Alberto Heimler* 阿尔贝托 ﹒ 海姆勒 *

1. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE SUPPLY OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES? 我们能从私营部门对本地公共服务供应的参与中期待些什么？ Alberto Heimler* 阿尔贝托﹒海姆勒* Chongqing, June 5 2013 重庆，2013年6月5日 ** SSPA (Italian School of Government, Rome, Italy – Email: a.heimler@sspa.it ** SSPA (意大利政府学院，罗马，意大利 – 电邮： a.heimler@sspa.it

2. Public or private supply: how to choose? 公共或民营供给：如何选择？ • When is public supply preferable 什么时候需要公共供给: • Non verifiable service quality 服务质量无从检验 • Lack of innovation 缺乏创新 • Little rewards for efficiency 对效率缺乏奖赏 • Major problem with public supply 公共供给的主要问题 • SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT 软预算约束 • When is private supply preferable 什么时候需要民营供给: • Quality is verifiable 质量可检验 • Flexibility of production 生产富于弹性 • Innovation: process/product 创新：流程/产品 • Incentives 激励

3. Liberalization and competition 自由化和竞争 Competition in the market and competition for the market: theoretical issues (Demsetz) and practical applications (Williamson) 市场中的竞争和以竞争获得市场：理论问题（Demsetz）和实际应用（Williamson）

4. Why competition for the market? 为什么需要以竞争获得市场？ ‟Competitive processes and local services” “竞争过程和本地服务” • Main justifications 主要理由: • Allocative Efficiency 配置效率selection of the most efficient suppliers to the benefit of our citizens (both tax payers and users of local services) 在顾及公民（纳税人及本地服务的使用者）利益的前提下选择最有效率的供应商 • Trasparency透明度rules of the games well known and information avaliable to all 所有人都明了游戏规则并掌握相关信息 • Accountability 担责increasing the responsability in the handling of public resources 提高公共资源操作中的责任

5. Object of the auction拍卖对象 The problem of incentives 激励问题: • Bus services (trade-off between profit maximizartion and service quality) 公交服务（利益最大化和服务质量间的权衡） • Rail services (external effects on the quality of the rail infrastructure) 轨道交通服务 （轨道基础设施质量的外部影响） Contract 合约

6. Object of the auction and efficiency拍卖对象和效率 • Which risk should the winner bear 获胜方需要承担何种风险? • Risk on the costs of the service: certainly yes 承担服务成本的风险：当然需要 • Regulatory risk: no 监管风险：不需要 • Demand risk: no if demand is subsidized 需求风险：如果服务获得补贴则不需要 • In order to participate to an auction a firm needs to be informed about production costs: how can someone acquire information on the costs of an existing firm? Very difficult/impossible 为了参加一项拍卖，公司需要了解生产成本：一个人如何获得现有企业的成本信息？非常困难/不可能 • Solution: I enter the market with my own firm (my buses, my drivers, my trains, etc.) 解决方案：利用自己的公司进入市场（自己的公交车，自己的司机，自己的火车，等等）

7. Auction and the quality of services拍卖和服务质量 • Incentive to reduce quality when it is difficult (or impossible) to verify it (bus frequencies, cleaning, maintenance, etc.) 质量无从（或不可能）验证时，降低质量的诱因（巴士的频次，清洁，维护，等等）: • Controls on the part of the public and sanctions 公众方的控制手段和制裁 • Make profitability dependent on customer satisfaction 令盈利与客户满意度挂钩 • Incentive to reduce quality in the final years of the contract (for example this problem led in 1905 the Giolitti government to nationalize the railways in Italy) 合约最后阶段降低质量的诱因（比如该问题导致1905年乔利蒂政府对意大利铁路系统的国有化） • Extend the length of the contract if services are of good quality 如果服务质量上佳则延长合约期限 • Necessity of avoiding hold up situations 避免停顿情形出现的必要性: • waste services in Phoenix (Arizona, US): a part of the service is still provided directly by the municipality 凤凰城（美国亚利桑那州）的垃圾处理服务：一部分服务至今仍直接由市政提供 • Bus services in London (UK): city wide service has been split among nine different suppliers 伦敦的公交服务（英国）：城市公交服务由九家不同供应商分担

8. Auctions and renegotiations (1/2)拍卖和重新谈判（1/2） Of over 1000 concessions assigned to private firms in Latin America from the mid 1980s to the year 2000 in transport, water, energy and telecommunicatins José Luis Guash (Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions, World Bank, 2004) shows that： José Luis Guash（基础设施特许经营项目的授予和重新谈判，世界银行，2004年）指出，20世纪80年代中期到2000年间拉丁美洲在运输、水、能源和电信部门超过1000项授予给私营公司的特许经营权当中： • In 30% of the cases the initial contract was renegotiated. In transport more than 50% and in water services more than 75%. Rinegotiations were more likely when the auction was on the basis of the lowest possible price (60%) than if the auction was organzied around a lump sum to be paid to obtain the concession (11% of the cases) 有超过30％的情形，最初合同经过重新谈判。50％以上的运输服务和75％以上的水务服务经过重新谈判。当拍卖基于一个尽可能低的价格时，更有可能启动重新谈判（60％），这超过当拍卖是基于一次性支付一笔特许款项的情形（11％的案例） • Rinegotiations were more likely if there where investment obligations (70%) than if there were only obligations on prices and/or quality (18%) 当拍卖涉及投资义务时，更有可能启动重新谈判（70%），这超过了当拍卖仅涉及价格和/或质量的情形（18%）。

9. Auctions and renegotiations (2/2)拍卖和重新谈判（2/2） The main effects of the renegotiations have been tariffs increases (62%), delays or suspensions in the investment obligations (69%), enlargement of the cost components that would entail an automatic increase of prices or tariffs (59%) and reductions in the yearly concession tax (22%) 重新谈判的主要影响表现在：关税提高（62%），投资义务的延期或中止（69%），导致价格或关税自动提高的成本构成因素的扩大（59%），以及年度特许经营税的减少（22%）

10. Auctions and competition (1/2)拍卖和竞争（1/2） • Auction design influences the level of competition in a market, especially when the auction creates a new market (for example auctions for 3G concessions) 拍卖设计影响一个市场的竞争水平，尤其是当拍卖创建一个新的市场时（例如3G牌照的拍卖） • If market structure depends upon the results of the auction (for example if firms are allowed to bid for more than one concession), then the final allocation will depend upon private information of firms 如果市场结构取决于拍卖结果（例如，如果允许企业竞投一个以上的特许权），那么最终的分配将取决于私人对企业信息的掌握

11. Auctions and competition (2/2)拍卖和竞争（2/2） • The risk of monopoly or of market power may then be controlled by antitrust enforcement (extending the notion of merger control to concession granting) 垄断或市场势力的风险将有可能由反垄断执法部门来掌控（将合并控制的概念扩展到特许权的授予） Identifying the best market structure ex-ante may be very difficult and there are no theories to follow 事前确定最佳的市场结构可能非常困难，没有现成的理论可供参考

12. Legal instruments法律文件 • EU law makes it mandatory to run an auction unless a local administration “exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities” (Teckal judgment of the ECJ, 1999) 实行拍卖是欧盟法律的一项强制性要求，除非地方管理机构“对当事人实施与对其内部各部门一样的控制，且当事人能与地方控制当局一道开展其活动的主要部分（欧洲法院就Teckal案件的裁决，1999年） • Auctions however have to be organized well to be effective. 应该妥善组织拍卖，令其发挥效力

13. Which lesson did we learn?我们能从中学到什么？ • Auction design and identification of contractual incentives should be done together  it would be more more appropriate to call this market design 拍卖的设计和合约激励因素的确定应一道进行更恰当的称谓应该是市场设计 • Negative consequences are often the result of badly designed auctions and not the result of the auction system as such (see UMTS auction in the UK and Germany v UMTS auctions in Italy) and are very much related to the fact that the bidding bodies disregarded the problem on incentives 消极后果往往是由于拍卖的设计糟糕透顶，而不是由于拍卖系统本身的原因而引起的（如英德的UMTS拍卖与意大利的UMTS拍卖间的对比），并且与招标机构忽视激励问题有莫大的关系 • Risks should be allocated to the party that controls them, otherwise high probability of renegotiations 风险应由控制方承担，否则将极有可能展开重新谈判 • In order to design a market well you need technical, economical and legal competences 良好的市场设计需要您具备技术、经济和法律方面的能力