Internal Security Scene

1. Internal Security Scene VR RAGHAVAN 2003

2. Security Spectrum – 9/11 • Terrorism the new RMA. • Are democracies better or less able to cope with terrorism? • Changed notions of security. • Security for whom? What is being secured?

3. Components of Security. • Military: State remains supreme. Territorial defence. Legitimate user of coercive instruments. • Economy : The major source of power. “ The way we make wealth is also the way we make war.” -Toffler, War and Anti War.

4. Components of Security… • Environmental : Energy, Water, Forest cover. Migrations. • Societal : Identity and assimilation. • Political : State & Citizen relationship.

5. New Security Perspectives • Each region views security differently. • Security notions and priorities are different in states and regions. • Comprehensive Security concept. • Non Traditional Threats to Security.

6. IS & LICO • Conceptual confusion. • IS : Law & Order. Constabulary role of military. Police & Para Military expansion. • Insurgency: Conflict thresholds. • LICO: Vietnam. • Limited War: Korea.

7. Indian Perspectives. • All terms are used interchangeably. • Army used first and Armed Forces Special Forces Act brought in later. • Command and Control challenges. • Unified Commands. J&K and Assam experience.

8. Indian Experience. • Living with the problem. • Preference for ‘capping’ violence rather than finding political solutions. • Ceilings on military – None on para military. • No improvement in on IS.

9. Police & PMF. • Operational culture : Guards, Check posts, Protection, Defensive Outlook. • Manpower oriented and not as Force – in - Being. Not pro-active. • CRPF : Strike Force? No central control.

10. PMF • BSF : multi role limitations. Neither quite military nor police. • Others: ITBP, CISF, etc. Limited coercive value. • State Police & Armed Constabulary: Of little use.

11. Why IS failures? • Mr. Vajpayee: August 5, 2000. First ever conference of Chief Ministers on IS:- • Inadequate police forces, insensitive civic administration, and dilatory criminal justice system are the weaknesses.

12. SYNERGY • Mr. Padmanabhiah: GOI does not have ‘corporate thinking’ in managing strategies with different departments & agencies working at cross purposes.

13. Why IS failures? • PM :“ Need to manage the borders in a far better manner… Need to effectively using the BSF for border management.” • Raise allocations from 2 billion to 10 Billion Rs. • “ Strengthen police in states so that personnel have greater courage.”

14. Comments …. • Dy PM Mr. LK Advani : “ IS has acquired serious proportions in view of Pakistan’s proxy war.” • Cross Border terrorism. • Government funds into militant hands. Corruption. • J&K should adopt the NE model !

15. Definition Dilemmas. • Insurgent , Terrorist , Militant, ANE, Mujahidin. • Laws : TADA –POTA. • Politics – Crime linkages. Where does one end the other start? • Politicisation of crime vs criminalisation of politics.

16. Nature of threat. • Techno terrorist. • International networks. • Narcotics and Small Arms links. • International finance, banking and weapons market. • Failing states’ ruling hierarchies involved. Crime mafia, even in India.

17. Cooperative Systems. • Militant organisations cooperate on training, leadership, and information. • Abu Sayyaf in Philippines to Al Qaeda to Russian mafia and Colombian drug lords. • Ease of weapons procurement and transportation.

18. States must Collaborate. • UK – Eire on Northern Ireland with USA. • Israel – Palestinians with USA. • Indonesia with ASEAN and UN on its problems. • Myanmar – Thailand.

19. Impact on India. • Afghanistan and Indian IS. • Economic dimensions: Oil Prices. • Religions getting involved and communal consequences. • Political implications in India. • Relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

20. Army’s Challenge • Guerillas do not lose wars; armies often do.

21. Army’s Challenge…. • Diffused and uncertain political guidance. Need to independently define pol-mil objectives. • Unify operational thought instead of unifying command arrangements. • There is no political hurry, hence use military instrument carefully.

22. Challenge ………… • Actionable intelligence. It won’t come but can be created from within army. • Intelligence data base. North East has problems. Can Army create it? • Networking by commanders and staff.

23. Challenges……………. • Civil – Military Relations : Build it, nurture it amongst officials. • Speaking the language of political economy and political costs. • ‘Rent collection’ for military operations.

24. Operational Philosophy. • Retain full operational control at all levels. • Let not civil administration or political executive decide the operational response.

25. Operational Philo…. • Demand political objectives to be periodically defined. Put it into written form. • Demand that state plays a role in administrative support and facilities.

26. Operational Philo…. • Understand the political dimensions of IS. Insurgent today is tomorrow’s legitimate political leader. • Keep in touch with third and fourth rungs of cadres and leaders. • Inter –Agency cooperation.

27. Military Networking. • Understand the Delhi Perspective. This is often quite different from the state outlook. The army has often paid a price for this failure. • Work the MLAs and MPs of your area.

28. The Use of Force. • Know that like money ‘Force is Fungible.’ Fungible = that which can serve or be replaced by another set of goods. Force is not therefore the only answer or means. Threat of force or denial of what the adversary seeks is often equally good as an instrument.

29. Military Opportunity in IS. • The military holds things together. • It has the best organisational cohesion in the state. • Military’s strength is as much in giving confidence to the political executive in a crisis as in employing force. Use both effectively.

30. Military’s Opportunity. • Remember: In India, IS/CI/LICO is always a long haul. • Therefore understand the time and resource relationship. CMs may come and go, the military will remain. Take the long view. • Safeguard organisational assets.

31. Thank you.