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IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards April 23–27 2007, Santa Fe, NM, USA

IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards April 23–27 2007, Santa Fe, NM, USA. The Mission of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. Wan-Sou Park SGCP-CCA. What is Safeguards?.

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IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards April 23–27 2007, Santa Fe, NM, USA

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  1. IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for SafeguardsApril 23–27 2007, Santa Fe, NM, USA The Mission of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards Wan-Sou Park SGCP-CCA

  2. What is Safeguards? The activities IAEA uses to verify compliance with undertakings not to use nuclear material and activities for weapons purposes – • a confidence-building measure • an early-warning mechanism • the trigger for response by UN/ International community if needed Provides ‘credible assurance’ that – • nuclear material are not ‘diverted’ or misused to develop/ produce weapons; • no nuclear material remain undeclared which are required to be declared under NPT/ SG agreements

  3. What are Safeguards based on? • The IAEA Statute • The NPT – the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons • Safeguards Agreements • INFCIRC/153 – Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement • INFCIRC/540 – Model Additional Protocol • INFCIRC/66, VOA, etc.

  4. What does Safeguards do ? Verifies correctnessof a State’s declaration to provide assurance on the non-diversion of “declared” nuclear material; and Verifies completenessof a State’s declarations to provide credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  5. What do we actually do? Safeguards looks at Nuclear Material and at Activities • What Material? • IAEA takes account of all NM, especially ‘source and special fissionable material’; • monitoring/ verification activities concentrate on what is crucial and relevant to weapons. • What Activities? • The principal ways of obtaining undeclared NM are - • undeclared imports • an undeclared nuclear facility • undeclared production at a safeguarded plant • diversion of declared material

  6. How ? IAEA Safeguards – • are applied at ~925 facilities in some 70 countries; • involve ~ 250 inspectors and 21,000 field days/a; • receive ~ 13,000 NM accounting reports; • perform ~ 2,400 inspections of 650 nuclear facilities • apply ~ 25,000 seals; • analyze ~ 1,200 material/ environmental samples; • use ~ 900 NDA systems, CCTV systems etc.

  7. Sources of information Four sources, can be combined/ cross-checked in various ways depending on legal authority – • Provided by State – • declarations, updates; • voluntary reporting* • Our own – • verification i.e. inspections and visits; • internal data i.e. what we already know; • Open sources – • internet searches, publications, news media • satellite commercial imagery • From third parties – • information from other States and organizations Evaluation of inspection results (MUF, SRD) Could be export info. from AP

  8. IAEA Board of Governors March 1995 “… the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”

  9. Safeguards Conclusions For States with safeguards agreements: • … the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities … For States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols: • … all nuclear material remained • in peaceful nuclear activities …

  10. For States with CSA, the State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions: • Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear programme consistent? • Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned nuclear programme complete? • Is there sufficient information available on which to draw a conclusion?

  11. Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions Otherinformation Open andother sources Results of verification activities State-suppliedinformation Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Inspection Voluntaryreporting Design information verification (DIV) Complementaryaccess Additional protocoldeclarations CSAs focus on verification of declared nuclear material and facilities

  12. Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions Results of verification activities Otherinformation State-suppliedinformation Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Open andother sources Inspection Voluntaryreporting Design information verification (DIV) Complementaryaccess Additional protocoldeclarations Some strengthening measures could be introduced under existing safeguards agreements

  13. Strengthened Measures under Inspections • Unannounced/short-notice inspections • Remote monitoring • Environmental sampling • Enhanced cooperation with SSACs or regional systems

  14. Site Remote Monitoring

  15. Remote Monitoring Systems – Implementation 130 42 (8) 88 (14) Surveillance Unattended Radiation # of States 123 39 (7) 84 (15) ( ) 86 26 (2) 60 (11) 45 1 (1) 44 (9) 39 39 (6) 30 30 (7)

  16. Environmental Sampling Current Status (12/2006) • Swipe sample collections in more than 68 States (inspections, DIV, CA): - 16 enrichment facilities - 270+ other installations, mostly with hot cells • Over 5,000 samples analyzed • 14 Network Laboratories in 8 Member States

  17. Environmental Sampling - Implementation Number of environmental samples collected

  18. Enhanced Design Information Verification (DIV) • Early provision of design information (DI) • DIV throughout the life cycle of the facility Current status: • All States with CSAs and significant nuclear activities have agreed to early provision of DI • In 2005, DIV conducted in all such States at relevant facilities (513) • By end 2005, life-cycle DIV plans prepared for 500 facilities

  19. Additional Information Requested from States Under INFCIRC/153 • Information on closed-down and decommissionedfacilities • Information on past activities Voluntarily-Supplied • Responses to State System of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) questionnaires • Periodic reporting on exports and imports of sensitive equipment and non-nuclear material • Holdings and exports of separated americiumand neptunium • Response to Agency requests for further information

  20. State evaluation includes the use of open and other sources of information • IAEA information • Scientific and technical literature • Academic and research institutions • Trade publications • Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports • Satellite imagery • Third party sources

  21. Satellite Imagery

  22. Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions Results of verification activities Otherinformation State-suppliedinformation Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Open andother sources Inspection Voluntaryreporting Design information verification (DIV) Complementaryaccess Additional protocoldeclarations Some strengthening measures could be introduced under existing safeguards agreements

  23. Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions Results of verification activities Otherinformation State-suppliedinformation Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Open andother sources Inspection Voluntaryreporting Design information verification (DIV) Complementaryaccess Additional protocoldeclarations Under an additional protocol the Agency has more extensive information and access.

  24. Nuclear material Domestically produced source material Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes Locations and uses of exempted material Waste containing “terminated” nuclear material Nuclear-related facilities and activities Co-located nuclear infrastructure Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated) Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material Future plans Information under an Additional Protocol

  25. Waste Storage Waste Storage Expanded Safeguards Coverage under AP Safeguards coverage under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement Expanded coverage with an Additional Protocol

  26. In addition, the Agency can request: • Amplification and clarification of declared information. • Information to clarify and facilitate the resolution of questions and inconsistencies. • Operational activities of safeguards relevance. • Complementary access: • On a selective basis to assure the absence of nuclear material and activities • To resolve a question or inconsistency related to the declaration • To confirm the decommissioned status of a facility.

  27. Complementary Access - Implementation

  28. Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions Results of verification activities Otherinformation State-suppliedinformation Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Open andother sources Inspection Voluntaryreporting Design information verification (DIV) Complementaryaccess Additional protocoldeclarations Only with the information and access under CSAs and APs can assurances be provided on ‘completeness and correctness’ of States’ declarations.

  29. State Evaluation Process • All relevant information evaluated for consistency, correctness and completeness. • Evaluations performed for individual States by responsible State evaluation group headed by Country Officer. • State evaluation periodically documented in a State Evaluation Report (SER). • SERs reviewed by interdepartmental team with recommendations for follow-up action. • State evaluation is basis upon which safeguards conclusions are drawn.

  30. State Evaluation ReportsCompleted and Reviewed

  31. Integrated Safeguards • Optimized combination of traditional safeguards measures and measures of the additional protocol. • Conceptual framework including concepts, approaches, and guidelines that govern design, implementation and evaluation of IS completed in 2001. • Basis for implementation is the State level integrated safeguards approach and annual implementation plan.

  32. Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (31 January 2007)

  33. Right of Special Inspections reaffirmed; Early provision of DI Development of Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) Programme 93 + 2 1991 2007 2005 Np/Am Monitoring Scheme BOG decided revised standard text of and changed criteria for an SQP Discovery of Iraq’s Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Programme BOG Approves Model Additional Protocol Development of the Safeguards System Nuclear Trade Analysis Unit (NUTRAN) established 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 BOG Endorses Part I Measures: e.g., Remote Monitoring Environmental Sampling Broader Information

  34. Further Strengthening of Safeguards • Conclusion and full implementation of existing safeguards instruments • CSA & AP conclusion, modified SQP • Expanding technical capabilities • Environmental sampling : enhancing SAL • Satellite imagery: high resolution, GIS, process • Novel technologies • Broader information

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