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Leaving Legacy, Moving to Next Generation Communications

Leaving Legacy, Moving to Next Generation Communications. Presented by: Motty Anavi VP Business Development. Entelec Conference Spring 2013. Agenda. Utility Network Migration Process Factors and Influencers on Migration Migration Options Process Technology

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Leaving Legacy, Moving to Next Generation Communications

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  1. Leaving Legacy, Moving to Next Generation Communications Presented by: Motty Anavi VP Business Development Entelec Conference Spring 2013

  2. Agenda • Utility Network Migration Process • Factors and Influencers on Migration • Migration Options • Process • Technology • Looking at the New Technology • Reliability • Services • Still Outstanding • Summary

  3. The Legacy Utility Network Sub-Station • Only TDM based • Strict and well known and tested protocols • Cyber Security in not a major concern • Delay is not an issue • Ubiquitously supported by carriers and service providers Control Center RTU RTU T1/E1 RS-232 RS-232 Multiplexer Multiplexer Tele-Protection Control Console C37.94 PBX Server ADM ADM ADM T1/E1 NMS Sub-Station Power Line PBX Phone 4W

  4. Migrating to Packet Networks • Obsolescence of equipment • Lack of support for 4W service • Improving and streamlining of Telecom network • New standards for Sub Station Services • IEC61850 • M2M communications • New challenges with Packet Networks • Cyber Security • New Characteristics of transport (More Delay, Compatibility)

  5. The Evolving Telecom Network Sub-Station Control Center RTU RTU RTU T1/E1 RS-232 RS-232 RS-232 Multiplexer Multiplexer Multiplexer Tele-Protection Tele-Protection Control Console C37.94 C37.94 PBX PBX Server ADM ADM ADM T1/E1 T1/E1 Sub-Station NMS Power Line PBX Switch PMU/ Small SS Packet Network RF-3080

  6. Challenges: Next Generation Migration Uncertainty Challenges in switching to All Packet • Not all critical application capable of migration • Maintain smooth operation of current networks, despite discontinued vendor products • Avoid over-burdening network operations and management due to TDM/PSN transport co-existence • Reconcile required investment in SDH/SONET equipment with decommissioning plans • Avoid CapEx hikes related to increase in number of network devices: • Continue using legacy installed-base while introducing IP/Ethernet devices • Ensure service quality for mission critical apps (e.g., Teleprotection)

  7. Challenges: Next Generation Migration Technology Aspect Smart Communications over Packet • Service assurance for mission critical apps in PSN environment: • Low end-to-end delay • High Availability • SDH/SONET-level Resiliency • Differentiated quality of service for SCADA, video surveillance, voice, Teleprotection, radio and data traffic • Remote operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) for fault management and lower OpEx • Efficient connectivity for IEC 61850 intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)

  8. The Migrated Telecom Network Sub-Station Control Center RTU RTU RTU RS-232 RS-232 RS-232 Next Gen MS Next Gen MS MS Gateway Tele-Protection Tele-Protection Control Console C37.94 C37.94 PBX PBX Server Sub-Station ADM T1/E1 T1/E1 NMS Power Line PBX PS Network PMU/ Small SS Firewall Firewall Firewall

  9. The Challenges • Selecting the “winning” packet network • Not all applications can be transported over packet • Application issues • Security concerns • Upgrading ancillary equipment to be “Packet Compatible” • Or making adjustment to the network • Training or retraining of workforce • Massive capital expense with a complete upgrade • Complexity of maintaining two or more networks • Buying more equipment with a short usability timeframe

  10. Addressing the Challenges: The Options Evolution instead of Revolution… Move everything to packet! • Keep my legacy forever! • Utilize existing assets • Deterministic performance • No learning curve • Flexible & scalable • Low OpEx • Future support • Asset lifespan • Gradual migration • Guaranteed performance • Moderate learning curve • Future ready design • High equipment costs • Non-deterministic • Steep learning curve • High operating costs • Low scalability • Not flexible

  11. The Core Replacement Choices • IP/MPLS • Added deterministic paths to IP • Used as a core Technology • No Built-in Security Mechanism • Still untried as access technology • CoE (aka Carrier Ethernet) • Mature Technology • Enhanced and updated • Established Security Protocol support • Connection Oriented Ethernet

  12. IP/MPLS Highlights • Mature Technology • Widely used • Deterministic routing • No Built-in Security • All paths for packets setup on connection establishment • Well established resiliency mechanisms • No built-in security (very susceptible for cyber attacks) • Different in architecture than existing SONET/TDM • Fairly unaffordable

  13. CoEthernet Highlights • Mature Technology • Newly enhanced Connection Oriented Ethernet technology • Built in Security including Source authentication • Similar to SONET/SDH in terms of architecture and Terminology • CoE developed mechanisms for: • Deterministic network performance • Detection of Network failure • Measurement of network performance • Very fast restoration of service (Sub 10ms) • Very affordable

  14. An IP/MPLS Based Network • Architecture is very different than SONET/SDH (Similar to IP) • New set of addressable values • Each device now requires new management connection • Training is a challenge • Susceptible to cyber attacks with no source authentication • Network performance is predictable • In network delay is manageable and could be designed to be low • Extremely high equipment costs • Built in fast resiliency

  15. A CoE Based Network • Architecture similar SONET/SDH • Connection based virtual circuits • Similar OAM terms (AIS/RDI etc….) • Training simple • More resilient to cyber attacks with source authentication • Network performance guaranteed by CoE OAM measurements • In network delay can be designed to be low • Relatively low equipment cost – regardless of network size or number of nodes • Built in fast resiliency

  16. Comparing The Technologies • Connection Setup • SONET : Hard coded paths mapped through ADMs • CoE: Hard coded EVCs mapped through Switches with pre-determined priorities • MPLS: Dynamic path setup based on IP addressing and exchanging routing tables • Vulnerability of connections • SONET: All connections are initiated by NMS • COE: All connections are initiated by NMS • MPLS: Connections made dynamically and are vulnerable to errored/malicious routing information

  17. Comparing The Technologies • Troubleshooting • SONET : Comprehensive troubleshooting built in with OAM bits propagating faults • CoE: Comprehensive troubleshooting built in with OAM packets propagating faults • MPLS: No built-in OAM mechanism for localizing faults relies on other overlays to initiate backup paths • Resiliency • SONET: Ring resiliency to a predetermined path • COE: Ring and path resiliency to a pre-determined path within 10ms • MPLS: Ring or Mesh resiliency depending on topology

  18. Comparing Security • Source Authentication: • MPLS – No source authentication, once entering an CE/PE – local id is erased. • Ethernet – Universal address is maintained (MAC address), Standard for source authentication 802.1X • Snooping / Scouting: • MPLS – LSPs used as transparent pipes from one location to another. • Ethernet - Individual frames screened at global level (MAC) for validity • Control Plane: • MPLS - BGP and other routing protocols very susceptible for attacks that can crash entire network • Ethernet - Control plane isolated and access controlled by corporate access control

  19. The Future: IEC 61850 • Standard design for Sub Station Communications • Establishes standard: • Architecture (Process/Station Bus) • Protocols and formats (e.g. Goose) • Open interconnection points • Equipment requirements • Common communications: Ethernet

  20. Comparing the Contenders • CoE has the advantage over the other packet technologies when it comes to similarity to SONET/SDH which make this technology the technological and business winner

  21. Ethernet OAM

  22. Drivers for Ethernet OAM • OAM benchmarks • Set by TDM and existing WAN technologies • Operational Efficiency • Reduce OPEX, avoid truck-rolls • Downtime cost • Management Complexity • Large Span Networks • Multiple constituent networks belong to disparate organizations/companies

  23. Ethernet OAM Capabilities • Fault Management • Fault Detection • Fault Verification • Fault Isolation • Fault Recovery • Fault Notification • Performance Management • Frame Loss Measurement • Delay Measurement • Delay Variation Measurement • Availability Measurement Configuration Management Ethernet OAM

  24. Ethernet OAM • IEEE 802.1ag • Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) • Also referred as Service OAM • IEEE 802.3ah (clause 57) • Ethernet Link OAM • Also referred as 802.3 OAM, Link OAM or Ethernet in the First Mile (EFM) OAM • ITU-T Y.1731 • OAM functions and mechanisms for Ethernet-based networks

  25. Standards: Ethernet OAM A summary of available Ethernet OAM mechanisms

  26. Ethernet SLA Tools Example

  27. Pseudowires

  28. What is Pseudowire (PW)? • Pseudo = Simulated, Seemingly • Emulation of a native service over a Packet Switched Network (PSN). • The native services can be ATM, TDM, Frame Relay or ETH, while the PSN can be ETH, IP or MPLS. • Supports voice, data and video • Provides a transparent tunnel through the PSN • Provides clock distribution and synchronization over PSN

  29. What is Pseudowire (PW)? PSN Network SCADA SCADA PW-GW PW-GW Analog Analog TDM TDM

  30. Timing

  31. IEEE 1588 IEEE-1588 is a standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems • Defines a Precision Time Protocol (PTP) designed to synchronize real-time clocks in a hierarchical distributed system • Intended for LAN using multicast communications • Targeted accuracy of microseconds or sub-microsecond (v1) • v1 approved in September 2002 and published November 2002 • v2 approved in June 2007

  32. What is IEEE1588v2? • IEEE1588v2 is designed to distribute frequency and time to a higher accuracy and precision, to the scale of nanoseconds and fractional nanoseconds. • The protocol operates over packet switched networks. The standard is currently defined to run over IEEE 802.3, UDP/IPv4, UDP/IPv6, DeviceNet, ControlNet and PROFINET. • Designed to operate automatically to establish master slave hierarchy for time distribution. (not for Telecomm industry) • Introduces “Transparent Clocks” to overcome the network’s delay variation. • C37.238 Power Profile based on IEEE-1588v2 required for Syncrophasor accuracy

  33. Protection Over Ethernet - G.8031

  34. G.8031 Protection • Protection as per ITU-T G.8031 • 1:1 Mode • Unidirectional Only • Using APS messages • Triggers • Port Signal loss • CCM LOC , ETH-AIS • Protection time • 10ms protection for one pair of EVC • As low as 40ms protection 4 pairs of EVCs • Topologies • EVC protection with one fiber (both EVC’s running on the same Fiber) • EVC protection with 2 fiber each path on different fiber (dual link) • EVC protection with dual fiber working with MC-LACP to dual PE • EVC protection with Dual NTU (Future development)

  35. G.8031 Applications – End to End path protection • Redundancy on S-Tags in the network • APS is running over one standby EVC only • Revertive and Non revertive modes • End to end service shell be maintained • TLS , Accesses to L3 VPN • CCM or ETH-AIS is used to trigger protection event Customer Premises CustomerPremises Ethernet NID CPE CPE NID X L2PE Metro / VPLS L2PE L2PE End to End path protection Online EVC Redundant EVC

  36. Teleprotection • Deliver Teleprotection signals with mission-critical accuracy over dedicated fiber, TDM or IP • C37.94-compliant Teleprotection communication channels allow reliable transmission by minimizing data errors due to EM and RF interference, or ground potential rise (GPR) •Ultra-low end-to-end propagation delay supports immediate delivery of Transfer Trip commands from protective relay/contact transfer to remote-end substations •Maintain performance levels when migrating to packet networks with hard QoS, as well as robust latency and jitter protection

  37. Teleprotection Requirements • Very strict delay • 80ms total • 40ms for network • Differential Teleprotection • Constant delay • During failover – Delay could change • Packet solutions do not factor differential delays on redundancy

  38. The Ideal Migration Strategy • Select a new technology • Reliability • Longevity • Affordability • Selectively migrate application • Check availability of solutions • Migrate only when application validate • Minimize cyber security threat • Complete migration within timeframe

  39. Migration Steps Infrastructure Required Services ETH to PSN SDH/SONET Legacy to SDH/SONET Legacy to PSN Data ETH to SDH/SONT PSN VoIP NMS Aggregation Network Access Aggregation Access

  40. Summary • The energy industry is being forced to migrate to packet technologies • Caution should be used when selecting a new technology • Established Standards such as IEC61850, C37.238 (IEEE-1588v2) use Ethernet as their transport of choice • An evolutionary approach to migration can ease the pain • Some applications may not be suitable today for migration to NGN • Migrating to NGN is unavoidable and should be designed today to optimize available funds and reduce future issues

  41. Questions ?

  42. For More Information: Motty Anavi VP of Business Development Motty_a@rad.com (201) 378-0213

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