AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013

1. AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013 COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMC Regional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia 15 Jan, 2013 This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson.

2. Aim • Understand current situation • Discuss the way ahead • ISAF • NATO • Afghanistan, and for the Alliance • Integrate observations (Security Force Advisor Team, Afghan National Police, 2010-11, Ghazni) • Discussion – throughout – welcome your views

3. Agenda • Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends I. Afghanistan • Current Assessments • “How Insurgencies End” • Taliban status/motivations/objectives II. Operations • Strategy / Policy Process overview • Cost • Current strategy crossroads • Requirements for success III. Strategy • NATO challenges • Options • Your Views IV. Way Ahead

4. Area Overview Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan (heritage.org) • Trends positive since 2011 • Still a major world supplier • Major funding source for INS

5. Indices- Afghanistan • UN Human Development Index: • 172 of 187 • Transparency International Corruption Index • 180 out of 182 • Press Freedom: • 150 of 179 • Life Expectancy: • Men: 2004: 42 2010: 62 • Women: 2004:42 2010: 64 • Inflation: 5% GDP: +5.5% • Phone ownership: >45%

6. Right Direction? • Positive opinions relatively constant • Some recent higher negatives

7. Stay or go? Number of Afghan Asylum Applications, 2011-2011

8. ISAF – Current Overview • Security • Blunted summer offensive • Continued ANSF transition to security lead • Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) up 1% Apr-Sept; shortened poppy harvest • EIAs down 3% from Jan-Sept 2012 vs same in 2011 • EIAs now outside populated areas; cities more secure • Insider attacks – growing trend – measures in place to control • Stability • Several international agreements to support long-term results • May: US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement • May: Chicago summit, NATO/ISAF support through 2017 • July: Tokyo summit, linking reforms in governance and rule-of-law with sustained financial assistance through 2015 • 87%of Afghans living in areas moving to ANSF control

9. ISAF MISSION • Mission: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, • ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, • support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), • and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development • in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

10. Governance • Legitimacy and Effectiveness High • Security forces • International • Domestic • Governance • International • Domestic Violence Low Time  Where is Afghanistan now?

11. ISAF – as of 1 Jan 2013 Troop Strength: 130,386

12. PRTs – 1 Jan 2013 Process underway of handing over responsibilities to AFG organizations

13. ANSF Recruiting, Retention • Attrition remains • problematic

14. Assessments of ANSF Average (1-6 scale) ANA Kandaks ANP Districts Average (1-6 scale)

15. Evaluation Process - example Data (colored charts etc, e.g. CUAT) In-person assessments

16. Regular Assessments:Key Terrain Districts and Add’l Interest DIstricts Ajiristan

17. Transition to ANSF lead • Conventional Operations: • 90% partnered • 85% ANSF led • SOF Operations: • 83% partnered • 83% ANSF led

18. Inteqal - Transition

19. Enemy-Initiated Attacks • Last 3 months: 13% lower than previous year • But…2012 still higher than 2009, pre-surge

20. Executed IED attacks • IEDs- principal INS attack mode • 2012: 17% decrease over 2011

21. Insider Attacks • Statistically - minor • Psychologically – major • Interaction altered; force protection measures emplaced Attacks on ISAF Personnel • Reasons, ISAF investigation: • Infiltration (6%) • Co-option (14%) • Personal Motives (38%) • Unknown – INS related (4%) • Unknown – pending (38%) Attacks on ANSF Personnel

22. Example – Khogyani District Ctr • 4 ‘sleepers’ infiltrated; took over station at night • Stole property, burned buildings, kidnapped 12 • 10 tortured & killed; 2 escaped; Station later rebuilt

23. Casualty Trends • 3256 total • 2010 – peak (711) • 2011 – 20% decline • 2012 - 28% decline • IEDs – biggest % • 2012 – trend lower IED vs All Hostile Deaths Fatalities by Province Source – iCasualties

24. ISAF vs ANSF KIA • 2012 ANSF data vary

25. Drone Strikes in Pakistan • N & S Waziristan • Haqqani Network • Taliban vs ‘good’ Taliban

26. Civilian Casualties • INS caused 94% of casualties, Nov 2012 • ISAF caused Civ-Cas decreased 39% last 3 months

27. Cultural ‘lenses’ are important:Barber, Bomber, or both? • Khogyani District – INS haven, near Ghazni • ‘IED strasse’ – no movement, casualties • IEDs remained • Suspected INS detected; airstrike; investigation • Barber, Bomber, or both? • Cultural ‘lenses’ help overcome blind spots

28. ISAF MISSION • Mission: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, • ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, • support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), • and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development • in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

29. POL CDR US CDR DOS rep Rule of Law Attorney and staff Agribusiness Development Team (Texas) STT / SFAs; LEPs; Legacy OMLTs; POMLTs PRT Mil Staff DOS, USAID, USDA PRT Mil Staff Example - Stability Ops ‘Players’ and the ‘Game’ Joint; Interagency; Multi-national; Intergovernmental Unity of Effort vs Unity of Command; Team Play COMISAF Ambassador COMIJC IPA Coord. Regional Command Regional Commander Regional Senior Civilian Rep (SFS) Commander POL MFA Rep (vacant) Task Force White Eagle Task Force Staff US DOS rep Stab Ops DST Staff Commander District Support Team Civilian Team Lead (1 est; 2 pending) Military elements include security forces, ANSF mentors and civil affairs teams State, USAID, USDA 30

30. Stability Ops ‘Players’ - Examples • ADT – JangalBagh farm • Major $500k project • Stalled w/o security OPs • Police resources strapped • Solution – OP for Ghazni • ‘ring’ plus private security • PRT – Road expansion • IEDs & threats stalled work • Contractor tried to hire own • CoP explained PD 62 • Work continued w/approved private security • Also Moqur & Qarabagh

31. American Football Play stops / starts Rigidly defined positions Separate teams & phases offense / defense / etc Mostly one-nation sport ‘Futbol’ / soccer; not American football Soccer / ‘Futbol’ / Football Play continuous Roles vs positions Same team – lightning transitions World sport

32. “How Insurgencies End” • RAND study on 89 insurgencies • Not predictive; indicates • Some findings: • 0 of 89 ended in unambiguous success • Insurgencies last on average 10 years—government chances of “winning” increase over time • State sponsorship is critical—withdrawal usually leads to crippling of insurgency • Government better off without external intervention/support • Attacks on civilians eventually backfire • “Anocracies” don’t often succeed (15%) • Tipping points—desertions, defections, infiltrations, civilian reporting

33. Status of Taliban • Largest of 8 insurgent factions • Well resourced -- much by Pakistan’s ISI • Sanctuary in Pakistan for command, logistics, planning, training, recruitment, treatment, recuperation • Many unhappy with ISI influence over movement • Older leaders being replaced by younger more militant • Believe cause is just; some uneasy about certain tactics • Locals provide food and shelter – thru fear or support • Support more a function of government weakness, corruption, predatory behavior • Peace initiatives? * From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

34. Agenda • Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends I. Afghanistan • Current Assessments • “How Insurgencies End” • Taliban status/motivations/objectives II. Operations • Strategy / Policy Process overview • Cost • Current strategy crossroads • Requirements for success III. Strategy • NATO challenges • Options • Your Views IV. Way Ahead

35. Strategy/Policy Process • Strategy – ends+ways+means • What is to be done? (ends) • How will it be done? (ways) • What resources? (means) • Premises • Proactive • Must know end state • “If you don’t know where you’re going…” • Balance ends-ways-means • Risk introduced when out of balance • Policy gives end state – Clausewitz • Hierarchical… National -> military -> theater… • Where does Alliance policy fit in? • Comprehensive; Based on thorough analysis + Process – complex in democracies + Alliances – complexity multiplied From H. Richard Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy”, US Army War College, Sept 2005.

36. Taliban Motivations • Multiple and variable by individual • Five main clusters of motivations • Retaliation for perceived military aggression by foreign forces • Resistance to perceived invading infidel forces that threaten Afghan and Islamic values and culture • Resistance to officials regarded as dishonest, corrupt, and unjust who benefit from impunity • Exclusion from power or resources • Social and economic security for poor (possibly motivation for over half the insurgent fighters) • Also expediency (coercion or intimidation) or opportunists (criminal purposes) * From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

37. Example - Defections • Sept 2010 – 4 from Moqur; feigned illness, left with police ranger, weapons

38. Taliban Objectives • Withdrawal of foreign troops • Establishment of Sharia Law • Enforcement of law and order • Harsh punishments • Change constitution (but not saying how) • Honest government • Resist immoral western practices specifically related to women • Force hijab wear • Separation of men and women, limit girls’ education and women’s jobs, movement, and freedom * From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

39. Current NATO Strategy End state: • Extremism and terrorism no longer a threat to stability; • ANSF self-sufficient; Afghan government extends good governance, reconstruction, and development to benefit all its citizens • (NATO—3 Oct 08 – reaffirmed in subsequent summits) Ways / Lines of Effort: • Train and develop ANSF & security institution building • Help strengthen Afghan institutions to establish rule of law, protect human rights, and promote shared values • Assist Afghan-led counter-drug efforts • Improve unity of effort • Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) • Deepen engagement with Pakistan Way Ahead post 2014? • ? ? ?

40. Current US Options • Key issue: Immunity for US troops, or else withdrawal • If forces remain, options discussed (LWJ, 10 Jan 2013) • 6,000: CT, one base, limited training / logistical support for ANSF • 10,000: + limited training, JTAC. Similar to 2003-2004. • 20,000: + second base, QRF for ANSF, limited patrolling • Reported Administration options (with immunity): • 2,500-9,000

41. Cost • US cumulative total thru 2012: • $557.1B • Significant for EU, other NATO

42. Debt • Current GDP (Dec 2012): $15.903 trillion • Debt-GDP ratio: 103% “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt." Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 27 Aug, 2010

43. US Defense Spending - % of GDP • Prior to 1940, 1-2 % except in war • Since 1945, higher share of GDP sustained • Corresponds to ‘Pax Americana’

44. US Defense Spending- real terms • Projection: around $500b • Various scenarios lower Post 9-11, Iraq, AFG Reagan Build-up Korean war Viet Nam war

45. When Spending Exceeds Revenue • Gov’t spending can aid productivity • US entitlement spending and debt interest threaten this • Other factors: interest rates, reserve currency role Source: http://www.gao.gov

46. Requirements for success • Afghans in the lead to secure their future • Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) providing security as professional, respected force of ANA, ANP, and local police • Rule of law at local level • Corruption diminished • No safe haven in Pakistan • Reintegration/reconciliation • Regional cooperation

47. Current Situation • NATO / ISAF • Pakistan • Afghanistan

48. Politics in Afghanistan Politics: who gets what, when, how. Frequent question – for public or private benefit? Must address.

49. NATO challenges • Domestic politics – where does AFG fit? • Is nation-building something NATO can / should do? • How will AFG influence NATO’s future?

50. Options • Long term commitment to partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan for stability in region? • At what cost in blood and treasure? • Democratic support • “Balkanization” with small CT focused force • At what cost and consequences? • Larger training force • Negotiate with Taliban? • Timing?