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DETERMINANTS OF DEBT CAPACITY 1st set of transparencies for ToCF

DETERMINANTS OF DEBT CAPACITY 1st set of transparencies for ToCF. INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. I. I. Adam Smith (1776) - Berle-Means (1932). Agency problem. Principal. outsiders/investors/lenders. Agent. insiders/managers/entrepreneur. 1. Insufficient ‘‘effort’’

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DETERMINANTS OF DEBT CAPACITY 1st set of transparencies for ToCF

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  1. DETERMINANTS OF DEBT CAPACITY 1st set of transparencies for ToCF

  2. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION I. I. Adam Smith (1776) - Berle-Means (1932) Agency problem Principal outsiders/investors/lenders Agent insiders/managers/entrepreneur 1. Insufficient ‘‘effort’’ 2. Inefficient investment 3. Entrenchment strategies 4. Private benefits Good governance: (1) selects most able managers (2) makes them accountable to investors 2. Inefficient investment  Pet projects.  Empire building.

  3. OUTLINE Approach: controlled experiment Topics: • 1. Micro • Basics: (a) one-stage financing: fixed and variable investment models; • (b) applications: debt overhang, diversification, collateral pledging, redeployability of assets. • Multistage financing: liquidity ratios, soft budget constraint, free cash flow. • Financing under asymmetric information. • Exit and voice in corporate governance. • Control rights.

  4. 2. Macro • Dual role of assets and multiple equilibria. • Credit crunch. • Liquidity shortages. • Liquidity premia and pricing of assets. • Political economy of corporate finance.

  5. II. BASICS OF CREDIT RATIONING: FIXED INVESTMENT MODEL Lenders / investors /outsiders Project costs I. Has cash A < I. Entrepreneur / borrower / insider Key question: Can lenders recoup their investment?

  6. TYPICAL MODEL • Risk neutral entrepreneur has one project, needs outside financing.

  7. Want to induce good behavior: and Contract: Success: Rb + R =R. Failure: 0 each (optimal).

  8. Reward Rb in case of success Necessary and sufficient condition for financing or PLEDGEABLE INCOME  INVESTORS’ OUTLAY Minimum equity:

  9. Remarks (1) Entrepreneur receives NPV Will always be the case with competitive financial market. (2) Reputational capital / scope for diversion (shortcut) A increases with B. Note : Courts can help reduce B (3) Investors’ claim: debt or equity? (At least) two interpretations: • inside equity + outside debt (R to be reimbursed); • all-equity firm: shares No longer true if leftover value in case of failure. In any case: no need for multiple outside claims. weakness, strength (focus on fundamentals).

  10. DEBT OVERHANG Definition:(project would always be financed inabsence of previous claim). Example: A < 0new investment cannot be financedsolely because renegotiation with initialinvestors infeasible. Previous claim is senior. Borrower no longer has cash (A =0).

  11. a) Bargaining with initial investors, who have cash Noone receives anything if no investment. Investment: Choose Rbsuch that and Feasible since b)Initial investors don’t have funds to invest. Bargainingwith new investors only. Income that can be pledged to new investors: by assumption. cannot raise funds. DEBT OVERHANG

  12. c)Initial investors don’t have funds to invest. Bargainingwith new and initial investors. Debt forgiveness: where That is When is debt overhang an issue? – Many creditors. Examples: • corporate bonds • (nomination of bond trustee, exchange offers) • interbank market/derivatives/guarantees,.. – Asymmetric information (not in this model).

  13. III. BASICS OF CREDIT RATIONING/VARIABLE INVESTMENT MODEL 1. EQUITY MULTIPLIER / DEBT CAPACITY Implicit (perfect) correlation hypothesis: specialization,voluntary correlation, macro shocks.

  14. Notation: income per unit of investment pledgeable income per unit of investment Assumption First inequality: finite investment Second inequality: positive NPV (otherwise no investment). Constraints: and Borrower’s utility (=NPV) wants to maximize I.

  15. DEBT CAPACITY Utility

  16. DEBT OR EQUITY? THE MAXIMAL INCENTIVE PRINCIPLE Extension: RSI in case of success RFI in case of failure (salvagevalue of assets) Generalization of

  17. Optimal sharing rule: s.t. and Breakeven constraint binding (otherwise ). wants to maximize I.

  18. Incentive constraint binding (otherwise debt capacity) Suppose Then relaxes incentive constraint. Outside debt maximizes inside incentives Generalization: Innes (1990). Discussion: • risk taking, • broader notion of insiders, • risk aversion.

  19. 2. DIVERSIFICATION Diamond (1984)’s diversification argument. n projects. IRS due to the possibility of cross-pledging. Basic idea:

  20. TWO IDENTICAL PROJECTS Rewards R0 , R1 , R2 Risk neutrality R0 = R1 =0. Other IC constraint is then satisfied

  21. Nonpledgeable income Financing condition. Entrepreneur’s equity= 2A. PROJECT FINANCE IS NOT OPTIMAL

  22. Continuum of independent projects Two cases: pHR - B - I < 0 : net worth still plays a role pHR - B - I > 0 : unlimited size Second case: continuum of projects, mass 1. Debt contract: D=I Work on all: pHR - D = pHR- I > 0 Work on y % of the projects: either y pH R + (1-y) pLR < I then y=0 better, but dominated or y pH R + (1-y) pLR  I payoff increases with y ((p )R > B)

  23. LIMITS TO DIVERSIFICATION • limited attention, • core competency, • endogenous correlation (asset substitution, VaR) continuum:

  24. 3. LIQUIDITY NEEDS In case of "liquidity shock", rbinvested yields : rb> rbto entrepreneur (none of which is pledgeable to investors).

  25. Two issues: • imperfect performance measurement at date 1 • strategic exit (if liquidity shock unobservable, 2 dimensions of MH: effort, truthful announcement of liquidity need). Contract (can show: no loss of generality) Menu: • Rbin case of success at date 2, or • rbat date 1.

  26. Benchmark: Liquidity shock observable or Independent of rb! Pledgeable income (for given rb) : Must exceed I-A  rbcannot be too large!

  27. Case 2: Possibility of strategic exit Assume pL=0 (or, more generally, small)  wants to exit if shirks. or pL = 0  (2) is more constraining than (1). Must also have Pledgeable income: (for given rb)

  28. when rb >0. And: Lower pledgeable income, same NPV. * * for a given rb. But rbis smaller!

  29. Benefit from speculative monitoring at date 1. Signal: good or bad. Good signal has probability qHor qL. Incentive constraint: Disciplines entrepreneur. • Same if active monitor as well. • In practice • – sale to a buyer, • – IPO. VC exit is carefully planned. • Reversed pecking-order logic: want risky claim to encourage speculative monitoring.

  30. 4. COLLATERAL / REDEPLOYABILITY OF ASSETS • Pledging collateral: – increases pledgeable income, • – boosts incentives if state-contingent pledges. • Cost of collateralization: – transaction cost, – suboptimal maintenance, – lower value for lender. • Redeployability of assets boosts debt capacity Proper credit analysis: relevant value of collateral  average value: – low maintenance near distress, – aggregate shocks.

  31. Assumption: 0  P 1 Previously: x = 1. • Positive NPV: • Breakeven condition: I grows with P. (grows with P, for two reasons).

  32. 5. ENDOGENEIZATION OF P: SHLEIFER-VISHNY (1992) (chapter 14 in book) Idea : P endogenous, depends on existence of other firms able to purchase asset. Model : 2 firms in industry (do not compete on product market). "Local liquidity": only other firm can buy asset. Entrepreneur i : cash Ai, borrows Ii -Ai. If j in distress and i not in distress, i (with the help of lender i) can buy j’s assets. assets I1+I2 potential private benefit B(I1 + I2) income in case of success R(I1 + I2)

  33. As usual and Lender i and entrepreneur i sign (secret) loan agreement {Ii , Rbi},

  34. LIQUIDATION VALUES Both firms in distress: no revenue for anyone. None in distress: standard model. Firm 1 in distress, firm 2 is not: Assumption: lender 1 makes take-it-or-leave-it offer to lender 2. Lender 2 must adjust incentive scheme: becomes

  35. Discount since 0 < 1. Extra rent for entrepreneur 2:

  36. Entrepreneur’s expected utility: where and

  37. Debt capacity decreases with correlation between  shocks. Ii = kAi where Ii  1(minimum scale) and  < 0 multiple equilibria (complementarity). • Financial muscle: do potential acquirers build too much or too little financial muscle for M & As? See chapter 14.

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