Managing the reader’s load: a cognitive theory for legal writers

1. Managing the reader’s load: a cognitive theory for legal writers Andrew M. Carter O’Connor College of Law Arizona State University Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

2. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

3. Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

4. 24 248 + + 44443 5,489,378 + 6,897,953 Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

5. 24 + 44 =66 Searches at the international border are excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

6. 248 + 443 Searches at the international border are excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the United States, like any sovereign, has a deeply rooted right to stop and inspects persons and goods entering the country. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

7. 5,489,378 + 6,897,953 The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at the time of the making by the defendants of the promises hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and occupiers of the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and were possessed of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked the said mills, and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into meal, and dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs were desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill, and had ordered the same of certain persons trading under the name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who had contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs . . . . Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

8. 5,489,378 + 6,897,953 • Searches at the international border are excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and may be conducted with no suspicion whatsoever because the United States, like any sovereign, has a long-recognized right to question those entering the country without administering Miranda. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

9. Fluency • “Fluency” = the reader’s subjective experience of ease or difficulty in processing a writer’s sentences and paragraphs (Oppenheimer 2008) • It is well-established that readers are conscious of how difficult it is to process the writer’s sentences and paragraphs. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

10. 24 248 + + 44443 Fluent 5,489,378 + 6,897,953 Disfluent Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

11. Fluency cues positive judgments • Readers encountering fluent writing think positive things about the writer and the writer’s ideas. • Readers find the fluent writer more credible and intelligent (supports ethos) • Readers have more confidence in fluent arguments (supports logos) • Readers have more positive reactions to the arguments presented (supports logos) • (Oppenheimer 2008) Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

12. Cognitive Load Theory and Legal Writing Basic Theory: A legal reader’s working memory is limited with respect to the amount of new information it can process at one time. Cognitive Load: The amount of cognitive activity imposed on a legal reader’s working memory by a particular sentence Schema Formation: To transfer information from working memory to long-term memory, readers organize and categorize the new information into a “memorable” framework, or schema. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

13. Thesis: Fluency is a function of the demands placed on the reader’s working memory capacity. • Fluent: sentence/paragraph does not exceed reader’s working memory capacity. • Disfluent: sentence/paragraph exceeds reader’s working memory capacity. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

14. 24 248 + + 44443 Fluent 5,489,378 + 6,897,953 Disfluent Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

15. Disfluent: Exceeds working memory capacity The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at the time of the making by the defendants of the promises hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and occupiers of the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and were possessed of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked the said mills, and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into meal, and dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs were desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill, and had ordered the same of certain persons trading under the name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who had contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs . . . . Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

16. The legal reader’s total cognitive load = • Intrinsic Load: The inherent complexity of the information/knowledge to be transferred to the reader. + • Germane Load: The reader’s working memory required to categorize and organize information into a framework (schema) for long term memory processing. + • Extraneous Load: The reader’s working memory needlessly consumed by the legal writer’ poor writing. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

17. Legal writing/analysis entails a heavy intrinsic load • The legal principles expressed will involve numerous abstract and complex elements. • In addition, there are important relationships between and among these elements. • It is this “elemental interactivity” that is uniquely burdensome on the reader’s cognitive resources. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

18. “If a Department component denies an employee a security clearance—that is, if the component determines that the employee is not eligible for access to classified information—or if the component revokes such eligibility, the component must provide the employee with a comprehensive and detailed written explanation of the basis for the decision, to the extent that the national security interests of the United States and other applicable law permit.” Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

19. Basic rules to ensure that the reader’s working memory is not overburdened The legal writer must monitor and manage the intrinsic load (sentence level). The legal writer must bear as much of the reader’s germane load as possible by providing an accessible organizational framework. The legal writer must eliminate extraneous load (editing, editing, editing). Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

20. Monitoring the intrinsic load • Pay attention to the number of elements in a sentence and the number of interactions between and among these elements (elemental interactivity) • Three elements and two interactions will near the limits of your reader’s working memory. • If the sentence may exceed the reader’s working memory, you must “chunk” it into smaller loads. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

21. Chunked “Generally, if a Department component denies an employee a security clearance—that is, if the component determines that the employee is not eligible for access to classified information—or if the component revokes such eligibility, the component must provide the employee with a comprehensive and detailed written explanation of the basis for the decision. This requirement may be superseded, however, by the national security interests of the United States and other applicable law.” Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

22. Carrying the germane load To reduce the reader’s germane load, the legal writer must provide the reader with an organizational framework that the reader can use to categorize and organize the new information presented in the text. The legal writer does this with headings, subheadings, paragraph breaks (segmentation cues) and topic sentences. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

23. Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

24. Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

25. Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995). The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. See e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

26. The 1994 Haiti deployment did not require prior Congressional approval. Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. B. The 1995 Bosnia deployment did not require prior Congressional approval. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995). The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. See e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. C. Even the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia did not require prior Congressional approval. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

27. Eliminating Extraneous Load • Proof each sentence for “local coherence”. • Search out and “chunk” sentences that will push the reader’s working memory capacity; note not just the number of ideas in the sentence but also their interactions. Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

28. Tools for chunking: Generic Transitions “Generally, if a Department component denies an employee a security clearance—that is, if the component determines that the employee is not eligible for access to classified information—or if the component revokes such eligibility, the component must provide the employee with a comprehensive and detailed written explanation of the basis for the decision. This requirement may be superseded, however, by the national security interests of the United States and other applicable law.” Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University