“ Culture of complicity tied to stricken nuclear plant”

1. An article from The New York Times By NorimitsuOnishi and ken Belson “Culture of complicity tied to stricken nuclear plant”

2. General Summary: “SOAPstone” • Subject: Nuclear power in Japan • Occasion: Nuclear meltdown caused by the earthquake and Tsunami on March 11, 2011 • Audience: Americans and other English speakers interested in the nuclear disaster • Purpose: To convince the reader that corruption made the Daiichi disaster worse, and to expose the “nuclear power village” as a continuing danger to Japan and the world. • Speakers: NorimitsuOnishi (liberal Canadian-Japanese) and Ken Belson (writer in Tokyo) • Tone: conspiratorial

3. Point Number 1 (claim): • “Investigators may take months or years to decide to what extent safety problems or weak regulation contributed to the disaster at Daiichi, the worst of its kind since Chernobyl. But as troubles at the plant and fears over radiation continue to rattle the nation, the Japanese are increasingly raising the possibility that a culture of complicity made the plant especially vulnerable to the natural disaster that struck the country on March 11. “ POINT: Safety concerns over weak regulations as Daiichi and a culture of complicity made the plant vulnerable. Evidence (EXAMPLE): • Unenforced Regulations (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency): Low Sea Wall, Backup Diesel Generators, 10-year extension (2002) -40 year statutory limit Explanation (warrant): • “…many Japanese and Western experts…” – Vague • Kei Sugaoka (inspector) 2000 “cracked steam dryer” – Whistle Blowers, Blackballing: “…least want to do: undertake costly repairs.”

4. Point Number 2 Point (claim): • “Though it is charged with oversight, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is part of the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, the bureaucracy charged with promoting the use of nuclear power. Over a long career, officials are often transferred repeatedly between oversight and promotion divisions, blurring the lines between supporting and policing the industry. Despite safety concerns the use of nuclear power is still being promoted and often overseen by officials who also make money off of these plant. Influential bureaucrats tend to side with the nuclear industry — and the promotion of it — because of a practice known as amakudari, or descent from heaven. Widely practiced in Japan’s main industries, amakudari allows senior bureaucrats, usually in their 50s, to land cushy jobs at the companies they once oversaw.” Evidence / Explanation (Warrant): • KuzuoOshima(Democratic Party “lawmaker”) – Rissho Kosei-Kai (Buddhist) “Taboo” • Communist Party vs.(Toru Ishida - Example of amakudari) Kazuhiro Hasegawa – Tepco “best people”– Whose standards? • Hiroaki Koide – Tokyo University (Grant $) amaagari (technical experts from industry) Satoshi Sato – “30 years experience working in the nuclear insdustry” – the regulatory agency “Lacks technical capability” • Comparison to NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) -Navy, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge- • Taro Kono (Liberal Democratic “lawmaker”) – “Both parties are captive to the power companies” • Tokio Kano (VP Tepco) Keidanren (Business Lobby) -12 years in parliament (2010 back to Tepco!) • Opposed deregulation of power industry, parliamentary records (solar vs. nuclear in textbooks) • He said he served out of “conviction”

5. Point Number 3 Point (claim): • “So entrenched is the nuclear power village that it easily survived postwar Japan’s biggest political shake-up. When the Democratic Party came to power 20 months ago, it pledged to reform the nuclear industry and strengthen the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency… [but instead] Japan would make the sale of nuclear reactors and technology the central component of a long-term export strategy to energy-hungry developing nations. A new company, the International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan, was created to do just that. Its shareholders were made up of the country’s nine main nuclear plant operators, three manufacturers of nuclear reactors and the government itself. The nuclear power village was going global with the new company. The government took a 10 percent stake. Tepco took the biggest, with 20 percent, and one of its top executives was named the company’s first president.” Evidence / Explanation (Warrant): • Akihiro Ohata(Hitachi nuclear division) – unavailable for interview! • 14 new reactors by 2030, up to 70%

6. Ethos, pathos and Logos • Pathos the use of Emotional language often used to garner support from those who fear conspiracy : • Some other examples: ”fierce insularity”, “web of connections”, “village outcasts”, “ministry’s ‘reserved seat’”, “cross-fertilizing interests” • Logos the use of dates and names to reveal the on-going issues in Japan’s nuclear reactor and safety meeting an acceptable standard “from 1959 to 2010, four former top-ranking ministry officials served as vice presidents” – creates a sense of questioning as to were they the best for the job or just had connections. • Ethos – applies to ethics – safety of people “”fears over radiation continue to rattle the nation, the Japanese are increasingly raising the possibility that a culture of complicity made the plant especially vulnerable” idea that what is being done is not the best for the majority.

7. Conclusion (Logos, Pathos, Ethos) • The article’s title says it all: “cultutied to” doesn’t show cause/effect relationship • Proves complicity fairly well (point 2 and point 3) • Relies heavily on some sources whose credibility is only loosely established • Emotional language often used to garner support from those who fear conspiracy: • Some other examples: ”fierce insularity”, “web of connections”, “village outcasts”, “ministry’s ‘reserved seat’”, “cross-fertilizing interests”