.