1 / 39

IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture

IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture. IAEA Safety Standards. IAEA Safety Standards. Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1. Integration of safety culture

albertas
Download Presentation

IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture

  2. IAEA Safety Standards

  3. IAEA Safety Standards

  4. Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1 Integration of safety culture 3.13. “A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes: Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels; Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety; Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regards to safety.”

  5. General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework 1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety 2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources 3. Safety of Research Reactors Part 4 Safety Assessment Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities 6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response

  6. General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework 1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety 2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources 3. Safety of Research Reactors Part 4 Safety Assessment Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities 6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response

  7. Difference between Management and Leadership “The difference between management and leadership can be stated simply whereby ‘management’ is a function and ‘leadership’ is a relation. Management ensures that work is completed in accordance with requirements, plan and resources. It is through leadership that individuals may be influenced and motivated, and organizations changed. Managers may also act as leaders.” Source: IAEA Safety Standards: GS-G-3.5

  8. Evolution to Management Systems Time Systemic approach GSR Part 2 2013 (Integrated) Management Systems Safety & Performance GS-R-3 2006 Quality Management 50-C-Q 1996 Quality Assurance QualityControl 50-C-QA 1985-88

  9. Objective of the GS-R Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety • The application of SF-1 to establish requirements for: • Effective leadership for safety • Effective management for safety • Effective safety culture improvement activities • Safety as a sustainable outcome of excellence in leadership and management • Integrated management system: make sure that other requirements will not compromise Nuclear Safety • Systemic approach of ITO

  10. Systemic Approach – The Interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organization

  11. IAEA Safety Standards

  12. Safety (Culture) Requirement GS-R-3 “The management system shall be used to promote and support a strong safety culture by: • Ensuring a common understanding of the key aspects of safety culture within the organization; • Providing the means by which the organization supports individuals and teams in carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, taking into account the interaction between individuals, technology and the organization; • Reinforcing a learning and questioning attitude at all levels of the organization; • Providing the means by which the organization continually seeks to develop and improve its safety culture.”

  13. IAEA Safety Standards

  14. IAEA Safety culture characteristics and attributes (GS-G-3.1)

  15. Safety is a clearly recognized valueAttributes High priority to safety: shown in documentation, communications and decision- making Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of resources The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in business plan Individuals are convinced that safety and production go ‘hand in hand’ A proactive and long-term approach to safety issues is shown in decision-making Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and supported (both formally and informally) GS-G-3.1

  16. Accountability for safety is clearAttributes Appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists, which ensures that the accountability for safety remains with the licensee Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures Management delegates responsibilities with appropriate authority to enable accountabilities Ownership for safety is evident at all organizational levels and by all individuals GS-G-3.1

  17. Safety is learning drivenAttributes A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels An open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments are used Organizational and operating experience (both internal and external to the facility) is used Learning is enabled through the ability to recognize and diagnose deviations, formulate and implement solutions and monitor the effects of corrective actions Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and acted upon There is a systematic development of staff competencies GS-G-3.1

  18. Safety is integrated into all activitiesAttributes • Trust permeates the organization • Consideration for all types of safety, including industrial and environmental safety and security, is evident • Quality of documentation and procedures is good • Quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is good • Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the work processes • Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered • Good working conditions exist with regards to time pressures, work load and stress • Cross-functional and interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork are present • Housekeeping and material condition reflect commitment to excellence GS-G-3.1

  19. Leadership for safety is clearAttributes Senior management is clearly committed to safety Commitment to safety is evident at all management levels Visible leadership showing involvement of management in safety related activities Leadership skills are systematically developed Management assures that there is sufficient and competent staff Management seeks the active involvement of staff in improving safety Safety implications are considered in the change management process Management shows a continuous effort to strive for openness and good communications throughout the organization Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary Relationships between management and staff are built on trust GS-G-3.1

  20. IAEA Safety Standards

  21. Safety (Culture) Guidance GS-G-3.5 Specific guidance for nuclear installations* Further explanation of the five safety culture characteristics and the attributes Improving safety culture Warning signs of a decline in safety culture Concept of interaction between individuals, technology and the organisation Assessment of safety culture * Nuclear power plants, other reactors (research and critical assemblies), nuclear fuel cycle facilities GS-G-3.5

  22. Post-Fukushima activities – Strengthening of Nuclear Safety IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety Vienna, 20-24 June 2011 Chairpersons’ Summaries 15. In spite of all recent efforts there is still room for improvement in understanding the concept of safety culture and implementing it effectively worldwide in the management of all NPPs.

  23. Basis for the recent work on safety culture • Member States requests to IAEA to provide practical guidance • IAEA Safety Standards • Behaviour and social science • Past experiences

  24. IAEA Safety culture publications http://www.iaea.org

  25. From Variable to Metaphor Approach Culture Technology Management system Strategy Safety- system Strategy Technology Management system Culture Safety- system Culture as one variable amongst others: Culture as something inherent in all aspects of the organisation: The Metaphor Approach Organizations are cultures TheVariableApproach Organizations have cultures

  26. Organizational culture theories nowadays • Culture is seen as less of a ‘quick fix’ • It is recognized that culture can be changed, but it is also recognized that this often takes • time, • effort, and • does not always end up the way it is planned. • Culture can be seen as something we can influence, rather than something we can control • Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization – not a top-down process • Communication is essential • Shared understanding

  27. What use can we draw from the theories? • We need to accept: • Culture is complex • Culture is abstract and inherent into all aspects • There are many cultures in an organization • So what do we need to do? • Educate and train to become more effective in improvement activities • Address the deepest cultural elements when assessing and to make sustainable change • Better understand how different cultures impacts safety culture

  28. Some of TEPCO’s conclusion in IEM5The IAEA International Expert Meeting on Human and Organizational Factors TEPCO: “The cause of the accident shouldnot be treated merely as a natural disasterdue to an enormous tsunami being something difficult to anticipate. We believe it is necessary to seriously acknowledge the result that TEPCO failed to avoid an accident which might have been avoided if ample preparationshad been made in advancewiththorough use of human intellect.” TEPCO concluded the following in the IAEA International Expert Meeting5: • Believed that severe accident was unlikely • Did not pay attention to low probability high consequence risks • Missed out the opportunities to learn from others and improve Is this only valid for TEPCO?

  29. Importance to surface the assumptions Culture is stronger than the technical factors. We easily get ”blind” and get socially conformed. Therefore it is of key importance to create a good shared space which support the basic assumptions to surface and to periodically perform safety culture assessments.

  30. Behaviour Attitudes Values Understanding From Theory of culture to Practice

  31. Performance • Depends on the ability and willingness of individuals to continuously think, engage, and demonstrate safe behaviours • Shaped by: • Personal motivation • Shared space

  32. The Difference…. Dialogue Debate Discussion

  33. Shared Space

  34. Behaviour Behaviour Attitudes Attitudes Values Values Understanding Understanding Shared space as a tool for cultural change Shared Understanding Dialogue

  35. …Thank you for your attention

More Related