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Joanna Schug 1 Toshio Yamagishi 1 David Matsumoto 2 Yutaka Horita 1 Kemberlee Bonnett 2

International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, Japan. Emotional Expressivity as a Signal of Cooperativeness: An Investigation of Facial Expressions of Emotion in the Ultimatum Game. Joanna Schug 1 Toshio Yamagishi 1 David Matsumoto 2 Yutaka Horita 1 Kemberlee Bonnett 2.

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Joanna Schug 1 Toshio Yamagishi 1 David Matsumoto 2 Yutaka Horita 1 Kemberlee Bonnett 2

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  1. International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, Japan Emotional Expressivity as a Signal of Cooperativeness:An Investigation of Facial Expressions of Emotion in the Ultimatum Game Joanna Schug1 Toshio Yamagishi1 David Matsumoto2 Yutaka Horita1 Kemberlee Bonnett2 1: Hokkaido University 2: San Francisco State University

  2. Emotional Expressions as signals of cooperation • Cooperation among non-kin may evolve in a population when reliable signals of cooperative tendency exist, instilling cooperators with the ability to selectively seek out other cooperators as interaction partners(Dawkins, 1976; Frank, 1988, 2001;Hamilton, 1964) • Many studies have examined whether cooperators can be visually identified • Physical traits (Takahashi et al., 2006, Yamagishi et al., 2003) • Facial expressions of emotion (Boone & Buck 2003; Frank 1988; Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2007; Oda et al., 2009; Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik & Wilson, 2001)  Genuine positive emotion: Duchenne smiles 2

  3. Duchenne smiles • Duchenne smiles involve the facial musculature (orbicularis occuli) which surround the eyes • Difficult to intentionally control • Correlated with subjective positive experience (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess, Banse, & Kappas, 1995; Keltner & Bonanno, 1997 ) • Non-Duchenne smiles only involve the zygomatic major muscle (pulls back corners of mouth) • Possible to intentionally control • Not correlated with subjective positive experience (Bonanno et al., 2002, Keltner, 1995) • Because genuine expressions of positive emotion cannot easily be faked, they can reliably signal cooperativeness 3

  4. Duchenne smiles as a signal of cooperativeness • Altruists/Cooperators display higher levels of genuine positive emotion (= Duchenne smiles) than egoists • When talking about personal experiences (Shelley & Kuhlman, 2007) • When engaged in natural conversation (Oda et al., 2009) • Reading aloud a fairy-tale (Brown et al., 2003) • Sharing a reward with a friend (Mehu, Grammer & Dunbar, 2007) Duchenne smiles signal cooperativeness 4

  5. Duchenne smiles as a signal of cooperativeness Duchenne smiles as a signal of cooperativeness • However, Duchenne smiles do not always signal cooperation… • Pre-school children playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game show Duchenne smiles when successfully defecting on their partner (Matsumoto et al., 1986) • Olympic athletes show Duchenne smiles when defeating an opponent (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2007) • Duchenne smiles were positively related to altruistic tendency only when they were displayed in situations requiring sharing, but not during a waiting period before the experiment (Mehu, Grammer & Dunbar, 2007) • The situation in which the emotion is displayed is important 5

  6. Can negative emotion signal cooperative intent? • Can “negative” emotional expressions signal cooperative tendency? • Moral Disgust: One recent study found that facial musculature relevant to the expression of disgust was activated in response to unfair offers in an ultimatum game (Chapman, 2009, Science) • Many negative expressions of emotion can be just as (if not more) difficult to intentionally falsify than Duchenne smiles (Ekman, 2003; Ekman, Roper, & Hager, 1980; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008)  Same logic holds 6

  7. Emotional Expressivity as a signal of Cooperation • Alternative explanation: Emotional expressivity • Emotional expressivity in itself may serve as a marker for cooperative behavior and trustworthiness(Boon and Buck, 2003) • Facilitates mind-reading, allowing for mutual selection among cooperators • Expressivity in itself difficult to falsify • Emotionally expressive individuals are less able to deceive others Makes defection a bad strategy • Tendency for cooperators in previous studies to show higher levels of positive emotion may be due to the tendency for cooperators to openly express their emotion • Previousstudies have only examined specific emotions in positive/ neutral situations 7

  8. The current study In this study, we examine the facial expressions of emotion of cooperators and non-cooperators as they face a negative situation Unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game We identify cooperators using both a behavioral and measurement and SVO If cooperators are more emotionally expressive, they should display higher levels of not only positive but also negative emotion

  9. Method • 20 male participants from Hokkaido University • Truncated Ultimatum Game (Falk et al., 2003) • Proposer makes a binary choice (500:500 or 800:200) • Receiver decides whether to accept or reject the offer • If he accepts the offer, both players receive the amount offered by the proposer • If he rejects the offer, both players receive nothing 9

  10. Method • Participants played the Ultimatum Game three times (each time with a new player, anonymity assured) • In the first two games, participants played the role of the responder, facing offers from two “proposers” 1. Intentional unfair offer • Choices were:\500(proposer)/ \500(participant) \800(proposer)/ \200(participant) 2. Unintentional unfair offer • Both choices were \800(proposer)/ \200(participant)  Intention of the proposer is unclear • In the last game, the participant played the role of the proposer • Chose between \800(self) / \200(other) and \500 each 10

  11. Identification of Cooperators • Behavioral identification of cooperators: • Those who selected the fair (500/500) offer as a proposer in the third round of the ultimatum game 11/20 participants selected the fair offer • Social Value Orientation: • Ring Measure of Social Value Orientation (SVO) Liebrand, 1984 • Classified as pro-socials and pro-selfs • 9/20 participants classified as pro-socials 11

  12. Coding of Facial Expressions • Facial expressions videotaped through the monitor display (participants were aware they were being recorded, however the camera itself was relatively obscured) • Facial Action Coding System (FACS) • Only comprehensive, anatomically based system for scoring facial expressions • EMFACS system: • Only codes action units relevant to emotional signaling • Identifies eight emotional categories: anger, disgust, fear, sadness, contempt, duchenne smile, non-duchenne smile, and surprise 12

  13. Time spans coded We focus the analysis on the time period from when the unfair offer was displayed on the screen, until the participant decided to accept or reject the unfair offer. Response phase (approx. 15 seconds) Negative event intended to elicit negative emotion We also coded the waiting period before/after the response phase Pre- response phase (15-25 seconds) Post response phase (30 seconds) * Because each phase varies in length, we divide emotion frequency by the length of each phase and use the resulting per-second frequencies in the analysis

  14. Results (Fair vs. Unfair proposers) Decision-making phase of first two games (intentional/unintentional) pooled 14

  15. Ultimatum game • May not be a pure measure of cooperation • Even those who are solely concerned with their own welfare may propose a fair offer if they believe their offer will be rejected • Thus, we qualified the behavioral measure with the measure of SVO • 3/11 fair proposers were identified as pro-selfs • 1/9 unfair proposers was identified as a pro-social  We focus our examination on those who were consistently identified as cooperators (pro-socials) and non-cooperators (pro-selfs) 15

  16. Consistent cooperators Decision-making phase of first two games (intentional/unintentional) pooled 16

  17. Because we had predicted that differences between cooperators and non-cooperators would be most pronounced in the response phase (when participants faced an unfair offer) we examined the differences in the total frequency of emotional expressions shown in all three game phases: Pre-response Phase Response Phase (P’s faced unfair offers) Post-response Phase As predicted, we found a significant interaction between proposer type (cooperator/non-cooperator) and game phase (Pre, Response, Post) on the total amount of emotional expressions observed. F (2,28)=11.21, p= .0003 Facial expressions displayed in each phase

  18. Facial expressions displayed in each phase 18 Phase

  19. Facial expressions displayed in each phase 19 Phase

  20. Facial expressions displayed in each phase 20 Phase

  21. Facial expressions displayed in each phase Participants displayed more facial expressionsduring the decision-making phase (in which they faced unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game) than in the waiting periods before and after the decision-making phase. 21 Phase

  22. Positive (Duchenne Smile) d=.99, p=.07, ns ns 22 Phase

  23. Neutral (Non-Duchenne, Surprise) d=1.28, p<.05 ns ns 23 Phase

  24. Negative (Anger, Contempt, Disgust, Fear, Sadness) d=1.13, p<.05 ns ns 24 Phase

  25. Summary • As in previous studies, cooperators showed higher levels of positive emotion (duchenne smiles) • However, cooperators also showed higher levels of neutral (e.g., non-duchenne smiles, surprise) and negative (e.g., sadness, disgust, contempt) facial expressions of emotion. • These differences were most apparent when participants were faced with a negative situation (unfair offers in the UG) 25

  26. Implications • Previous studies have mainly focused on the display of genuine positive emotion as a signal of cooperation • Results of this study suggest that this finding may stem from the tendency for cooperators to openly display all emotion • Should lead to higher levels of positive emotion in situations requiring cooperation • Should simultaneously lead to higher levels of negative emotion in negative situations 26

  27. Limitations • No incentives to falsify emotion • Emotions displayed in privacy, no interaction with other participants • Future studies should examine situations in which participants have incentives to mask and/or falsify their emotion • Uncertain whether non-cooperators feel less emotion, or whether they are masking their expressions 27

  28. Thank you very much for your attention!

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