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1. In this presentation on CIMIC actors I will be drawing on a range of personal experiences working closely with, and as a representative of, military and civilian organisations at different points throughout my career:
ADF career, including service in PNG, Kashmir, Cambodia, and 3 Brigade.
UN Deputy Force Commander, East Timor.
CEO, AUSTCARE – currently with 22 projects across 11 countries.
In this presentation on CIMIC actors I will be drawing on a range of personal experiences working closely with, and as a representative of, military and civilian organisations at different points throughout my career:
ADF career, including service in PNG, Kashmir, Cambodia, and 3 Brigade.
UN Deputy Force Commander, East Timor.
CEO, AUSTCARE – currently with 22 projects across 11 countries.
2. This photo of a Kiwi medical Captain in East Timor in 2000 represents but one aspect of CIMIC – there are others that I will explore in this presentation.
At the outset I want to stress three points:
First, the nature of conflict continues to change and natural disasters will continue to impact on us all. In conflict, post-conflict and natural disasters, CIMIC is becoming increasingly important. Consequently, effective CIMIC is of exceptional relevance to all military forces and humanitarian agencies. At the same time, some senior ADF commanders and heads of humanitarian agencies do not fully understand CIMIC, and most of them have not really been trained in CIMIC. The distinction between peacekeeping and warfighting, and the roles of soldiers and humanitarians, has become increasingly blurred. For military forces, CIMIC is now relevant to warfighting, peacekeeping, nation building, and emergency response - and all of these are likely to be occur in the same AO, either concurrently or consecutively.
Second, I would like to congratulate the ADF on improving its CIMIC doctrine and awareness in recent years, particularly through the release of ADDP 3.11, and the practical work being done by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in Brisbane, and courses such as this. It is essential that CIMIC has a strong legal basis, because its success is ultimately dependent on the legitimacy under which military forces operate. I commend the work of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law.
Third, the role and legitimacy of military forces in the conduct of humanitarian operations (and, therefore, CIMIC) continues to evolve. Debate continues amongst and between civilian humanitarian agencies and military forces. Consequently, courses such as this are very important because you can have much more influence on the future of CIMIC than will the current leaders in the ADF.This photo of a Kiwi medical Captain in East Timor in 2000 represents but one aspect of CIMIC – there are others that I will explore in this presentation.
At the outset I want to stress three points:
First, the nature of conflict continues to change and natural disasters will continue to impact on us all. In conflict, post-conflict and natural disasters, CIMIC is becoming increasingly important. Consequently, effective CIMIC is of exceptional relevance to all military forces and humanitarian agencies. At the same time, some senior ADF commanders and heads of humanitarian agencies do not fully understand CIMIC, and most of them have not really been trained in CIMIC. The distinction between peacekeeping and warfighting, and the roles of soldiers and humanitarians, has become increasingly blurred. For military forces, CIMIC is now relevant to warfighting, peacekeeping, nation building, and emergency response - and all of these are likely to be occur in the same AO, either concurrently or consecutively.
Second, I would like to congratulate the ADF on improving its CIMIC doctrine and awareness in recent years, particularly through the release of ADDP 3.11, and the practical work being done by the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in Brisbane, and courses such as this. It is essential that CIMIC has a strong legal basis, because its success is ultimately dependent on the legitimacy under which military forces operate. I commend the work of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law.
Third, the role and legitimacy of military forces in the conduct of humanitarian operations (and, therefore, CIMIC) continues to evolve. Debate continues amongst and between civilian humanitarian agencies and military forces. Consequently, courses such as this are very important because you can have much more influence on the future of CIMIC than will the current leaders in the ADF.
3. SCOPE What is CIMIC?
Battlespace or Humanitarian Space?
Who are the key CIMIC Actors?
Can/how can militaries work with the UN & NGOs?
Some CIMIC lessons from East Timor. I will fairly quickly cover these seven points, and hope that they provide a good basis for much of your discussions throughout the course.I will fairly quickly cover these seven points, and hope that they provide a good basis for much of your discussions throughout the course.
4. Resources Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 2004: Civil-Military Cooperation (Operations Series ADDP 3.11)
United Nations Standard Generic Training Module on Civil-Military Coordination
UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (June 2004)
UK Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90: Civil Military Co-operation (Nov 2003)
InterAction DVD on CIMIC I thought you might also like to check these resources. I thought you might also like to check these resources.
5. Resources/Websites UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Best Practices Unit – www.un.org
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) – www.odi.org.uk
International Peace Academy (IPA) – www.ipa.org
These three websites have lots of good information around CIMIC. There are many other sites as well. These three websites have lots of good information around CIMIC. There are many other sites as well.
6. 1. What is CIMIC?
7. Dimensions of CIMIC Where CIMIC exists it can mean different things to different people and organisations. This diagram illustrates different dimensions of CIMIC:
Internal civil-military relations – the interaction between domestic civil authorities and domestic/national defence forces.
Traditional focus of humanitarian actors – the interaction between international civilian organisations and domestic military forces (eg UNDP, international development NGOs operating in a developing country)
Military CIMIC – the interaction between a foreign military force and the local population in the host nation/area of operations.
International Civil-Military Relations/UN-CM Coord – the interaction between international humanitarian actors and any international military forces on the ground in the affected state.
It is important to note that all four of these dimensions exist in any humanitarian emergency where there is an international military force present.Where CIMIC exists it can mean different things to different people and organisations. This diagram illustrates different dimensions of CIMIC:
Internal civil-military relations – the interaction between domestic civil authorities and domestic/national defence forces.
Traditional focus of humanitarian actors – the interaction between international civilian organisations and domestic military forces (eg UNDP, international development NGOs operating in a developing country)
Military CIMIC – the interaction between a foreign military force and the local population in the host nation/area of operations.
International Civil-Military Relations/UN-CM Coord – the interaction between international humanitarian actors and any international military forces on the ground in the affected state.
It is important to note that all four of these dimensions exist in any humanitarian emergency where there is an international military force present.
8. Definitions Civil-Military Affairs (CMA)
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
Civil-Military Co-ordination (CM Cord) The terms Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Coordination (CM Cord), and Civil-Military Affairs/Relations (CMA) are often used interchangeably and understood differently by different actors. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasises the need for a common vocabulary – or at least an understanding of each other’s vocabulary - in order for civilian and military actors to communicate and coordinate effectively. The terms Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Coordination (CM Cord), and Civil-Military Affairs/Relations (CMA) are often used interchangeably and understood differently by different actors. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasises the need for a common vocabulary – or at least an understanding of each other’s vocabulary - in order for civilian and military actors to communicate and coordinate effectively.
9. Civil-Military Affairs (CMA) International CMA – refers to the range of possible relations between civilian and military actors present in warlike and non-warlike operations. This can range from conflictual through to cooperative relations. Conflict and competition often occur where coordination is deficient or absent.
In East Timor in 1999, INTERFET used the term “CMA” to describe its relationship and operations with the civil actors. This was adopted by the UNTAET Peacekeeping Force which replaced INTERFET. In hindsight I think this highlights two things:
the wrong term was probably used, and
the wrong term was used because the ADF and coalition partners, as well as UN OCHA, did not have a good understanding of CIMIC.International CMA – refers to the range of possible relations between civilian and military actors present in warlike and non-warlike operations. This can range from conflictual through to cooperative relations. Conflict and competition often occur where coordination is deficient or absent.
In East Timor in 1999, INTERFET used the term “CMA” to describe its relationship and operations with the civil actors. This was adopted by the UNTAET Peacekeeping Force which replaced INTERFET. In hindsight I think this highlights two things:
the wrong term was probably used, and
the wrong term was used because the ADF and coalition partners, as well as UN OCHA, did not have a good understanding of CIMIC.
10. ADF Definition of CIMIC “the coordination and cooperation in support of the mission between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-government organisations and agencies.” (ADDP 3.11)
But, this defines CIMIC from a “military” perspective: what if the civil and military objectives are not aligned? The above definition of CIMIC is good from the military perspective, but can only be implemented effectively if the civil actors want to play ball. This will not always be the case. The above definition of CIMIC is good from the military perspective, but can only be implemented effectively if the civil actors want to play ball. This will not always be the case.
11. CIMIC CIMIC is one form of CMA that is characterised by:
A relationship of mutual support.
An understanding of common objectives in complex peace operations and humanitarian emergencies.
Based on trust, respect, and separateness.
Exchange of information between military and civil actors.
Aided by joint planning. CIMIC is one form of CMA that is characterised by:
a relationship of mutual support;
an understanding of common objectives in complex peace operations and humanitarian emergencies;
a relationship based on trust, respect and “separate identities”;
where there exists a willingness to exchange information between military and civil actors for the common good; and
where joint planning is encouraged.
CIMIC is one form of CMA that is characterised by:
a relationship of mutual support;
an understanding of common objectives in complex peace operations and humanitarian emergencies;
a relationship based on trust, respect and “separate identities”;
where there exists a willingness to exchange information between military and civil actors for the common good; and
where joint planning is encouraged.
12. CM Coord – UN OCHA “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency and when appropriate, pursue common goals.”
A shared responsibility.
A better reflection of the differences and realities between the military and civilian humanitarian actors. The UN OCHA definition of CM Coord highlights the need for sharing, and provides a better understanding of the differences and realities existing between military and civilian humanitarian actors.
CM Coord implies that common goals may not always be achievable, but should be strived for.The UN OCHA definition of CM Coord highlights the need for sharing, and provides a better understanding of the differences and realities existing between military and civilian humanitarian actors.
CM Coord implies that common goals may not always be achievable, but should be strived for.
13. CIMIC works best when: Security exists.
Civil authority predominates.
International legitimacy is apparent and unambiguous. (Non-belligerent occupation.)
The host-population is supportive.
But such situations are rare! CIMIC works best when:
There is a secure environment for civil actors to operate.
Civil authority predominates.
International legitimacy is apparent and unambiguous – the military force is not perceived as belligerent.
The host-population is supportive.
But such situations are rare!CIMIC works best when:
There is a secure environment for civil actors to operate.
Civil authority predominates.
International legitimacy is apparent and unambiguous – the military force is not perceived as belligerent.
The host-population is supportive.
But such situations are rare!
14. 2. Battlespace or Humanitarian Space? Establishing cooperative relations is challenging for a number of reasons including the fact that civil endstates differ significantly from military endstates. Where there are overlapping objectives, the potential for cooperation is higher.Establishing cooperative relations is challenging for a number of reasons including the fact that civil endstates differ significantly from military endstates. Where there are overlapping objectives, the potential for cooperation is higher.
15. Military Missions & Political Conditions The potential for cooperation often depends upon the mission of the military force, the degree of security, and the political circumstances. If socio-political conditions deteriorate from stable to unstable, and from peacebuilding to combat, then the need for humanitarian assistance increases while the availability and impartiality of military forces to support humanitarian efforts decreases.The potential for cooperation often depends upon the mission of the military force, the degree of security, and the political circumstances. If socio-political conditions deteriorate from stable to unstable, and from peacebuilding to combat, then the need for humanitarian assistance increases while the availability and impartiality of military forces to support humanitarian efforts decreases.
16. 3. Who are the CIMIC Actors? So who are the CIMIC actors?So who are the CIMIC actors?
17. In thinking about what CIMIC is, and the range of actors involved in CIMIC, it is useful to first consider the context within which CIMIC issues arise.
In complex humanitarian emergencies or peace operations, issues of security, development, governance, peace, democracy, human rights and financial resources are all essential components to establishing stability and preventing further conflict. These multiple components therefore give rise to a multiplicity of essential actors – civilian and military. No single actor can work in isolation.
The analogy of a three-legged stool shows how that without security, governance and development it will not be possible to ensure a durable peace and democracy. Moreover if any of these legs is too short then the stool will fall over. What makes the legs stronger are adequate financial resources and effective human rights.In thinking about what CIMIC is, and the range of actors involved in CIMIC, it is useful to first consider the context within which CIMIC issues arise.
In complex humanitarian emergencies or peace operations, issues of security, development, governance, peace, democracy, human rights and financial resources are all essential components to establishing stability and preventing further conflict. These multiple components therefore give rise to a multiplicity of essential actors – civilian and military. No single actor can work in isolation.
The analogy of a three-legged stool shows how that without security, governance and development it will not be possible to ensure a durable peace and democracy. Moreover if any of these legs is too short then the stool will fall over. What makes the legs stronger are adequate financial resources and effective human rights.
18. CIMIC Actors This list gives an idea of the complex mix of actors that may be present.
Host-population and local authorities.
UN Mission and UN Agencies (eg OCHA, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR).
Military forces – host nation, foreign, insurgent.
International organisations (ICRC, World Bank, IMF, etc).
NGOs – international and local.
Intergovernmental organisations such as NATO, OSCE, AU, Commonwealth, etc.
Private businesses – local and international.
Media.
Diplomats and Donors.
The “spoilers” – which may include some of the above.
Ideally, this disparate group should operate in a co-ordinated and complementary way. Often, stereotypical images and/or ignorance in regard to other actors hinders the effective attainment of complementary action. Individual elements in this complex often regard other elements with suspicion. Consequently, like-minded actors have tended to function independently and often less efficiently than may be possible if joint planning and unity of effort had been pursued.
Note that the local population is at the centre and the reason for intervention. Often, however, these are the most disempowered of all actors and find it difficult to have their voices heard and priorities implemented. NGOs are not absolved from this criticism.This list gives an idea of the complex mix of actors that may be present.
Host-population and local authorities.
UN Mission and UN Agencies (eg OCHA, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR).
Military forces – host nation, foreign, insurgent.
International organisations (ICRC, World Bank, IMF, etc).
NGOs – international and local.
Intergovernmental organisations such as NATO, OSCE, AU, Commonwealth, etc.
Private businesses – local and international.
Media.
Diplomats and Donors.
The “spoilers” – which may include some of the above.
Ideally, this disparate group should operate in a co-ordinated and complementary way. Often, stereotypical images and/or ignorance in regard to other actors hinders the effective attainment of complementary action. Individual elements in this complex often regard other elements with suspicion. Consequently, like-minded actors have tended to function independently and often less efficiently than may be possible if joint planning and unity of effort had been pursued.
Note that the local population is at the centre and the reason for intervention. Often, however, these are the most disempowered of all actors and find it difficult to have their voices heard and priorities implemented. NGOs are not absolved from this criticism.
19. 4. Can militaries work with the UN ? Yes and No – and to varying degrees – but mainly Yes (if the UN is understood, resourced & is held accountable)
Which UN are we working with?
DPKO / DPA / OCHA / Agencies
Distinction between humanitarian (OCHA), peacemaking (DPA), and peacekeeping operations (DPKO), but sometimes they are merged – eg East Timor & Afghanistan
20. 4. Can militaries work with NGOs? “ I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team. We are all committed to the same, singular purpose to help every man and woman in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educate their children, have hope.”
Secretary of State Colin Powell to NGO Leaders,
26 October 2001
21. Can militaries work with NGOs? Yes and No. It Depends.
NGO principles – humanity, neutrality, impartiality – are sacrosanct.
NGOs wary of “belligerent donors”.
NGOs must abide by their Codes of Conduct and will be held accountable.
NGOs are accountable to their beneficiaries, donors and Boards.
NGOs prefer the military to provide humanitarian assistance only in exceptional circumstances – avoid dependencies.
22. Understanding NGO Principles The Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief
SPHERE Charter and Minimum Humanitarian Standards
ACFID Code of Conduct (for Australian NGOs)
UN Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies
UN Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)
But, never assume that all NGOs understand and follow these!
23. Best Areas for Civilian-Military Co-ordination/Cooperation Security
Logistics
Communications
Transportation
Information (selective)
PRIORITISATION
24. Core Areas of NGO Humanitarian Assistance Grass roots poverty reduction
Restoration of livelihoods
Water & sanitation
Food & nutrition
Shelter & site planning
Health services
Micro-enterprise
Protection & human rights
Repatriation and resettlement
Peacebuilding and conflict prevention
Human rights advocacy
25. Potential Areas of Discord Security is threatened
Military invades the Humanitarian Space
Lack of civilian authority
Dependency culture is created
Military denies assistance
Information gathering
Use of Language (eg. ‘humanitarian’, ‘impartiality’, ‘security’)
26. Working “With” works when: There is mutual understanding and willingness.
Relationship is based on trust, respect, and separateness.
Exchange of information does not compromise either party.
Joint planning occurs with some actors.
The CMOC, UNHOC and NGO Forum are able to network effectively.
27. CIMIC Guidelines Mutual understanding – principles, codes, doctrine, sectors
Conduct more joint training
Civil Authority in charge as soon as possible
Share information without jeopardising security and impartiality
Military provide security and assist humanitarian agencies
Avoid public criticism – only encourages “spoilers”
NGOs – must be better organised
Military – make CIMIC a principle of peace and war
30. 1. Speed of Action 2. Planning, Leadership and Teamwork 3. Legitimacy 4. Strong and Achievable Mandate 5. Host-Country Support 6. International Commitment 7. Capable Security Forces 8. Separation of Combatants 9. Effective Border Control 10. Establishing the Rule of Law 11. Managing War Crimes 12. Responsive Budgets 13. Capacity Building
In my book on East Timor, titled Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, I highlighted and discussed 13 political factors that were required for successful intervention.
I do not propose to discuss these here today.
More relevant to you are some of the military lessons related to CIMIC, shown on the next sequence of slides.
In my book on East Timor, titled Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, I highlighted and discussed 13 political factors that were required for successful intervention.
I do not propose to discuss these here today.
More relevant to you are some of the military lessons related to CIMIC, shown on the next sequence of slides.
31. CIMIC LESSONS FROM EAST TIMOR Centre of Gravity
Changed from being the “militia” to “earning the support of the ET people”.
This change transformed operations, and security improved.
Governance
Neither INTERFET nor the PKF properly understood the traditional system of governance. (See following slide.)
More anthropologists!
32. Setting: Levels of Local Leadership The recognised equivalent of our Town Councils, such as Darabin in East Timor would be these 13 Districts.
When considering Local Government in East Timor, most people would say they belong to hamlets, villages or sub districts well before they identify with a District. In fact it is not difficult to find people in remote villages who have never been to their District Centre. It could take two hours to get to the house of the head of the village or 4 hours to get to the sub district administrative centre. And then sometimes as much as six hours to reach the District capital..
The recognised equivalent of our Town Councils, such as Darabin in East Timor would be these 13 Districts.
When considering Local Government in East Timor, most people would say they belong to hamlets, villages or sub districts well before they identify with a District. In fact it is not difficult to find people in remote villages who have never been to their District Centre. It could take two hours to get to the house of the head of the village or 4 hours to get to the sub district administrative centre. And then sometimes as much as six hours to reach the District capital..
33. 3. Best human intelligence comes from CIMIC
Avoid a false division between intelligence and civil affairs staff – coordinate.
4. Longevity
Leave CIMIC teams in location for as long as possible. Trust requires time.
5. Language
Less important than trust, respect and integrity.
But, a good interpreter is essential.
34. 6. Listen and Learn
Military forces will leave.
Local population will trust those who listen to them.
7. Sustainability
Avoid projects that cannot be sustained when the military depart. No dependencies!
8. Opportunity Cost
Military should only do what civilian agencies and NGOs cannot.
Handover to civilian agencies asap.
35. 9. Force Protection
Enhanced by being close to the people.
Don’t become isolated from the community.
10. IHL and Customs
Always respect local customs and traditions.
Know and apply IHL at all times.
11. Media
Use primarily for the benefit of the local people, not to enhance your unit’s reputation at home.
36. 12. Cooperate with Civil Authorities
Do not control, except when security demands.
Influence and shape decisions by being part of the team – at all levels of governance.
Support police.
13. Understand NGOs
Don’t jeopardise their integrity and security.
Respect their neutrality and impartiality
Protect their information.
Never assume that one NGO represents all NGOs.
37. Summary – Key Messages CIMIC is a two-way street - the military is one of many actors
CIMIC is fundamental to all military operations
The best CIMIC is convergence between the “battlespace” and the “humanitarian space”
Effective CIMIC has the host population at the centre of gravity
38. Questions? Thank you for your attention, and it is with considerable relief that I now turn the spot-light on you.Thank you for your attention, and it is with considerable relief that I now turn the spot-light on you.
