101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

1. 1 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM SAFETY LESSONS LEARNED

2. 2 • OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES • LIVING AREAS • MAINTENANCE AND MOTOR POOL OPERATIONS • POL OPERATIONS • REFUELING OPERATIONS • POL SUPPLY POINT REQUIREMENTS • CONVOY OPERATIONS • WEAPONS SAFETY • AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES (AHA / WSP) • COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS • HOT WEATHER OPERATIONS • ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM • SAFETY PROGRAMS • ACCIDENT REPORTING & INVESTIGATION • WORKPLACE SAFETY • VEHICLE & TRANSPORTATION SAFETY • RANGE SAFETY • EXPLOSIVE, UXO, IED SAFETY • AVIATION SAFETY • TACTICAL SAFETY • RADIATION SAFETY BASE CAMP STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE • ANNEXES • REFERENCES • SAFETY ASSESSMENTS & INSPECTIONS • SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAM • SUPPORTING CHECKLISTS • SAFETY GRAPHIC TRAINING AIDS • RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM • FOUR BASIC RULES OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS • NORMAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE RM PROCESS • FIVE STEPS OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS • TYPES OF RISK ASSESSMENTS • RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEETS

3. 3 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TRAINING LESSONS LEARNED SAFETY SPECIALIST ASPECTS BASE CAMP INSPECTIONS UNIQUE SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS

4. LESSONS LEARNED – PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • ISSUE: SAFETY SPECIALIST ROLE (S) DURING DEPLOYMENTS. • BACKGROUND: SAFETY PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED AS PART OF THE MAIN BODY WHICH PROVIDED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO DEVELOPING SITUATIONS. • DISCUSSION: • DEPLOYMENT OF SAFETY SPECIALISTS “UP FRONT” PROVIDED: • - AN ADDITIONAL SET OF EYES FOR THE COMMANDER. • - PROACTIVENESS VERSUS REACTIVENESS. • - IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS OR ACCIDENTS. • - SAFETY LINK FROM DIVISION TO BRIGADE AND TO HIGHER AND VICE VERSA. • - STAFF ASSISTANCE WITH RISK MANAGEMENT DURING THE MDMP PROCESS. • - UNITS WITH PERSONNEL FOCUSING ENTIRELY ON SAFETY DURING COMBAT. • WHAT WENT WELL: • - INTEGRATION OF SAFETY WITH OPERATIONS. • - COMMAND EMPHASIS OF NOTED PROBLEMS OR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS BASED ON SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS. • WHAT REQUIRES IMPROVEMENTS: • ACCIDENT REPORTING DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS WAS INTERMITTENT. ONE SAFETY SPECIALIST PER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM WILL WORK BUT ASAD AUGMENTATION COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY. • REPORTING PROCESS MUST BE SIMPLIFIED INITIALLY. ECOD AND PATIENT STATUS MAY NOT BE KNOWN FOR DAYS OR WEEKS. • RECOMMENDATION: REVISE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY. 4

5. LESSONS LEARNED – PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • ISSUE: DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND SUPPORTING PUBLICATIONS • BACKROUND: UPON NOTIFICATION OF DEPLOYMENT, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BECAME PART OF THE TROOP LISTS. PREPARATION WAS COMPLETED WITH GUIDELINES PUBLISHED FOR DEPARTURE. • DISCUSSION: • PREPARATION OF SRP PACKETS DURING INITIAL INPROCESSING SPED UP THE PROCESS. • THE LITERATURE CONTAINED WITHIN DA PAM 690-47, DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE, NOV 95, WAS USEFUL BUT COULD USE UPDATING IN SOME AREAS. • REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE SHOTS OR EQUIPMENT WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED TOWARDS CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND REQUIRED GUIDANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE DIVISION. • QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AS TO WHETHER CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD BE PLACED ON TCS ORDERS OR TDY ORDERS. TCS ORDERS PERMITTED UNITS TO SUPPLY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • CONDUCT A REVIEW OF DA PAM 690-47 AND UPDATE AS REQUIRED. • DETERMINE WHETHER CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES SHOULD DEPLOY ON TCS ORDERS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SUPPORT FROM SUPPORTED UNITS. • PUBLISH A ONE SOURCE DOCUMENT ON CIVILIAN PAY AND ENTITLEMENTS OR EXPAND DA PAM 690-47 TO INCLUDE FINANCIAL DOCUMENTATION. 5

6. LESSONS LEARNED – PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • ISSUE: UNDER THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) CONCEPT, ADDITIONAL SAFETY PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED. • BACKROUND: DIVISION SAFETY OFFICES ARE NOT ALLOCATED SUFFICIENT JOB POSITIONS TO SUPPORT SAFETY COVERAGE AT THE BCT LEVEL. • DISCUSSION: • EACH MANEUVER BRIGADE, DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND, DIVISION ARTILLERY BRIGADE, DIVISION REAR SUPPORT AREA, AND DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST, REQUIRE A SAFETY SPECIALIST (TOTAL OF 7 GS EMPLOYEES). • THE ARMY SAFETY AUGMENTATION DETACHMENT (ASAD) SHOULD BE INCORPORATED AT THE TIME OF NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO LEARN THE UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE DIVISION. ONE ASSIGNED TO EACH GS EMPLOYEE. ( TOTAL 7). • THE ASAD PROVIDES ABILITY TO ROTATE AMONG COMPANY & BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO THE BCT COMMANDER. • SAFETY SPECIALISTS AVERAGED 12 TO 18 HOURS PER DAY WHEN OPERATING AT THE BCT LEVEL. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DIVISION SAFETY OFFICES SHOULD BE FUNDED TO SUPPORT TACTICAL SAFETY COVERAGE AT ALL BRIGADE SIZE ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE FUNDING OF REQUIRED SAFETY EQUIPMENT. • ASAD PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXPANDED IN ORDER TO ALLOW TRAINING WITH THE DIVISIONAL UNITS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT. • ASADs SHOULD BE DEPLOYED WITH THE UNIT THEY WILL BE SUPPORTING. 6

7. LESSONS LEARNED – PRE-COMBAT/COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • ISSUE: TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR SAFETY PERSONNEL. • BACKROUND: DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ORGANIC VEHICLES TO SUPPORT TACTICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS NOR RADIOS OR ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY. • DISCUSSION: • SAFETY SPECIALISTS REQUIRE TRANSPORTATION IN ORDER TO PERFORM THEIR MISSION AND TO REACT TO REPORTED ACCIDENTS. • SAFETY PERSONNEL HAVE TO RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF THEIR BCT. • MOVEMENT IS HINDERED TO THOSE AREAS WHERE THE FOCUS SHOULD BE AND PREVENTS REACTION TO CLASS A AND CLASS B ACCIDENT SITES (SAFETY PERSONNEL GO FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE MODE). • DIVISION ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS DUE TO MTO&E CONSTRAINTS. • RECOMMENDATION: • AR 385-10 SHOULD BE CHANGED TO REFLECT SPECIFIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED AT EVERY DIVISIONAL SAFETY OFFICE. • THE UNITED STATES ARMY SAFETY CENTER, SUPPORTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MUST ESTABLISH A TDA IN SUPPORT OF DIVISIONAL SAFETY OFFICES WHICH INCLUDES TRANSPORTATION, EQUIPMENT, AND COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS. 7

8. LESSONS LEARNED – PRE-COMBAT/COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • ISSUE: LOCATION OF SAFETY PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF BCTs. • BACKROUND: UNITS COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THEIR SAFETY SPECIALIST SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF THE BCT MISSIONS AND RELIED ON THEIR SPECIALIST TO PROVIDE INPUT. • DISCUSSION: • AT HOME STATION, SAFETY SPECIALISTS CAN MONITOR ALL ASPECTS OF DEPLOYMENT TO INCLUDE VEHICLE PREPARATION, MOVEMENT BETWEEN VARIOUS CHECK STATIONS, RAIL AND AIR OPERATIONS. • SAFETY SPECIALISTS CAN PERFORM AS ANOTHER SET OF EYES FOR THE BCT COMMANDER IF PLACED IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME. • SAFETY SPECIALISTS MUST SUPPORT THE SPOD AND MOVEMENT FROM PORTS TO CAMPS (AND VICE VERSA UPON REDEPLOYMENT). • SAFETY SPECIALISTS MUST MONITOR ACTIONS AT THE BASE CAMPS. • DURING TRANSITION TO COMBAT ACTIONS, SAFETY SPECIALISTS SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA ELEMENTS TO MONITOR DEPARTURE OF THE OTHER GACs. • RECOMMENDATION: • DEVELOP A DOCUMENT EXPLAINING: • THE ROLE OF THE SAFETY SPECIALIST • WHAT THE SAFETY PROGRAM/SPECIALIST PROVIDES IN SUPPORT OF A DEPLOYMENT • HOW THE SAFETY SPECIALIST SUPPORTS OPERATIONS • SAFETY SPECIALIST ROLE IN COMBAT 8

9. 9 OUTWARD FACING SEATING INITIATIVE FUEL CAN RACK FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY GUN MOUNTS TCP DEVICES

10. 10 VEHICLE SEATING REDESIGN

11. SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF NEW BENCHES 11 OLD SEATS SOLDIERS STANDING IN VEHICLE IN ORDER TO LOOK OUT. • FROM A FORCE PROTECTION STANDPOINT • MAKES MORE SENSE. ELIMINATES PROBLEMS DISCUSSED ON THE RIGHT. • FROM A SAFETY STAND POINT • Soldiers lose ability to have a hand hold (loss of side running bar). • Does Provide seating while increasing Force Protection • RECOMMENDATION: • Use rolled canvas top in order to provide protection from the sun. Soldiers can still see out. • Add sandbags to bed of truck/metal plates to side. • Use and re-evaluate/try to provide hand hold (5/50 cord?) Should use slat type seats or pad the seats for long distances. • Add head support bar across top. Only the air guard has ability to return fire effectively. SOLDIERS NOT BOTHERING TO KEEP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

12. 12 Centerline Troop Seats (Shown on 5T Cargo Truck) • Uses existing seats for installation • Configuration allows space for equip • Seats are removable (bolt to bed) • Soldiers face outward IOT engage • Seating capacity is the same • Manufactured w/locally procured iron • Relatively inexpensive • Easy to install • Minimal changes made to bed of truck

13. LESSONS LEARNED – FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY ISSUES (REDESIGN OF AMV SEATS) • ISSUE: CURRENT CONFIGURATIONS OF SEATS IN VEHICLES LIMIT SOLDIERS ABILITY TO FOCUS OUTSIDE THE VEHICLE. COMMANDER’S HAVE DIRECTED CENTER BUILT, OUTWARD FACING SEATS TO BE ADDED TO CARGO TRUCKS AND IN SOME CASES, HMMWVS. • BACKROUND: OIF BROUGHT TO LIGHT THAT NORMAL TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN DID NOT PREPARE THE FORCE ADEQUATELY FOR THE POST-CONFLICT ATTACKS AND EXPLOSIVE/IED THREATS. CONVOY MOVEMENTS OCCURRED OVER LONG DISTANCES AND A REQUIREMENT FOR ALL AROUND OBSERVATION TO INCLUDE FRONT AND REAR SECURITY SURFACED. • DISCUSSION: • SOLDIER LOSSES FROM GUERILLA STYLE TACTICS, UXO/IED AND SECURITY CONCERNS INDICATED A NEED TO FIND NEW MEANS OF PROVIDING VEHICLE/CONVOY FORCE PROTECTION. • DESIGN OF CENTER SEATS TO PROVIDE THE ABILITY TO HAVE SOLDIERS FACING OUT WITH THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OCCURRED. SAFETY OF THE SOLDIERS WITH THE IMPROVISED SEATS HAS MINIMAL CHANGE; HOWEVER, DESIGN OF A SEAT WHICH PROVIDES HAND HOLDS AND LAP BELT OR SHOULDER/LAP BELT COULD IMPROVE SAFETY. SEAT SHOULD ALSO BE COLLAPSIBLE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CARGO HAULING CAPABILITY WITHOUT BUILDING SECONDARY LOADS WHICH CREATE SAFETY HAZARDS. • FOREIGN NATION VEHICLES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ALLOW OUTWARD FACING SOLDIERS WHO ARE READY TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY IF REQUIRED. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DESIGN A PERMANENT COLLAPSIBLE SEAT AFFIXED TO THE CENTER OF THE TRUCK BED THAT PROVIDES FOR: • SEATBELT OR LAP BELT WITH SHOULDER HARNESS DESIGN BUILT INTO THE SEAT. • HEAD RESTRAINT TO PREVENT WHIPLASH. • USE THE UH60 HELICOPTER SEATS AS A BASELINE FOR DEVELOPMENT. • NOTE: SEE FOLLOWING SLIDES FOR IMPROVISED SEATING INITIATIVES. 13

14. 14 GUN MOUNT REDESIGN

15. LESSONS LEARNED – FORCE PROTECTION VS SAFETY ISSUES (REDESIGN/USE OF GUN MOUNTS) • ISSUE: CONVOY PROTECTION IS PROVIDED BY HMMWVs IN THE FRONT AND REAR USING GUN MOUNTS. • BACKROUND: CONTINUED ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS REQUIRED OUTFITTING THE HMMWV FLEET WITH GUN MOUNTS THAT COULD HOLD M249 SAWS, M240BS OR .50 CALIBER MACHINEGUNS. • DISCUSSION: • GUN MOUNTS WERE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FRONT AND REAR SECURITY WITH NORMAL CARGO OR COMMAND CARRIER HMMWVS. • GUN MOUNTS BEING PRODUCED IN IRAQ HAVE ADVANTAGES OVER THE MILITARY ISSUE GUN MOUNT AND ENHANCES SAFETY IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS: • - BOLT STOP ADDED WHICH PREVENTS DEPRESSION OF THE MUZZLE WHERE IT COULD JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF DRIVER AND TC. • - PEDESTAL HOOK PROVIDED FOR ATTACHMENT OF A SOLDIER’S SAFETY HARNESS. • - TRUCK BED PROTECTION INCREASED FROM THE STEEL SHEET WHICH HOLDS THE PEDESTAL. • - MOUNTS INTO EXISTING TIE DOWN BOLT HOLES ELIMINATING THE NEED TO DRILL INTO THE BED OR FRAME OF THE VEHICLE. • - ALTERNATE MOUNTING LOCATIONS FOR THE PEDESTAL PROVIDED. • - TEST FIRING FOUND LESS VIBRATION AND BETTER CONTROL. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • IMPROVE GUN MOUNT SYSTEMS IN HMMWVS OR CHANGE MTO&E TO PROVIDE MORE HARD SHELL HMMWVS WITH TURRET GUN MOUNT RINGS FOR CS AND CSS UNITS. • ADD ROLLOVER PROTECTION TO PROTECT THE GUNNER. 15

16. FABRICATED GUN MOUNT 16 HAS ADJUSTABLE BOLT STOP IN ORDER TO PREVENT DEFLECTION WHERE DRIVER/ASST DRIVER ARE THREATENED. MOUNTS USING EXISTING TIE DOWN HOLES – REPLACE WITH LONGER BOLT, LOCK WASHER AND TWO NUTS TO PREVENT LOOSENING. PROBLEMS NOTED WITH MILITARY ISSUE MOUNT * REQUIRED DRILLING INTO VEHICLE BODY/FRAME NOT AUTHORIZED. * COMING LOOSE – BODY SPLITTING & BOLTS LOOSE. * CAN BE DEPRESSED JEOPARDIZING DVR/TC.

17. 17 SEATBELTS

18. LESSONS LEARNED – FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY ISSUES (SEAT BELTS) ISSUE: CURRENT SEATBELT CONFIGURATION DOES NOT PROVIDE ABILITY TO BUCKLE WHEN SOLDIER’S WEAR ALL REQUIRED EQUIPMENT. SOLDIERS ARE ELECTING NOT TO WEAR THE SEATBELT BECAUSE OF A FEAR THEY WON’T BE ABLE TO REACT TO ENEMY CONTACT. BACKROUND: THE ARMY IS WORKING SEATBELT MODIFICATIONS BY CHANGING FROM THE LAP BELT TO THE 3 POINT SYSTEM; HOWEVER, THE 3 POINT SYSTEM, EVEN WITH THE ADDITIONAL 18” STRAP STILL DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS. SOLDIERS WANT THE FREEDOM TO BE ABLE TO MANEUVER IN THE SEAT AND ARE ELECTING NOT TO WEAR THE BELT AT ALL. DISCUSSION: MWOS TO REPLACE THE TWO POINT SEATBELT HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 2007. THE 18” EXTENSION FOR THE 3 POINT SYSTEM HAS BEEN ORDERED BY UNITS BUT NOT DELIVERED. FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS WITH BEING ABLE TO REACT TO ENEMY CONTACT FINDS THAT SOLDIERS ELECT NOT TO WEAR THE BELT WHEN OUTSIDE THE BASE CAMPS. COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE PUSH BUTTON RELEASE LOCKING UP BECAUSE OF DIRT AND SAND HAVE SURFACED REPEATEDLY. SOLDIERS PREFER A FLEXIBLE RESTRAINT SYSTEM WITH A QUICK RELEASE TYPE LOCKING DEVICE. IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT ZERO SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN LOST BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY; HOWEVER, NUMEROUS FATALITIES AND SEVERE INJURIES HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE SOLDIERS WERE NOT WEARING THE SEAT RESTRAINT SYSTEM AND WERE THROWN OUT OR FELL OUT OF THE VEHICLES. RECOMMENDATIONS: REPLACE CURRENT BELT SYSTEMS WITH A 4 POINT SYSTEM AS DESIGNED IN THE UH60 BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER. LAP PORTION MUST BE ADJUSTABLE ON ONE SIDE AND RETRACTABLE ON THE OTHER IN ORDER TO CENTER THE BUCKLE. SHOULDER HARNESSES MUST BE RETRACTABLE WITH SUFFICIENT BELT LENGTH TO PROVIDE PULLING FORWARD AND SIDEWAYS IN ORDER TO REACH OBJECTS OR ENGAGE THE ENEMY IF REQUIRED. 18

19. 19 HARNESSES MUST ALLOW ENOUGH FREEDOM TO REACH THE FLOOR IN FRONT OF THE SEAT AND TO DO SIDEWAYS MOVEMENTS BUT ALSO LOCK DURING ACCIDENTS. Retractable harnesses Quick Connect/Disconnect Buckle Reverse adjustable and retractable pieces on passenger side Adjustable Harness (Driver's Side)

20. 20 WORN TIRES NO SPARES AVAILABLE SIDE WALL RUPTURES WORN TIRE BLOW OUTS SPARE TIRE KITS SPARE TIRE MOUNT END PRODUCT

21. 21 • LESSON LEARNED – SPARE TIRE KITS • ISSUE • EXCESSIVE TIRE WEAR LEADING TO BLOWOUTS WITHOUT SPARE TIRES BEING AVAILABLE. • BACKGROUND • VEHICLES DEPLOYED FOR OPERATIONS INITIALLY MET 10/20 STANDARDS; HOWEVER, TIRES ALREADY EXPOSED TO VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES WERE DRY ROTTED RESULTING IN EARLY FAILURE AND WEAR OUT WHICH WASN’T VISIBILE DURING PMCS. RADIAL AND BIAS TIRES ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE AND LED TO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS. • DISCUSSION • EXTENSIVE MILEAGE WAS PLACED ON THE VEHICLES DURING THE CONFLICT AND DURING SASO PORTIONS OF OIF. SPARE TIRES / RIMS WERE NOT AVAILABLE WITHIN THE THEATER RESULTING IN VEHICLES RUNNING WITH UNSERVICABLE TIRES. FOUR TIRES HAD TO BE CHANGED IN SOME CASES BECAUSE REPLACEMENTS WEREN’T THE TYPE ALREADY INSTALLED. • EXCESSIVE HEAT BUILD UP IN THE ROADS AND TIRES RESULTED IN SIDE WALL BLOWOUTS. • VEHICLES WERE NOT EQUIPPED WITH A MEANS OF CARRYING A SPARE TIRE. • RADIAL TIRES WERE A BETTER TIRE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT. • OFF THE SHELF REPLACEMENT TIRES WERE PURCHASED BUT DIDN’T MEET MILITARY STANDARDS. • RECOMMENDATIONS • ALL VEHICLES DEPLOY WITH A SPARE TIRE (MOUNTED AND INFLATED ON A RIM). • CHANGE TMs/SUPPORTING REFERENCES TO ADD A SPARE TO THE BII REQUIREMENTS. • THEATER LEVEL LOGISTICAL PACKAGES ADD TIRE (RIM MOUNTED) REPLACEMENT QUANTITIES SUFFICIENT FOR INITIAL SUSTAINMENT PURPOSE. • VEHICLES BE EQUIPPED WITH A ROOF RACK OR TIRE HOLDER WHICH CAN BE MOUNTED IN THE REAR FOR CARRYING THE SPARE TIRE (PRE-MOUNTED ON RIM).

22. 22 CHEMICAL FIRES OTHER SAFETY ASPECTS AMMUNITION HANDLING AND FIRE CONTROL BROWNOUTS

23. 23 NCO SUPERVISION CLEARING BARREL ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES NEW ITEM "BULLET STOP" PORTABLE CLEARING BARREL ON-THE-SPOT CORRECTIONS

24. LESSONS LEARNED- ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES. • ISSUE: ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. • BACKGROUND: DIFFERENT REASONS WERE FOUND FOR SOLDIERS HAVING ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES AND SEVERAL TECHNIQUES WERE USED TO ELIMINATE THEM. THEATER ACTIONS REQUIRED ADHERENCE WITH RED, AMBER AND GREEN WEAPONS STATUS. • DISCUSSION: • WEAPONS STATUS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY ALL SOLDIERS. (RED – ROUND IN CHAMBER & ON SAFE; AMBER – MAGAZINE IN CHAMBER OR ROUNDS IN FEEDTRAY BUT NO ROUNDS CHAMBERED, WEAPONS ON SAFE; GREEN – WEAPONS CLEARED AND ON SAFE). • THOROUGH RISK ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DEVELOPED FOR DAILY OPERATIONS THAT HAVE HAZARDS/INJURY RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. ENSURE CONTROLS ARE IN PLACE AND UNDERSTOOD IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE HAZARD. • UNITS MUCH CONDUCT WEAPON CLASSES FOR FAMILIARIZATION AND PROPER CLEARING PROCEDURES. • NCO SUPERVISION CONCENTRATING ON CLEARING PROCEDURES BUT ALSO LEADER INVOLVEMENT IN ENFORCEMENT OF CURRENT WEAPON STATUS. • PMCS MUST BE CONDUCTED AND PERIODIC T/I OF ALL WEAPON SYSTEMS TO HIGHER LEVEL MAINTENANCE. • LEADERS MUST REFRAIN FROM TRADING SAFETY AND ESTABLISHED STANDARDS FOR SPEED IN EXECUTION OF THE NEXT MISSION; DO NOT ACCEPT SHORTCUTS. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • PORTABLE WEAPONS CLEARING CONTAINERS SHOULD BE PROCURED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEARING BARRELS UPON ARRIVAL TO NEW LOCATIONS. • THEATER LEVEL GUIDANCE SHOULD BE ISSUED THAT REDUCES THE REQUIREMENT TO BE CONTINUALLY GOING FROM RED TO GREEN; SITUATION WHICH HAS CAUSED MOST ADs. • REQUIREMENTS IN COMBAT AREN’T TRAINED IN PEACETIME, CHANGE CTC REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOUNT FOR PROBLEMS FOUND DURING OIF. 24

25. LESSONS LEARNED – INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL FIRE HAZARDS • ISSUE: UNIQUE SITUATIONS AROSE WHICH SOLDIERS/UNITS WERE NOT PREPARED TO HANDLE SUCH AS CHEMICAL FIRES. • BACKGROUND: DURING PRE-DEPLOYMENT, DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED CONCERNING OIL FIRES AND THE HAZARDS IF SOLDIERS HAD TO REMAIN IN PROXIMITY TO THE FIRES FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. NO RESOLUTION WAS FOUND. • DISCUSSION • OIL FIRES DID NOT OCCUR TO ANY EXTENT WHERE PROLONGED EXPOSURE WOULD HAVE BEEN A CONCERN. • INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL FIRES HAVE OCCURRED (SEE NEXT SLIDE) WHICH SOLDIERS WERE NOT PREPARED TO FIGHT OR DID NOT HAVE REQUIRED FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT OR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. • LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENTS DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR CHEMICAL FIRES. BARRELS OF FIRE FIGHTING FOAM HAD TO BE SHIPPED IN. • EQUIPMENT REQUIRED WASN’T INITIALLY AVAILABLE: DETECTOR, GAS, SULFUR DIOXIDE, 6665-01-204-8175 & RESPIRATORS IN LIEU OF OXYGEN BOTTLES WITH MASK (FORCED AIR TO ASSIST WITH INHALATION PROBLEMS). • RECOMMENDATIONS • EACH DIVISIONAL SIZE UNIT SHOULD HAVE A FIRE FIGHTING PACKAGE/RESPONSE KIT FOR INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL FIRES OR UNKNOWN CHEMICAL HAZARDS/CONCERNS WHICH INCLUDES FULL RESPONSE SUITS AND REPLACEMENT OXYGEN BOTTLES. • A SUPPLY OF OXYGEN MASK SYSTEMS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS PART OF SUSTAINMENT PACKAGES (SOME INITIALLY SENT FORWARD WITH UNITS) AS A CONTINGENCY FOR OIL FIRES, CHEMICAL FIRES OR UNPLANNED INHALATION HAZARDS. • FIRE FIGHTING FORCES (ARMY RESERVES) SHOULD RECEIVE CHEMICAL FIRE RESPONSE TRAINING AND HAVE MTOE CHANGED TO INCREASE CAPABILITY. 25

26. 26 PROTECTIVE MASK USED FOR INHALATION PREVENTION PURPOSES – FILTER BREAKDOWN WITHIN 20 MINUTES SULFUR FIRE UNIQUE FIRE FIGHTING REQUIREMENTS: SULFUR FIRE (CHEMICAL FIRE) REQUIRED COOLING BY USING FIRE FIGHTING FOAM AND BURYING TO PREVENT OXYGEN FROM REACHING THE SULFUR. TEMPERATURES EXCEEDED 1400 DEGREES, SAND MELTED UPON CONTACT WITH THE MOLTEN SULFUR. MELTING SULFUR PILES

27. 27 Propellant Fire Stored Ammunition Fire UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES Ammunition Supply Point Explosion Secondary Explosions

28. LESSONS LEARNED – UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) • ISSUE: ENORMOUS CACHES WERE DISCOVERED THROUGHOUT IRAQ AND SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED FOR PROPER HANDLING. • BACKGROUND: AS UNITS DISCOVERED IRAQI AMMUNITION AND ABANDONED AMMUNITION, SOLDIERS WERE REQUIRED TO RECOVER THE MATERIAL AND CONSOLIDATE INTO AMMO SUPPLY POINTS. PRIOR TRAINING HAD NOT OCCURRED AND HAZARDS WERE NOT KNOWN UNTIL ACCIDENTS OCCURRED. • DISCUSSION: • AS THE IRAQI ARMY ABANDONED THEIR POSITIONS, AMMUNITION WAS LEFT BEHIND, SOME OF WHICH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY FIRE OR MISHANDLING. ENORMOUS PILES OF PROPELLANT AND OTHER HAZARDOUS STOCKPILES WERE UNCOVERED DAILY. • EOD PERSONNEL WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY SO A QUALITY CHECK OF MATERIALS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN ADVANCE. • CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD POINT OUT MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS; HOWEVER, THEIR DISREGARD FOR SAFETY RESULTED IN THEM PICKING THE MATERIAL UP TO SHOW THE U.S. FORCES AND CAUSING DETONATIONS. • A PSYOP CAMPAIGN TARGETING CIVILIANS BEGAN AS WELL AS TRAINING OF AMERICAN FORCES IN PROPER HANDLING TECHNIQUES AND USE OF EOD IN DETERMINING IF MATERIAL WAS SAFE FOR MOVEMENT TO DESIGNATED ASPs. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DEVELOP UXO TRAINING KITS WHICH INCLUDE ALL KNOWN TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES AND CONDUCT HANDLING PROCEDURES PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT. DESIGN DEVICES TO PROVIDE A SIGNATURE IF MISHANDLED. • ADD TRANSPORTATION OF UXO IN THE MASTER DRIVERS AND HAZMAT TRAINING PROGRAMS FOCUSING ON SAFEGUARDS. • HANDOUTS CONTAINING HAZARDS NEEDS TO BE PRODUCED AS A POCKET GUIDE. 28

29. 29 CACHE OPERATIONS & AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS

30. 30 FIRE STARTED BY CIGARETTE SMOKER AMMO IN LIVING AREA EXPLODED PROPELLENT FIRE STARTED BY FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES ASP FIRE STARTED BY BURNING HUMAN WASTE

31. 31 • LESSONS LEARNED – CACHE RECOVERY & AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS (ASP) • ISSUE: ASP ESTABLISHMENT & FIRES RESULTED IN AMMUNITION EXPLOSIONS AND SECONDARY AFFECTS. PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF CACHES REQUIRING STORAGE. • BACKGROUND: CACHES WERE TRANSPORTED TO OLD IRAQI AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITIES OVERLOADING THE CAPACITY AND AUTHORIZED EXPLOSIVE LIMITS. FIRES STARTED AS A RESULT OF CIGARETTE SMOKING AND BURNING OF TRASH/HUMAN WASTE WHICH SPREAD TO AMMUNITION STORAGE POINTS WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY PREPARED FOR STORAGE OF AMMUNITION. • DISCUSSION: • GUIDANCE IN ARMY PUBLICATIONS IS VERY TECHNICAL. GUIDANCE IS OFTEN CONFLICTING AND IMPRACTICAL FOR FIELD OPERATIONS. • AMMUNITION HOLDING AREAS COULD NOT BE INITIALLY BUILT DUE TO CONTINUAL MOVEMENT OF FORCES AND FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS UPON INITIAL ARRIVAL TO LOCATIONS. QRF AND UNITS BASIC LOADS WERE PLACED INTO BUNKERS AND OTHER HARD STANDS WHERE SOLDIERS RESIDED. EXISTING FACILITIES DID NOT MEET U.S. STANDARDS. • TRASH AND HUMAN WASTE BURNING WAS REQUIRED RESULTING IN HOT EMBERS BEING BLOWN OR WIND FLAMING FUEL IN THE HUMAN WASTE RECEPTACLES, IGNITING GRASS AND OTHER FLAMMABLE MATERIALS, WHICH SPREAD TO STORED AMMUNITION LOCATIONS. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DESIGN A QUICK GUIDE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF TEMPORARY AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS WHICH EXPLAINS THE BASIC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. • PROVIDE TABLES OF EXPLOSIVE QUANTITIES BASED ON NORMAL BASIC LOADS FOR VARIOUS PLATOON ELEMENTS, SUCH AS A BRADLEY PLATOON, INFANTRY PLATOON, ETC., TO INCLUDE COMPATABILITY GUIDANCE. • PRODUCE A COMPATABILITY GUIDE BASED ON IRAQI AND FOREIGN AMMUNITION DISCOVERED DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

32. 32 IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

33. LESSONS LEARNED – IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED). • ISSUE: NUMEROUS SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN INJURED AND VEHICLES DESTROYED BY IED. • BACKGROUND: DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, USE OF IED BY THREAT FORCES INCREASED IN EFFECTIVENESS. FORCE PROTECTION WAS INCREASED THROUGH INITIATIVES TO HARDEN VEHICLES. • DISCUSSION: • SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED ON REACTION TO IED THREATS. • VEHICLES CANNOT WITH STAND THE BLASTS WITHOUT CHANGES/HARDENING OF THE FLOORS AND SIDES. • INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INCREASE OVERALL FORCE PROTECTION BUT ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE FAMILY OF MILITARY VEHICLES IS REQUIRED. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • INCORPORATE AN EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS TRAINING COURSE AS PREDEPLOYMENT MANDATORY TRAINING. • PROVIDE UNITS WITH A TRAINING KIT CONTAINING KNOWN IED THAT CAN SIMULATE EXPLODING IF MISHANDLED. • INCORPORATE IED THREATS INTO ALL PHASES OF CTC TRAINING. IED MUST BE DESIGNED TO DETONATE – EITHER SMOKE OR OTHER SIMULATED EFFECTS IN ORDER TO PRODUCE RECOGNITION EFFECTS. • DESIGN STEEL, TITANIUM PLATING OR BALLESTIC BLANKET KITS FOR EACH SPECIFIC MILITARY VEHICLE. • PLACE BALLESTIC PROOF GLASS IN WINDSHIELDS OF VEHICLES. • REPLACE ALL DOORS OR ADD TO EXISTING DOORS, A SCREEN MESH WHICH PROVIDES A STAND OFF FOR RPGs OR OTHER DEVICES WHICH NORMALLY EXPLODE WITHIN THE VEHICLE. • REPLACE CS AND CSS HMMWVS WITH UP ARMORED HMMWVS FOR INCREASED PROTECTION. 33

34. 34 REAR-END COLLISIONS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS CONVOY OPERATIONS VISIBILITY ROLLOVERS

35. 35 LESSONS LEARNED – CONVOY OPERATIONS • ISSUE: NUMEROUS WRECKS AND ROLLOVERS OCCURRED DURING MOVEMENT THROUGH IRAQ DURING AND AFTER COMBAT OPERATIONS. • BACKGROUND: VEHICLE ACCIDENTS STARTED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES THAT THE DRIVERS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR SUCH AS ROUGH TERRAIN, DUST OBSCURING VISION AND DAYS OF TRAVEL OVER LONG DISTANCES. • DISCUSSION: • DRIVING HAZARDS EXISTED WHICH DRIVERS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR SUCH AS CROSS COUNTRY TRAVEL THROUGH THE DESERT, CREVICES, RAVINES, AND WASHOUTS, EXTREME DUST CONDITIONS LIMITING VISIBILITY, AND EXTENSIVE NIGHT DRIVING. • ACCIDENT REPORTS INDICATE THE CAUSE FACTORS FOR MOST ACCIDENTS WERE FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SPEED LIMITING REACTION TIME, LIMITED VISIBILITY AND FAILURE TO ADJUST VEHICLE SPACING, STOPPING IN THE MIDDLE OF A DUST CLOUD RESULTING IN REAR END COLLISIONS. • NUMEROUS VEHICLES REAR ENDED EACH OTHER OR ROLLED OVER IN DUST CONDITIONS. CONVOYS WERE PASSING EACH OTHER CREATING ADDITIONAL HAZARDS IN THE ENVIRONMENT. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • BUILD DRIVING COURSES AT ALL CTCs DESIGNED TO DUPLICATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOUND IN DESERT TYPE ENVIRONMENTS. INCLUDE RUBBER VEHICLES OR HAZARDS THAT WILL NOT DAMAGE MILITARY EQUIPMENT IF COLLISIONS OCCUR. • MASTER DRIVERS PROGRAM MUST BE EXPANDED TO REQUIRE SOLDIERS TO NEGOTIATE HAZARD TYPE COURSES. • DRIVERS MUST GAIN EXPERIENCE IN BASE CAMP SURROUNDING AREAS PRIOR TO EXECUTING COMBAT DRIVING (IF TIME PERMITS).

36. 36 INEXPERIENCED DRIVER SPEED, OVER BRAKING & LOOSE CARGO 3 FATALITIES, 6 INJURED IMPROPER TOWING PROCEDURES COMBINED WITH SPEED 1 FATALITY ACCIDENTS FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE FOR CONDITIONS STOPPING IN DUST 2 VEHICLES TOTAL LOSS UNFAMILIAR TERRAIN SPEED 3 INJURED

37. 37 37 LESSONS LEARNED – DRIVING IN IRAQ • ISSUE: SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED FOR ENVIRONMENT NOR TRAFFIC HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH DRIVING IN IRAQ OR THE CITIES. • BACKGROUND: VEHICLE ACCIDENTS STARTED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES THAT THE DRIVERS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR AND CULMINATED WITH CLAIMS BY CITIZENS POINTED TO THE U.S. MILITARY AS THE CAUSE OF VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, MANEUVER DAMAGE, AND PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENTS. • DISCUSSION: • DRIVING HAZARDS SUCH AS LIVESTOCK, CHILDREN, BROKEN DOWN VEHICLES, VEHICLES TRAVELING ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD, OR VEHICLES DRIVING AT NIGHT WITHOUT HEADLIGHTS ARE A COMMON OCCURRENCE. • ACCIDENT REPORTS INDICATE THE CAUSE FACTORS FOR MOST ACCIDENTS ARE: DRIVING TOO FAST FOR THE ROAD CONDITIONS; FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE TO THE VEHICLE IN FRONT; DRIVER IMPAIRMENT SUCH AS FATIGUE, MEDICATION, EXPERIENCE, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND ATTITUDE. • COMBAT OPERATIONS RESULTED IN SOLDIERS RESPONDING WITHOUT ADHERENCE TO LOCAL TRAFFIC LAWS. POPULACE OBSERVED AND MIMICKED DRIVING HABITS OF SOLDIERS. • IRAQ DOES NOT HAVE A DRIVING PROGRAM – PEOPLE ARE SELF TAUGHT AND ARE ONLY REQUIRED TO PASS AN EYE TEST, PROVE THEY CAN READ ARABIC AND HAVE A FORM OF ID. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • EXPAND THE MASTER DRIVER’S PROGRAM TO ACCOUNT FOR LESSONS LEARNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. • DEVELOP A FILM WHICH DEMONSTRATES THE UNIQUE ASPECTS OF MIDDLE EASTERN DRIVING. • DEVELOP A DRIVING SITUATION AT CTCs WHICH REQUIRES NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES EQUIVALENT TO THOSE FOUND OVERSEAS.

38. LESSONS LEARNED – HEAT INJURIES 38 • ISSUE: HEAT INJURIES RESULTED IN SOLDIER HOSPITALIZATION, LOST TIME AND DEATH. • BACKGROUND: LACK OF ACCLIMATIZATION AND FAILURE TO PLAN FOR OR EXECUTE REST AND WORK CYCLES RESULTED IN NUMEROUS HOT WEATHER INJURIES. • DISCUSSION: • COMBAT ACTIONS AND FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOUND SOLDIERS WORKING IN EXTREME HEAT WHILE WEARING IMPROVED BODY ARMOR, KEVLAR AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ITEMS IN TEMPERATURES REACHING ABOVE 120 DEGREES. • SOLDIERS WERE NOT ALWAYS PROVIDED A PERIOD OF ACCLIMATIZATION OR HAD VARIED PERIODS OF ACCLIMATIZATION UPON ARRIVAL TO THEATER. • SOLDIERS DEHYDRATION SLOWLY PROGRESSED OVER A PERIOD OF DAYS DUE TO INADEQUATE PRE-HYDRATING PRIOR TO MISSIONS. IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS WERE ALSO DETRIMENTAL TO HYDRATION DUE TO AVAILABILITY OF WATER ALTERNATIVES, A SENSE OF WELL BEING FROM SLEEPING & LIVING IN COOLER ENVIRONMENTS AND ACCESS TO SUGAR/CAFFIENE PRODUCTS. • MEDICAL LITERATURE LEADS ONE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SYMPTOMS OF HEAT INJURIES ARE PROGRESSIVE; HOWEVER, THE HIGH TEMPERATURES COMBINED WITH THE EQUIPMENT WORN RESULTED IN HEAT STROKE EVEN THOUGH SOLDIERS WERE PROFUSELY SWEATING. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DEVELOP AND INCORPORATE UNIT IN-PROCESSING PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS ON ALL SOLDIERS ARRIVING TO THEATER AND PLAN FOR DOCUMENTATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL’S TEMPORARY MEDICAL RECORD, ALL TREATMENT RENDERED. • UNITS CONDUCT TRAINING AND WORK AS PER GUIDANCE RECOMMENDED IN GTA 5-8-12 (WORK/REST/WATER CONSUMPTION TABLES) • MANDATE A PERIOD OF ACCLIMATIZATION PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN THEATER. • ENSURE MEDICAL LITERATURE ADDRESSES THE POSSIBILITY OF HEAT STROKE ONSET WITHOUT HAVING CRAMPS OR OTHER LESSER HEAT SYMPTOMS.

39. LESSONS LEARNED – BURNING OF HUMAN WASTE/TRASH • ISSUE: SEVERAL INJURIES WERE INCURRED AND FIRES STARTED AS A RESULT OF MOGAS USED FOR BURNING HUMAN WASTE AND TRASH. • BACKGROUND: ABOVE GROUND BURNING FOR HUMAN WASTE AND TRASH IGNITED GRASS AND OTHER FLAMMABLE OBJECTS WHEN WIND CAUGHT THE FLAMES. • DISCUSSION: • MOGAS AS A FIRE STARTER OR IN COMBINATION WITH JP8 FOR BURNING OF HUMAN WASTE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. • ADDITIONAL FUEL ADDED TO ALREADY BURNING FIRES OR FAILURE TO ALLOW BURN PITS TO COOL BEFORE ADDING ADDITIONAL FUEL RESULTED IN FLASH FIRES. • FIRE PREVENTION CONTROLS AND ADEQUATE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT WAS NOT PRESENT AT FUEL SOURCES. • MAJORITY OF FIRES RESULTING IN SEVERE BURNS OCCURRED DURING UNSUPERVISED OPERATIONS WHERE SOLDIERS ADDED ADDITIONAL FUEL TO HOT PITS OR WASTE CANS. • THE AMOUNT OF BURNABLE TRASH ACCUMULATED EXCEEDS ABILITY TO TRANSPORT WITH UNITS RESULTING IN DISPOSABLE ALONG ROUTES OR BURNS PRIOR TO MOVEMENT. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • ELIMINATE REQUIREMENTS FOR USING FUEL AS A BURN PRODUCT THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF PORTABLE DEVICES. • DESIGN/PRODUCE A COMPACT LATRINE FACILITY WHICH USES DISPOSABLE BAGS (SEAT WITH FOLDING TRIPOD LEGS) FOR HUMAN WASTE. POP UP POLE SUPPORT SYSTEM WITH CURTAIN CAN PROVIDE A QUICK MEANS OF PRIVACY IF REQUIRED. • PROVIDE LITERATURE ON PROPER MEANS OF TRASH BURNING – INCLUDE PIT SIZES AND SAFEGUARDS BUT ELIMINATE MOGAS AS PART OF THE SOLUTION. ALSO RECOMMEND FIRE FIGHTING PROTECTION SUCH AS FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, SHOVELS, WATER ETC. 39

40. 40 BROWNOUT & ACCIDENTS HARD STAND MITIGATES BROWNOUT

41. 41 • LESSONS LEARNED – BROWN OUT CONDITIONS • ISSUE: SEVERAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF BROWNOUT CONDITIONS. • BACKGROUND: AREAS REQUIRING AIR OPERATIONS CONSISTED OF DESERT REGIONS CONTAINING LOOSE POWDERED DIRT RESULTING IN ENORMOUS BROWNOUT AREAS AND LOSS OF VISIBILITY. • DISCUSSION: • ALTERNATE LANDING SITES PROVIDING A HARD STAND COULD NOT BE FOUND DURING CERTAIN PHASES OF THE OPERATION. • DUST MITIGATION BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED FAILED, SUCH AS FUEL POURED ON LANDING PADS. INITIALLY EFFECTIVE BUT AFTER ONE OR TWO LANDINGS, PROBLEM RETURNED. • MOBI-MATTING WAS NOT AVAILABLE UPON INITIAL INSERTION OF FORCES. • CRUSHED ROCK PROVIDED A TEMPORARY SOLUTION; HOWEVER, NOT FEASIBLE FOR SHORT DURATION OCCUPATIONS. • AH64 COMBAT LOADS EXCEEDED WEIGHT NORMALLY TRAINED CREATING ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS. • PILOTS HAD TO ENSURE THEY WOULD LAND AGAINST THE WIND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. • NUMEROUS “GO AROUNDS” HAD TO BE EXECUTED WHEN FLYING IN “STICKS”. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • DEVELOP A ROLL OUT MATTING WHICH CAN BE TEMPORARILY USED UNTIL A FIXED SITE IS REQUIRED. • SELECT HARD STAND LZ/PZs WHEN FEASIBLE. • IMMEDIATELY HARDEN FARPS, LZs AND PZs WITH MOBI-MATTING WHEN PRO-LONGED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WARRANT. • DEVELOP A TRAINING AREA AT CTCs WHICH PROVIDE THE PILOTS THE SAME CONDITIONS AS FOUND DURING OIF. • DEVELOP GUNNERY PLANS THAT REQUIRE THE PILOTS TO EXECUTE WITH FULL LOADS AND FUEL IN ORDER TO TRAIN POWER MANAGEMENT.

42. 42 • LESSONS LEARNED – FIRE EXTINGUISHERS/FIRE OPERATIONS • ISSUE: PROPER FIRE EXTINGUISHERS WERE NOT SHIPPED OR AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES ONCE IN COUNTRY. • BACKGROUND: DURING PRE-DEPLOYMENT, DIFFICULTIES IN SHIPPING OF FIRE EXTINGUISHERS (NON-VEHICLE EXTINGUISHERS) RESULTED IN DECISIONS AT THE UNIT LEVEL NOT TO SHIP THEM. • DISCUSSION • FIRE EXTINGUISHERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLECTED (UNITS) AND TAKEN TO THE HAZMAT PHARMACY TO BE PACKAGED IN STANDARD HAZMAT MATERIAL. UNITS DID NOT SEE A NEED FOR NON-VEHICLE EXTINGUISHERS DURING PREPARATION. • REPLACEMENT EXTINGUISHERS OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES AND TYPES WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. FIRE EXTINGUISHER ORDERING THROUGH ULLs WAS POSSIBLE BUT RECEIPT OF THE ORDERED ITEMS WAS EXTREMELY SLOW. • OTHER FIRING FIGHTING EQUIPMENT WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT FIRE EXTINGUISHERS RESULTING IN LARGE LOSSES OF VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT. • EXPERIENCE IN USING FIRE EXTINGUISHERS WAS LACKING, SEVERAL REQUIRED DURING FIRE FIGHTING DUE TO INEFFECTIVE USE BY THE OPERATOR. • RECOMMENDATIONS • USE THE INSTALLATION HAZMAT PHARMACY TO PREPACKAGE EXTINGUISHERS IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO COVER TENTS AND FACILITIES IF OCCUPIED. • PREDETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE FIGHTING AS PART OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND SHIP AS PART OF A SUSTAINMENT PACKAGE. • AVIATION UNITS PREPARE AND SHIP BAMBI BUCKETS (CHINOOK CAPABLE AT 2000 GALLON DROPS/UH60 AT 660 GALLONS) TO FIGHT GRASS, TREE, OTHER LARGE FIRES. • ATTACH/OPCON FIRE FIGHTING DEPARTMENTS (RESERVE UNITS) TO ACTIVE DUTY UNITS AS PART OF THE DIVISION DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE.

43. LESSONS LEARNED- TRAINING SOLDIERS • ISSUE: • SAFETY CHALLENGE: GETTING THE WORD TO THE SOLDIER IN A WAY THAT CATCHES THEIR ATTENTION. • BACKGROUND: • NUMEROUS CLASSES WERE CONDUCTED DURING SAFETY STAND DOWNS USING CHARTS, VIDEO, AND BRIEFINGS. FEEDBACK INDICATES SOLDIERS ATTENTION SPAN DECLINED DRAMATICALLY AND THE INTENT OF THE CLASSES MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. • DISCUSSION: • CURRENT METHODS OF TRAINING ARE NOT CAPTURING THE ATTENTION OF THE SOLDIERS TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE SAFETY CONCERNS. • HANDS ON TRAINING HAS MORE EFFECT THAN OTHER METHODS. • “ATTENTION GETTER” POSTERS HAVE EFFECTS IF TOO MUCH DETAIL IS NOT PROVIDED. • RECOMMENDATION: • DEVELOP AS MUCH “HANDS ON” TRAINING AS POSSIBLE. • BUILD PORTABLE TRAINING KITS FOR AMMUNITION HANDLING, EXPLOSIVES, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. • ENSURE VIDEOS USE UP TO DATE AND REAL WORLD INFORMATION WHICH NOT ONLY EXPLAINS WHAT MAY GO WRONG BUT SHOWS ACTUAL ACCIDENTS OR SCENES WHICH DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTS. 43

44. RECAP OF PRESENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 44 • REVISE ACCIDENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY. • OES AND NCOES COURSES SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR SAFETY INFORMATION CONTENT. • CONDUCT A REVIEW OF DA PAM 690-47 & PUBLISH A “ONE SOURCE” DOCUMENT. • FUND SAFETY OFFICES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SAFETY SPECIALISTS TO THE BCT LEVEL AND PROVIDE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION ASSETS. • TRAIN AND WORK ASADS WITH THE UNIT THEY’LL SUPPORT ON DEPLOYMENTS. • DEVELOP A PUBLICATION EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF THE SAFETY SPECIALIST. • SUPPORT THE FORCE PROTECTION INITIATIVES BY FINDING VIABLE WAYS TO MITIGATE SAFETY CONCERNS WITH SEATING, GUN MOUNTS, SEATBELTS, SPARE TIRE KITS AND TIRE MOUNTING DEVICES. • HOLD A FORUM TO DISCUSS MITIGATION MEASURES FOR SPECIFIC AREAS SUCH AS ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, FIRE AND EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS. • PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ENHANCE FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITY OF DEPLOYING UNITS. • DEVELOP AND ISSUE TRAINING KITS FOR EXPLOSIVE AND IED TRAINING ALONG WITH SIMPLIFIED POCKET GUIDES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AMMO SUPPLY POINTS. • ASSIST IN INCREASING SAFETY BY DESIGNING VEHICLE KITS FOR BALLESTIC PROTECTION. • DEVELOP ADDITIONAL TRAINING AREAS AND REQUIREMENTS AT COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS TO PROVIDE DRIVING AND FLYING EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. • ENHANCE THE MASTER DRIVERS PROGRAM TO ADD IN LESSONS LEARNED DURING OIF. • DO ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON HEAT INJURIES AND REVISE PUBLISHED LITERATURE AS REQUIRED. • CONTINUE TO FIND WAYS TO “GET THE WORD” TO THE SOLDIER IN A MANNER THAT ENHANCES REMEMBERANCE OF THE MAIN POINTS.

45. 45 QUESTIONS?