Intergovernmental Relations and Policy Innovation: Comparing Canada, the US, and the EU

1. Intergovernmental Relations and Policy Innovation: Comparing Canada, the US, and the EU Kathryn Harrison University of British Columbia

2. Is Federalism “good” or “bad” for climate policy innovation? • Good news in EU • Shifting leadership among member states • Burden sharing • “best of both worlds” • Good news in US • Despite fed inaction, states taking matters into own hands

3. Is Federalism “good” or “bad” for climate policy? • Good news and bad news in Canada: • Fed-prov stalemate for almost 20 years • Recent dynamic of provincial innovation and diffusion • Why the difference? • Constitutional authority • Magnitude and distribution of costs • Public opinion as switch • Does it matter? • Impact on climate policy

4. Canada • Background: • Relative decentralizaton • Provinces own both sources and sinks • Fed authority largely untested • Uneven distribution of costs!

6. Canada • Background: • Relative decentralizaton • Provinces own both sources and sinks • Fed authority still largely untested • Uneven distribution of costs • Cyclical public attention

7. What happened? • Pre-2006 • Fed-prov: “joint decision trap” • Prov-prov: “stuck at the bottom” • Rabe: policy capacity, “show us the money” • Post-2006 • Fed-prov: feds increasingly irrelevant • Prov-prov: innovation and diffusion • BC leading • Policy outputs: • Fed level: lots of promises and plans, still no regulations • Provincial level: C&T in AB, C tax in BC, commitments to WCI

8. US • Background: • Relative centralization • Interstate commerce power, conditional grants • “everything airborne, from frisbees to flatulence” • Big states are relatively green! • “The California Effect” • Wealthy • Green • Special authority under Clean Air Act • Public inattention, even after 2006 • Variation at state level?

9. What happened? • Fed-state: feds mostly irrelevant • Some fed obstruction on tailpipe standards • State lawsuits against EPA • State-state: innovation and diffusion • Led by NY, CA • Policy outputs: • At fed level: $ and voluntary • At state level: • renewable portfolio stds • RGGI, WCI • Not all states joining the parade

10. EU (Tiberghien and Schreurs) • Background: • Relative centralization: • qualified majority (though not for taxes) • Environment as unifying issue for EC • Greater public concern, esp in key member states • Big players had BAU windfalls! • Germany + UK account for >100% of EU reductions • Without Germany and UK, per capita increases in rest of EU 15 comparable to Canada, Australia (8%, 1990-2004) • EU had easier target rel to BAU: • -3 to -9% vs. -29% for Canada, -31% for US

11. What happened? • State-state dynamic: • Early leaders held to commitments • Shifting leadership • EU-state dynamic: • Burden-sharing • Reinforcement of leaders by EP and EC • Oversight by EC • Policy Outputs: • C taxes • ETS

12. Intergovernmental dynamics • Depends on fed constitutional authority • No expectation of consensus in EU (or US) • Depends on distribution of costs • “Big players” were green and keen in US, EU, but not in Canada • Depends on public opinion • Like switch in Canada (also several EU member states), but has it turned off again?

13. Policy Outputs • Federalism has facilitated stronger EU policy, partially filled void in US and (more recently) Canada, but still obstructive force in Canada • It’s not all about federalism: • Concentration of authority in legislative institutions • Veto points can be activated by opponents (US) • Ability for leaders to pursue normative commitments (UK, Canada, BC vs. US) • Electoral systems: • PR reinforces (and perhaps amplifies?) electoral pressure, esp when majority of voters inattentive • Lock-in effects • Electoral incentives • window opened and closed without federal action?